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ABSTRACT

RISK QUADRUPLET: INTEGRATING ASSESSMENTS OF THREAT,
VULNERABILITY, CONSEQUENCE, AND PERCEPTION FOR HOMELAND
SECURITY AND HOMELAND DEFENSE
Kara Norman Hill
Old Dominion University, 2012
Director: Adrian Gheorghe

"Where there is much to risk, there is much to consider."
- Platen
Risk for homeland security and homeland defense is often considered to be a function
of threat, vulnerability, and consequence. But what is that function? And are we defining
and measuring these terms consistently? Threat, vulnerability, and consequence
assessments are conducted, often separately, and data from one assessment could be
drastically different from that of another due to inconsistent definitions of terms and
measurements, differing data collection methods, or varying data sources. It has also long
been a challenge to integrate these three disparate assessments to establish an overall
picture of risk to a given asset. Further, many agencies conduct these assessments and there
is little to no sharing of data, methodologies, or results vertically (between federal, state,
and local decision-makers) or horizontally (across the many different sectors), which
results in duplication of efforts and conflicting risk assessment results.
Obviously, risk is a function of our perceptions and those perceptions can influence our
understanding of threat, vulnerability, and consequence. Some assessments rely on
perceptions (elicited from subject matter experts) in order to qualify or quantify threat,

vulnerability, and consequence. Others exclude perception altogether, relying on objective
data, if available. Rather than fault the subjectivity of our perceptions, or muddle objective
assessments with personal opinions, it makes sense to embrace our perceptions, but
segregate them as a unique component of risk.
A risk quadruplet is proposed to systematically collect and integrate assessments of
threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception, such that each dimension can be
explored uniquely, and such that all four components can be aggregated into an overall risk
assessment in a consistent, transparent, traceable, and reproducible manner. The risk
quadruplet draws from the fields of homeland security, homeland defense, systems
engineering, and even psychology to develop a model of risk that integrates all four
assessments using multicriteria decision analysis. The model has undergone preliminary
validation and has proven to be a viable solution for ranking assets based on the four
proposed components of risk.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
"Suppose a person of the fourth dimension, condescending to visit you, were to say,
'Whenever you open your eyes, you see a plane (which is of two dimensions) and you infer
a solid (which is of three); but in reality you also see (though you do not recognize) a
fourth dimension, which is not color nor brightness nor anything of the kind, but a true
dimension, although I cannot point out to you its direction, nor can you possibly measure
it.' What would you say to such a visitor? Would not you have him locked up? Well, that is
my fate; and it is as natural for us Flatlanders to lock up a Square for preaching the third
dimension, as it is for you Spacelanders to lock up a Cube for preaching the fourth. Alas,
how strong a family likeness runs through blind and persecuting humanity in all
dimensions! Points, Lines, Squares, Cubes, Extra-Cubes — we are all liable to the same
errors, all alike the slaves of our respective dimensional prejudices..."
- Edwin A. Abbott, Flatland
Risk, in most contexts, is a two dimensional function of probability and consequences.
Risk, in the field of homeland security and homeland defense, however, is often considered
to be a function in three dimensions: threat, vulnerability, and consequence. And still we
find those three dimensions lacking. This function is not clearly defined and even if we
knew the function, we do not define and measure these terms consistently. These threat,
vulnerability, and consequence assessments are conducted separately; in addition, the
measurements are inconsistently defined, the data collection methods vary, and the data
sources differ. Further, many different agencies conduct these risk assessments and there is
little to no sharing of the data, methodologies, or results vertically (between federal, state,
and local decision-makers) or horizontally (across the many different sectors). This results
in duplication of efforts and conflicting risk assessment results.
In addition to these issues, it is also a challenge to integrate these three disparate
assessments to establish an overall picture of risk to a given asset. There are many different
types of risk assessments performed on assets and those different assessments explore risk
from different perspectives. Is the asset a critical power plant, essential to electricity
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generation? Is it a large dam, critical to the water supply? Is it a major road, critical to
transportation? Or is it a major tourist attraction, critical to national morale? Or, like the
Hoover Dam, is it all of these things? Which risk assessment is right? How can all of these
risk assessments be integrated? Are certain risk assessments more important than others?
Obviously, risk is a function of our perceptions and those perceptions can influence our
understanding of threat, vulnerability, and consequence. Furthermore, our perceptions may
not always agree with the results of our risk assessments. While some assessments rely
solely on perceptions in order to qualify or quantify threat, vulnerability, and consequence,
other assessments seek to exclude perception altogether from the assessment process,
relying on objective data. Rather than fault the subjectivity of our perceptions, or muddle
our objective assessments with personal opinions, it makes more sense to embrace our
perceptions, but to segregate them as their own unique component of risk. A risk
quadruplet is proposed to systematically collect and integrate assessments of threat,
vulnerability, consequence, and perception, such that each dimension can be explored
uniquely, and such that all four components can be aggregated into an overall risk
assessment in a systematic, transparent, traceable, and reproducible manner.
Although it has been argued that risk to our nation can be assessed and quantified
objectively through some application of the homeland security risk triplet (threat,
vulnerability, and consequence), this risk assessment approach does not account for the
type of entity, be it Critical Infrastructure (CI), Key Resource (KR), or Key Asset (KA).
The type of asset being assessed intuitively impacts our perceptions and our perceptions
may even contradict our quantitative risk assessments. Literature reviews reveal that there
is confusion about the definitions of CIKRKA.

3

Many talk about risk as a function of threat, vulnerability, and consequence (National
Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2009; H. H. Willis, 2007). Multiple risk assessments which
seek to assess threat, vulnerability, and consequence to a specific asset or facility could
vary widely. Risk assessments could be based on risk data or perceptions. The data from
one assessment could be drastically different from the data of another assessment; one
assessment could incorporate factors such as whether the risk was voluntary or involuntary,
while another might attempt to calculate risk using traditional risk equations (Turner,
1994).
There is also confusion about the definitions of threat, vulnerability, and consequence,
let alone how to assess those nebulous concepts. The many different definitions of these
concepts can drastically affect risk calculations. Threat could be viewed as a single
scenario, or the likelihood of that scenario. Vulnerability could be seen as a probability, or
it could be viewed as a state of the system, from which conditional probabilities of threat
might be derived. And there are many types of consequences (economic, environmental, or
in some cases loss of life) which must all be assessed in order to give the best possible
overall risk picture. Most of this confusion arises from our inherent perceptions. There is,
inevitably, an element of subjectivity to any risk assessment, and that subjectivity is
currently missing from the risk assessment approach. It only makes sense to integrate our
threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessments with our perceptions into an overall,
improved, risk assessment approach, thus defining a new risk paradigm. A risk quadruplet
is proposed in this dissertation that incorporates threat, vulnerability, consequence, and
perception (Figure 1.1).
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Risk

Threat

Perception

Vulnerability

Consequence

Figure 1.1. Proposed Risk Quadruplet ©

1.1 Research Definitions
Many of the following definitions will be discussed in further detail in the Literature
Review (5.4APPENDIX C). However, below is a list of terms and their intended meanings
when used throughout this research. Some of these definitions are pulled straight from the
literature. Others are modified from definitions provided in official, government
documents, such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Risk Lexicon. All of
these definitions, as they are presented here, reflect the intents and purposes of this
research.
•

Critical Infrastructure: government and private systems essential to the
operation of our nation in any or all aspects of the lives of its citizens (health,
safety, economy, etc.), such as utilities, facilities, pipelines, etc.
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•

Key Resources: public or private resources essential to the operation of our
nation's government and economy, such as fuel or goods.

•

Key Assets: those buildings, geographic regions, monuments, or icons, whose
destruction would cause a crushing blow to our nation's ego, morale, and
identity, but which are not essential to the operation of our nation, such as the
Washington Monument or the Statue of Liberty.

•

Asset: assets are the collective, generalized term used to represent the
combination of all critical infrastructure, key resources, and key assets.

•

Risk Scenario: natural or man-made occurrence, hazard, individual, entity, or
action that has or indicates the potential to damage an asset.

•

Threat: the threat of a risk scenario to an asset. The threat of an intentional
risk scenario is generally estimated as the likelihood of an attack (that
accounts for both the intent and capability of the adversary) being attempted
by an adversary. For other risk scenarios, threat is generally estimated as the
likelihood that the risk scenario will manifest; however, threat can also be
estimated qualitatively as perceived likelihood.

•

Vulnerability: ability of an asset to endure a risk scenario despite physical
features, operational attributes, characteristics of design, location, security
posture, operation, or any combination thereof that renders an asset open to
exploitation or susceptible to a given risk scenario. Vulnerability can be
estimated qualitatively, or quantitatively, as the likelihood of a successful risk
scenario given the risk scenario is identified, which implies that vulnerability
is also related to resilience.

Consequence: effect of a successful risk scenario on an asset. Consequence is
commonly assessed along four factors: human, economic, mission, and
psychological, but may also include other factors such as impact on the
environment; consequence can be measured quantitatively if data exists, but
can also be measured qualitatively either along a set of scales or along a single
integrated consequence scale for which all consequence factors are considered
as a whole.
Risk Perception: subjective judgment about the severity of a risk scenario to
an asset; may be driven by sense, emotion, or personal experience; generally
measured qualitatively; referred to merely as perception throughout this
research.
Risk: potential for an unwanted outcome resulting from a risk scenario, as
determined by the threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception of that
risk scenario to an asset. Risk is often measured and used to compare different
future situations, as well as to rank assets for the purposes of risk mitigation
and budgeting for emergency preparedness, response, and recovery.
Systems: comprised of interrelated or interdependent objects. Systems exhibit
holistic properties not necessarily evident at the level of individual objects or
subsystems; seek to achieve some final goal or state, and in order to reach this
goal they transform inputs into outputs; tend to devolve into entropy without
regulation and are typically organized in a hierarchical system of nested
subsystems where the subsystems are specialized with different functions
within the system. Systems either diverge, in which case it has many ways of

achieving a single goal, or converge, where, from an initial state, it could
achieve many different goals (Skyttner, 2005).
•

System of Systems: possess the same definition as systems, but on a larger
scale. For a hierarchy of systems, in which systems are components or
subsystems of other systems; component systems each have a purpose of their
own and would continue to operate even if separated from the overall system.
Each component system is managed individually, rather than being managed
within the context of the entire system of systems. System of systems often
exhibit characteristics of complexity and widespread geographic distribution.
The combination of several interdependent CI showing the characteristics of a
single system, but lack an overarching management entity (Gheorghe, Masera,
& Voeller, 2008; Maier, 1998; Skyttner, 2005).

1.2 Research Purpose
The risk quadruplet consists of three phases (Figure 1.2). The first phase is the
perception assessment. The second phase consists of threat, vulnerability, and consequence
assessments. The final phase is the assessment integration phase, where the assessments of
threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception are all assimilated. These phases will be
discussed in greater detail in CHAPTER 3.
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L.

Perception
Assessment

Threat, Vulnerability,
and Consequence
Assessments

Assessment
Integration

v
Figure 1.2. Risk Quadruplet Phases ©

The purpose of this research, as shown in Figure 1.3, is three-fold. First, it is necessary
to determine how to assess the perceptions of CIKRKA given a risk scenario. We are less
concerned with the perception data, itself, or even with which method is considered the best
way to collect perception data; rather, we are concerned with integrating perception data,
once collected, with threat, vulnerability, and consequence data. It is assumed that data for
the threat, vulnerability, consequence, and even perception could be leveraged from
previous assessments, collected as part of the research, or simulated, if necessary, in order
to demonstrate the viability of the risk quadruplet methodology.
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Assess
perce

Deterjjiip.« a risk
1
'

Rank CIKRKA
based oo

Figure 1.3. Research Purpose

Next, an integrated risk quadruplet assessment methodology must be researched. The
belief is that the currently accepted homeland security risk triplet (threat, vulnerability, and
consequence) is inadequate for characterizing risk to CIKRKA and that a risk quadruplet
should be explored to incorporate perception into the current risk assessment approach. But
exactly how those components of risk are integrated must be decided. The improved risk
assessment integration methodology, based on threat, vulnerability, consequence, and
perception assessments, will be developed and presented. This methodology will
systematically integrate all four assessments in a meaningful, traceable, and reproducible
approach.
The end result will be a ranking of CIKRKA, based on the risk quadruplet
methodology. This will allow for a more comprehensive ranking of these disparate entities
along multiple risk scales. This ranking system will improve resource allocation for risk
mitigation efforts in support of homeland security and homeland defense missions. Figure
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1.4 gives a mind map of the different areas covered by this research. It depicts how these
seemingly disparate fields are related when exploring risk to CIKRKA. It also reiterates the
goal of the research, which is to ultimately integrate threat, vulnerability, consequence, and
perception assessments of CIKRKA using systems engineering techniques such as risk
analysis and Multi Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA).

Research Areas

Homeland Security

Homeland Defense

Systems Engineering/
System of Systems Engineering

/Crifelv

^

Infrastructure

Risk Analysis

Psychology

Risk Perception
(Perception Assessment)

MCDA

^rotectigp

IV

Analytical
Hierarchy

Threat
Assessment

alytical
Network

Inerability
A ssessment

nsequence
sessment

Multi Attribute
Utility Theory

Evidential
Reasoning

Figure 1.4. Mind Map of Research Areas

Psychometric
Model
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1.3 Research Questions and Assumptions
The research will seek to address the two questions presented in Figure 1.5. These
questions, and their associated assumptions, are the culmination of an intensive Literature
Review (5.4APPENDIX C), which highlighted a number of issues and questions that
require resolution in the field of risk analysis for homeland security and homeland defense.
There remains confusion about the definitions of CIKRKA. Definitions of threat,
vulnerability, and consequence are also inconsistent and do not offer reliable modes of
measurement. Perceptions are included haphazardly, often jumbled with threat,
vulnerability, and consequence assessments, if they are included at all, which is why the
homeland security risk triplet is inadequate. Risk calculation methods can be
mathematically misleading and while risk assessments seek objectivity instead of
embracing subjectivity, perceptions may contradict risk assessment results. Lastly, the
current methodology for integrating threat, vulnerability, and consequence is undefined,
leaving analysts to assimilate the results of these disparate assessments indiscriminately,
making it impossible to compare assets against each other on the same risk scale.
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Figure 1.5. Research Questions and Assumptions

Question 1
What perception methodologies exist that can be applied to CIKRKA? Can a perception
model be applied to CIKRKA, and if so, how? Do we only seek perceptions from
homeland defense and homeland security experts? Do we include risk experts? Do we
include regular citizens since the consequences of threats to CIKRKA could affect them?
Can we apply the model to each category separately, using a blocked experimental design?
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Does the type of entity at risk (CI, KR, or KA) have an effect on perception? Perception
models, such as the Social Amplification of Risk Framework, the Cultural Theory Model,
and the Psychometric Model will be explored.
We must assume that a perception methodology exists which can be applied to
CIKRKA. Then, assuming that methodology exists and can be exploited to obtain
perception data, we would need to integrate that data with data from threat, vulnerability,
and consequence assessments. We will explore a number of MCDA approaches to integrate
the four components of risk proposed by the risk quadruplet.

Question 2
How can MCDA be used to integrate threat, vulnerability, consequence, and
perception into a comprehensive risk quadruplet methodology to rank CIKRKA? Could
perception be incorporated into a new risk quadruplet for an improved, overall risk
assessment methodology, and if so, how? What is the best way to integrate the results of
threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception assessments? MCDA models, such as
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), Analytic Network Process (ANP), Multi Attribute
Utility Theory (MAUT), or Evidential Reasoning (ER) will be explored.
What is the output of such a risk assessment approach? An overall risk score, a ranked
list of CIKRKA, or both? Could this be applied to items other than CIKRKA? For
example, could this approach be used to rank regions or sectors? Could regions or sectors
be added as additional criteria in the MCDA model? Or would this methodology only give
us a single value for each CI, KR, or KA, in which case how do we integrate those resulting
scores across dependent and interdependent CIKRKA. We must assume that the
application of this risk quadruplet, which will employ MCDA to integrate threat,
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vulnerability, consequence, and perception assessments, and would result in a ranked list of
CIKRKA which could be used to better inform decision makers about the risks to multiple
assets.

1.4 Research Significance
There are two main contributions proposed for this research (Figure 1.6). First, this
research will present an MCDA model for integrating assessments of threat, vulnerability,
consequence, and perception, incorporating them all into a risk quadruplet assessment
approach. Second, this research will produce a methodology for deploying the risk
quadruplet model, to include a means for collecting perception data for CIKRKA, and then
integrating it with threat, vulnerability, and consequence data.

Contribution
Development of a
risk quadruplet model
to integrate threat,
vulnerability,
consequence, and
perception

' S,

Development of a
methodology for
deploying that risk
quadruplet model

Figure 1.6. Research Contributions

1.5 Research Limitations Overview
There are some limitations to this research related to data access or collection, model
selections, and technology. A perception assessment model must be selected that will
ultimately produce results compatible with the MCDA model selected. Threat,
vulnerability, consequence, and perception data will need to be leveraged, collected, or
simulated, and again those data must be compatible with the selected MCDA model. And,

of course, an MCDA model must be selected from a number of potential options. Finally,
the research is at the mercy of the technology available to conduct the assessments, as well
as to integrate the assessments during the third phase of the risk quadruplet methodology.
All of these limitations are discussed in detail in 5.4APPENDIX B.
In addition to those limitations, there is one additional limitation to be addressed. It
would be ideal to validate the risk quadruplet methodology in vivo or in the real world,
using real data, collected anew, with a full scale model of multiple CIKRKA to compare
and rank. However, due to the constraints of scope, cost, and schedule, this type of model
verification and validation is beyond the scope of our research. Instead, we intend to
explore this model in vitro, literally in a petri dish, although in our case, the petri dish is a
computer. Given that one of our research contributions is to develop a methodology for
deploying the risk quadruplet model, we cannot ignore the in vivo aspect of this research,
so we will address data collection methodologies that could be employed in the real world,
including surveys and a simplified version of the risk quadruplet model that could be
generalized and adapted to more complex problems in the future. Additionally, we will
offer a parallel in vitro risk quadruplet methodology viability testing solution (Figure 1.7)
that directly corresponds to the in vivo approach. The in vitro approach will rely on
simulated data to emulate the real world, a series of risk quadruplet model examples that
can be analyzed and compared in order to offer insight into reality, sensitivity analyses, and
a preliminary verification and validation of the risk quadruplet model. This will allow us to
explore the in vitro risk quadruplet model without risking the exposure of sensitive (in
vivo) information that might otherwise jeopardize the very CIKRKA we seek to protect.
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In Vivo

In Vitro

• Perception Assessment
Threat, Vulnerability, and
Conseq

• Perception Data Simulation

Figure 1.7. Risk Quadruplet Viability Testing Options: In Vivo versus In Vitro

The risk quadruplet methodology proposed in CHAPTER 3 (and further described in
5.4APPENDIX D) is the methodology which would be used in vivo. The in vitro solution
is also presented in CHAPTER 3 and is crafted to parallel the in vivo methodology. Ideally,
future research would verify and validate the risk quadruplet methodology in vivo, based
on the lessons learned in vitro. The exploration of research limitations provided in
5.4APPENDIX B is limited to the in vivo application of the model, as the in vitro viability
testing does not have the same limitations.
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CHAPTER 2
CURRENT STATE ASSESSMENT
"The first step in the risk management process is to acknowledge the reality of risk. Denial
is a common tactic that substitutes deliberate ignorance for thoughtful planning."
- Charles Tremper
We conducted an analysis of four areas of literature related to this research
(5.4APPENDIX C). First, we explored national risks, focusing on the evolution of
homeland security, the definitions of risk and related terms, and the classification of
CIKRKA in the United States (US). Next we explored international risks, specifically an
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) report on risk
management for six countries and the annual global risks reports issued by the World
Economic Forum (WEF) since 2006. The international perspective also presented a
smattering of risk management programs, tools, assessment techniques, as well as
visualizations for communicating risk. Delving into Systems Engineering and System of
Systems Engineering, we explored whether CIKRKA could be considered systems or
system of systems. Finally, we reviewed the risk analysis literature, focusing on risk
calculation and risk perception.
We saw problems with risk definitions and calculations when exploring how risk is
addressed in a global context. The international community does rely on risk perception for
large scale risk assessments, perhaps to a fault, as other threat, vulnerability, and
consequence data are likely available. The approach to risk communication is elegant and
appears to be more advanced than what we see at the national level. Clear visualizations are
used to describe the complex and numerous dimensions associated with risk, which is often
described as a function of likelihood and consequence, although sometimes multiple
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consequence scales were explored (economic versus human loss), and sometimes other risk
dimensions were visualized, such as the degree of consensus for the risk or the degree of
correlation between risks.
From a national perspective, risk is considered to be a function of threat, vulnerability,
and consequence. Numerous government documents exist to describe risk, threat,
vulnerability, consequence, perception, and CIKRKA, such as executive orders,
presidential decision directives, acts, homeland security presidential directives, as well as
national strategies, guidelines, and plans. We analyzed all of these documents, specifically
looking at how risk is defined for homeland security. We noted that risk definitions,
including threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception, were inconsistent. Further, the
lack of clear definitions complicated the description of risk calculations, making it difficult
to know exactly how to go about conducting risk assessments. The definitions of CIKRKA
were equally muddled, and the term KA has been abandoned by DHS, although we argue
that it should be resurrected as it is a distinct type of asset. Perception was not formally
included in the risk assessment process for CIKRKA, even though DHS was criticized for
not including diverse perceptions of risk impacts in its approach to risk management.
In reviewing the system and system of systems analysis literature, we acknowledge that
a system of systems analysis approach seems both logical and necessary for exploring the
dependencies and interdependencies, not only within each CIKR sector, which in and of
itself is a system of systems, but also between these CIKR systems, analyzing their
vulnerabilities, and planning for their protection as a whole. However, this approach might
not be appropriate for KA, which are dependent on CIKR system of systems, but which are
not, themselves, typically components of the greater system of systems. In fact, we
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conclude that further research is necessary to determine whether KA are systems and
whether traditional risk assessments as performed on systems should be applied to KA.
After examining the literature for risk analysis, we see that risk is traditionally
calculated separately from studies of risk perception. Similar to what we saw in our review
of international risks, risk is often calculated as the product of the probability that a risk
event will occur (likelihood) and the magnitude of the consequences should the risk event
occur. Therefore, the function for risk in homeland security (a triplet of threat,
vulnerability, and consequence) is already deviating from

the normal approach.

Furthermore, an exploration of the calculation used in homeland security reveals some
potential mathematical pitfalls. Moving on to risk perception, we note that there have been
no attempts to integrate formal perception assessments into the overall risk assessment
process. Often, perceptions are incorporated in an ad hoc, haphazard manner, where subject
matter expert opinions are elicited for all components of risk (threat, vulnerability, and
consequence) or are included alongside quantitative data for threat, vulnerability, and
consequence, but the methodology is inconsistent and the parts of the overall risk score
attributed to perception versus actual data cannot be extracted. We need a way to
systematically incorporate subject matter expertise, or even public opinion, alongside actual
data (no matter how limited that data may be). This way, sensitivity analyses can be
conducted to determine how much of the overall risk score is being driven by our
perceptions, which will aid in the decision-making process, as well as the risk
communication process.
All of this research shows a clear gap in the literature that the risk quadruplet will fill.
We propose separating perception from threat, vulnerability, and consequence, as its own
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attribute of risk. We would collect data for threat, vulnerability, and consequence and then
integrate that data with data collected from perception assessments. The resulting risk
quadruplet will offer a transparent, reproducible, and systematic methodology for
integrating perception with threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessment data to
improve risk calculation for homeland security, resulting in an overall ranking of CIKRKA.
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CHAPTER3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
"People who don't take risks generally make about two big mistakes a year.
People who do take risks generally make about two big mistakes a year."
- Peter F. Drucker
The research methodology consists of a number of steps that relate to the three phases
of the risk quadruplet (Figure 1.2), including the selection of the model used to conduct the
perception assessment in the first phase, the decision to leverage existing assessment data
or conduct new threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessments in the second phase, as
well as the selection of the model which will integrate these four assessments in the third,
and final, phase. It also covers the research purpose (Figure 1.3), the research questions and
assumptions (Figure 1.5), as well as the research contributions (Figure 1.6). It addresses the
research limitations, including whether to test the viability of the risk quadruplet in vivo or
in vitro (Figure 1.7), and it details the risk quadruplet methodologies for both approaches.
Finally, the research methodology addresses the sensitivity analyses along with the
preliminary verification and validation of the risk quadruplet model (in vitro). A
comprehensive description of the entire risk quadruplet research methodology is given in
Figure 3.1.
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• Simulate all data
• ER with IDS
•Viability Testing
• Sensitivity Analysis
• Verification, Validation, and
Accreditation

Figure 3.1. Research Methodology
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The research methodology begins with the first purpose of the research, to assess risk
perceptions of C1KRKA. In order to do this, we addressed the first research question,
"What risk perception methodologies exist that can be applied to CIKRKA?" and its
assumption, that "there exists a risk perception methodology that can be applied to
CIKRKA". To address this, we reviewed a number of risk perception models, including the
Social Amplification of Risk, the Cultural Theory Model, as well as the Psychometric
Model. Details of this review can be found in 5.4APPENDIX B. After reviewing these
models, it was decided that the Psychometric Model was best suited to our needs, however,
it was recognized that it might need to be adapted as we explored other aspects of the risk
quadruplet methodology, such as the model selected for the assessment integration. Thus
we had defined the first phase of the risk quadruplet methodology.
The second phase of the risk quadruplet methodology consists of the threat,
vulnerability, and consequence assessments. It was assumed that threat, vulnerability, and
consequence data could be leveraged from prior assessments, or could be collected in new
assessments. Either way, it appeared that the data could easily be fit to the risk quadruplet
model. An obvious limitation of the research is acquiring access to this sensitive data.
Whether leveraging old assessments or conducting new ones, CIKRKA assets are, by their
very definitions, considered important or critical to national operations or morale. Even if
permission is granted to collect threat, vulnerability, and consequence data on such assets,
that data is likely to be categorized as sensitive information and therefore not publicly
available. This is detrimental to research endeavors. Furthermore, conducting multiple
assessments, in addition to the perception assessment, would adversely affect the scope and
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schedule of this research. These research limitations are addressed through alternative risk
quadruplet approaches later in the research methodology.
The second purpose of this research is to determine a methodology for integrating
threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception assessments, which directly relates to the
third phase of the risk quadruplet (assessment integration). This also directly relates to our
second research question and its associated assumption. The second research question is,
"how can MCDA be used to integrate threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception
into a comprehensive risk quadruplet methodology to rank CIKRKA?" The second
assumption is that "there exists a MCDA methodology which can integrate threat,
vulnerability, consequence, and perception into a comprehensive risk quadruplet
methodology to rank CIKRKA". We reviewed four MCDA models: AHP, ANP, MAUT,
and ER. The best candidate for our purposes was ER. Once we selected the assessment
integration model, we realized that the outputs of a traditional Psychometric Model (from
the first phase of the risk quadruplet) might not be immediately compatible with our
assessment integration model (ER), so we adopted a simplified psychometric survey
instead of a lull blown Psychometric Model.
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The methodology also includes the definition of the risk quadruplet model for our
research (Figure 3.2). The risk quadruplet model consists of alternatives, which in our case
is a set of CIKRKA assets. Further defining the model, we have a parent attribute denoted
as risk (the overall value we are seeking to calculate), as well as child attributes (threat,
vulnerability, consequence, and perception), all of which are part of the risk function. We
also define grades for the child attributes, as they relate to the alternatives, using a linguistic
set (none, very low, low, medium, high, very high). Weights are chosen to relate the child
attributes to the parent attribute. Utilities are assigned to relate the grades to the parent
attribute. The first set of belief degrees relates grades to the parent and child attributes. In
other words, does the linguistic set choice of none for threat, vulnerability, consequence,
and perception directly correlate to a linguistic set choice of none for the parent attribute of
risk? What about the choice of very low? If so, the belief degrees assigned to relate those
relationships would be higher than those relating a grade of none for a child attribute to a
grade of high for the parent attribute.
The second set of belief degrees are derived from the assessment data and are used to
relate grades to the alternatives within each child attribute. For the perception assessment,
the belief degrees are the proportions calculated based on how many respondents selected
each of the linguistic set choices. The perception assessment will be discussed later in the
research methodology, as will the number and types of respondents providing perception
data. For the threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessments, the belief degrees would
be translated to the linguistic set if the data was leveraged from historical assessments, or
that data could be collected in a new set of assessments using the linguistic set.
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With the methodology defined, the next problem was how to test its viability. One
option would have been to test it in vivo, but a number of research limitations made that
infeasible. Furthermore, we did not want the first test of this methodology to rely on subject
matter experts and their risk perception data, along with real threat, vulnerability, and
consequence data (all of which, for obvious reasons, could be sensitive). It is more
appropriate to test the risk quadruplet in a safe setting first, in vitro, to ensure that the
details of the methodology are validated, that the models selected perform as expected, and
that the outcome of the entire risk quadruplet produce the desired results (a ranking of
CIKRKA assets from most to least risky, as defined in the third purpose of this research). It
was decided that an in vivo methodology would be proposed in detail, as if we intended to
deploy the risk quadruplet methodology using real data. However, we would actually test
the methodology in vitro, which allowed us the freedom to explore more complex versions
of the risk quadruplet model.
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Figure 3.3. Risk Quadruplet Methodology (In Vivo)

The proposed in vivo risk quadruplet methodology (Figure 3.3) consists of the same
three phases (assessment of perception; assessments of threat, vulnerability, and
consequence; and assessment integration) as previously defined (Figure 1.2). However, we
have included additional details on the approach for deploying this methodology. For the
first phase, we have already discussed the model selected, a simplified psychometric
survey, which we determined would be deployed with a small group of subject matter
experts and stakeholders. In order to conduct this survey, we chose Inquisite, a software
package capable of deploying surveys online and collecting data. Once we had selected the
survey software, we set out to design the questionnaire. This involved a number of steps,
such as selecting a region, risk scenario, and a selection of CIKRKA assets to scope the
survey. We chose the National Capital Region for our area of focus. We also decided to
limit the survey (and thus the overall in vivo model) to three CIKRKA assets, and we chose
an example for each of the assets. For the CI we selected The George Washington
University Hospital in Washington, DC, for the KR we selected motor gasoline in the state
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of VA, and for the KA we selected the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, DC. Information
on these choices was included in the survey. Additionally, to further scope the survey and
model, we selected a single risk scenario, a tornado, for which we provided pertinent data
describing likelihood and consequences of that risk scenario in the selected region. We also
chose a linguistic set for the survey responses (none, very low, low, medium, high, very
high), which would be consistent with the ER model we developed. In order to provide data
compatible with our ER model, we knew that we would need to collect the proportion of
responses for each of the linguistic set choices for each of the CIKRKA assets, so the final
step for this phase of the risk quadruplet model would be to analyze the survey results and
determine those proportions.
The proposed in vivo methodology continues with the second phase, where it is
assumed that the data for threat, vulnerability, and consequence could be leveraged from
previous assessments, or that those assessments could be conducted. The goal of the risk
quadruplet is not to determine how to conduct these assessments, as they are already being
conducted and many approaches already exist for doing so. Rather, the point of the risk
quadruplet is to determine how to integrate these assessments with the perception
assessment we proposed for the first phase of the methodology.
Therefore, the final phase of the in vivo risk quadruplet methodology focuses on
integrating these assessments. The ER model is defined with the three alternatives
(CIKRKA assets) used in the Inquisite survey. The parent attribute and child attributes,
weights, utilities, and belief degrees are also defined. And the final belief degrees would be
input into the model based on the data collected from the perception, threat, vulnerability,
and consequence assessments.
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Finally, IDS was the software selected for implementing the ER model, so the
alternatives, attributes, weights, utilities, and belief degrees would be input into IDS for
analysis. With the choices for all three phases of the research defined, we have developed
the in vivo risk quadruplet methodology which combines a simplified psychometric survey
to collect perception data, leveraged or collected threat, vulnerability, and consequence
data, along with an ER model to integrate all four assessments together.

mmm
Respondents: 100 Simulated
Respondents
Data: Simulated

Data: Simulated
Data Analysis: Proportions as
Belief Degrees for Grades

Model: ER
•Alternatives: 9 CIKRKA
•Parent Attribute: Risk
•Child Attributes: Threat,
Vulnerability, Consequence,
and Perception
Software: IDS
Output: Ranked Alternatives

Figure 3.4. Risk Quadruplet Methodology (In Vitro)

The in vitro risk quadruplet methodology (Figure 3.4) consists of the same three phases
as the in vivo risk quadruplet methodology; however, there are some obvious differences.
For the first phase of the in vitro approach, we simulated the perception assessment data
using 100 simulated respondents. We chose the triangular distribution to simulate this
information as we were looking for a range of possible linguistic set choices across
multiple respondents. From this data, we were able to determine the number of responses
for each of the linguistic set choices for each CIKRKA asset to be used in the assessment
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integration phase. Rather than rely on leveraging or collecting data for threat, vulnerability,
and consequence data in the second phase, we simulated this data, as well. We used the
uniform distribution for this data simulation, as we are not seeking to simulate more than
one response for each of the linguistic set choices for this data, we just need one choice for
each asset as these assessments would only be conducted once in the real world. For
example, we would not expect to conduct multiple threat assessments for each CIKRKA
asset. Lastly, the assessment integration phase remains fairly similar to the in vivo
approach. However, since we are not constrained to the limits of the survey respondents,
we increase the number of alternatives to nine hypothetical assets (three CI, three KR, and
three KA). The attributes remain the same, as do the grades, weights, utilities, and parentchild belief degrees. The belief degrees relating the alternatives to the child attributes are
input based on the simulated data from the first two phases (the proportions calculated from
the simulated respondents for the perception data and the simulated data for the threat,
vulnerability, and consequence data). The same software, IDS, would be used to analyze
the results.
The resulting analysis from both the in vivo methodology, as well as the in vitro
viability testing, would provide a ranked output of CIKRKA assets (alternatives) based on
their parent attribute scores (risk), which, incidentally, is the third purpose of this research.
The first contribution defined for this research was to develop a risk quadruplet model to
integrate threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception assessments, and this model
was, indeed, developed, and further tested in vitro. The second contribution of this research
was to develop a methodology for deploying the risk quadruplet model, and we have
crafted an in vivo methodology which could be used as is, or easily adapted, to deploy the
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risk quadruplet model. While the methodology was not actually deployed, aspects of the
methodology along with the model, itself, were tested successfully in vitro .Sensitivity
analyses and preliminary verification and validation of the risk

quadruplet model

demonstrates the viability of the risk quadruplet methodology.

ment

Ranked iuirastracturi

Figure 3.5. Risk Quadruplet Methodology

The generalized risk quadruplet methodology (whether in vivo or in vitro) is given in
Figure 3.5. Further information on the perception and MCDA model selections, as well as
the software selections, and research limitations can be found in 5.4APPENDLX B. The
details of the in vivo methodology can be found in 5.4APPENDIX D. A text version of the
Inquisite survey can be found in 5.4APPENDIX E and an Informed Consent Document,
which would be provided to respondents participating in the survey, can be found in
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5.4APPENDIX F. The details of the in vitro data simulation can be found in
5.4APPENDIX G. Lastly, the details and results of the in vitro viability testing, along with
sensitivity analyses and a preliminary verification and validation of the risk quadruplet
model, can be found in CHAPTER 4.
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CHAPTER4
RISK QUADRUPLET VIABILITY TESTING (IN VITRO)
"If we don't succeed, we run the risk of failure."
- Dan Quayle
The goals of this research are to assess perceptions of CIKRKA, determine a
methodology for integrating threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessments with a
CIKRKA perception assessment, and to ultimately rank those CIKRKA accordingly. The
in vitro approach for testing the viability of the risk quadruplet methodology relies on
simulated data. However, this research is still informative and allows us to explore how the
model behaves prior to an in vivo deployment of the methodology. Even the way in which
we simulate the data can be done to mimic our in vivo methodology. For example, the
perception data is simulated as if 100 respondents were surveyed, a sample size that would
not have been easily achievable during this research. Furthermore, we increase the
complexity of the model by introducing additional CIKRKA assets (alternatives), which
would have made the in vivo perception data collection much more tedious. Figure 3.4
shows how the risk quadruplet methodology differs only slightly during the in vitro
viability testing when compared to Figure 3.3 which shows our in vivo risk quadruplet
methodology.
With IDS we are able to build an ER model for the risk quadruplet using a combination
of collected perception data and simulated threat, vulnerability, and consequence data. A
model was described in IDS, consisting of nine alternatives (CIKRKA), and four child
attributes (threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception) nested under an overall
parent attribute (risk). The model also uses weighting (to determine the contribution of the
child attributes to the parent attribute), utilities (to determine the relationship between the
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grades and the child attributes), and two sets of belief degrees (one to relate the grades of
child and parent attributes, the other to determine the beliefs held for the grades selected
within each child attribute for each alternative).
It is important to note that while this model is relatively simple, it is extensible and
could easily handle additional layers of complexity from an increase in the number of
alternatives under study, to a more complex description of the parent and child attributes
(perhaps breaking the perception attribute into two sub-categories for public versus private
risk perception assessments). However, as Albert Einstein is famous for saying,
"Everything should be as simple as possible, but not simpler." His opinion is echoed in the
world of modeling, as well, when Vamanu claims that "model complexity does not
necessarily [...] contribute to model quality," (Vamanu, Gheorghe, Acasandrei, &
Vamanu, 2011). The beauty of ER, and the IDS software for implementing ER, is its
simple structure, which can be organized into countless combinations of attributes and
alternatives making it easy to implement, but capable of handling complex problems
without overcomplicating them.
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Alternative Name
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•KR1
•KA1
•CI 2

Threat
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Consequence
Perception
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Figure 4.1. Risk Quadruplet Model (In Vitro)

An example of how this model appears in IDS is shown in Figure 4.1. In the IDS model
display window, users can opt to select View > Dialog Box View to see a more visual
version of the model (Figure 4.2). Each alternative is shown in yellow and has three boxes
for displaying the alternative name at the top, its ranking in the bottom left, and its attribute
score in the bottom right (depending on which attribute was selected at the time; in this
case the parent attribute of risk was selected). Each attribute is shown in blue and also
includes three boxes for displaying the attribute name at the top, its weight in the bottom
left, and its average score in the bottom right.
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Figure 4.2. Dialog Box View

Each of the attributes (threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception) were defined
in IDS as qualitative, so as to grade them using the same linguistic scale. Future research
would be necessary to decide whether to define any of the attributes as quantitative, but ER
can integrate both qualitative and quantitative data, and IDS provides that option when
defining attributes. For example, if the attribute is defined as quantitative, then the user can
also decide whether it is a certain or uncertain attribute. This is useful for defining
stochastic quantitative attributes, which could be random variables with some underlying
distribution, may be difficult to assess, or could suffer from missing data ("IDS
Multicriteria Assessor Quick Guide," 2010).
Utilities for the overall or parent attribute (risk) were assigned to these grades (from our
linguistic set of none, very low, low, medium, high, and very high) as shown in Table 4.1.
The utilities were chosen arbitrarily, but it may be worth exploring, during future research,
how to assess and incorporate the utilities of those providing inputs for the ER model.
These values could easily be revised in future iterations of the model. For our purposes, a

39

risk grade of none would be ideal and thus would receive a Utility of 1. The remaining
grades were ranked accordingly. Utilities, unlike probabilities, need not sum to 1.
Table 4.1. Grades and Utilities

None
Very Low
Low
Medium
High
Very High

1
.9
.7
.5
.3
.1

To relate parent and child attributes, the following belief degrees were used for each
child (threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception). These values could also be
adjusted easily in future iterations of the model. For example, if the child grade of threat is
very low, that could relate to a parent grade of none, very low, and low risk with belief
degrees of .25, .50, and .25, respectively. However, in the interest of keeping this model
simple, belief degrees were assigned using the identity matrix (Table 4.2). These belief
degrees that relate the parent and child grades are not the same belief degrees that are
selected by respondents during data collection when they chose the grade they deem
appropriate for a given combination of alternative and attribute.
Table 4.2. Belief Degrees for Relating Parent and Child Grades
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Weights are then used to relate the child attributes to the parent attribute. This can be
done using visual scoring or using a pairwise comparison of attributes. Again, future
versions of the model could work with respondents or subject matter experts to complete
the pairwise comparison approach provided with the IDS software, which is basically an
AHP approach for weighting the child attributes. For the in vitro viability testing, we used
the visual scoring approach, selected normalized to ensure the weights added to 1, and
while the weights initially started as equal (.25, .25, .25, and .25), it was realized that
perception might not be considered equally important as the other attributes by
stakeholders. Therefore, we will explore a version of the model for which the perception
attribute weight was set to be approximately half as important as the other attributes (where
the other attributes were weighted equally) as shown in Figure 4.3. Other versions of the
model will be explored during the Sensitivity Analysis.
Relative Weights of Attributes
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Figure 4.3. Attribute Weights Using Visual Scoring (Low Perception)

The details of the simulations used to create perception, threat, vulnerability, and
consequence data are provided in 5.4APPENDIX G. The following perception data set was
the result of the perception assessment simulation (Table 4.3). The simulated data for
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threat, vulnerability, and consequence is provided in Table 4.4. This data was input into
IDS using the data input dialog box (Figure D.8).
Table 4.3. Perception Grades and Belief Degrees

0.01
0.06
0.20
0.32
0.37
0.04

0.04
0.20
0.38
0.25
0.11
0.02

0.10
0.33
0.31
0.18
0.07
0.01

0.10
0.41
0.20
0.13
0.14
0.02

0.05
0.35
0.25
0.21
0.14
0.00

0.05
0.06
0.21
0.27
0.38
0.03

0.01
0.14
0.20
0.40
0.24
0.01

0.06
0.37
0.25
0.19
0.11
0.02

0.29
0.28
0.20
0.17
0.05
0.01

Table 4.4. Threat, Vulnerability, and Consequence Grades and Belief Degrees

Using the simulated data for threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception, the IDS
model can now rank the nine alternatives (CIKRKA) based on the attributes, grades, and
associated utilities, belief degrees, and weights. The user can select Report > Graph
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Ranking within IDS to obtain the overall ranking of alternatives on risk, the parent
attribute (Figure 4.4). The user can also select Report > Visual Comparison to see further
breakdowns of the nine alternatives across the four attributes (Figure 4.10). Figure 4.5
shows a comparison of the nine CIKRXA alternatives based on their respective overall risk
scores. But Figure 4.8 shows this comparison broken down by the attributes of risk (threat,
vulnerability, consequence, and perception).
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Alternative Performances on Selected Attributes
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Figure 4.5. Alternative Performances Across Child Attributes (Low Perception)
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Figure 4.6. KR 1 Grades for Risk Attribute (Low Perception)

Figure 4.6 can be obtained by highlighting the alternative of interest, then selecting

Report > Graph Belief Degree > Att at Alt, where the last selection means, "Attribute at
Alternative", so whichever combination of attribute and alternative are highlighted at the
time this report is run, that is the combination that will be used to create the chart. This
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charts show the breakdown of grades for KR 1 (with the lowest overall risk in the model
for which perception was weighted lower than the other attributes) at the parent attribute
level (risk). This gives an overall distribution of the calculated grades and belief degrees for
risk, based on the grades and belief degrees for the child attributes (threat, vulnerability,
consequence, and perception). Similar charts can also be created to explore the belief
degrees input by respondents on the individual child attributes.
Another interesting chart that is available in IDS is the radar plot. By plotting the values
of all of the child attributes, alongside the parent attribute, it is easy to see which of the
child attributes might be driving the overall risk score. In IDS, users can select Report >

Visual Comparison, then select the Tool Bar button to obtain a menu of options. One of
the options is an icon displaying the type of chart selected, and by clicking on it, users see a
drop-down list of chart types, including the radar plot. The default view of this chart is
three-dimensional, however, clicking the icon that looks like a set of three-dimensional
glasses will recalibrate the view to two dimensions. Because we are exploring nine
alternatives, it may be difficult to compare them all on the same radar plot. However, by
highlighting alternatives and using the Select One, Select Group, Select All, Deselect, and

Draw buttons we are able to explore alternatives individually (Figure 4.7). We can see, for
example, that consequence shows some influence on KA 1, while perception affects KR 2
for the low perception model. Even though this data is simulated, it is still interesting to
explore the results as it is obvious how they could be invaluable to the in vivo risk
quadruplet methodology.
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Figure 4.7. Risk and Attributes Radar Plots by Alternative (Low Perception)

4.1 Sensitivity Analysis
Incidentally, two other versions of the IDS model were created which were identical to
the low perception risk quadruplet model. One version of the model set the perception
attribute weight to be approximately twice as important as the other attributes (where the
other attributes were weighted equally) as shown in Figure 4.8. Another version removed
the perception attribute completely. These alternate models were used strictly for
comparative purposes.
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Relative Weights of Attributes
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Figure 4.8. Attribute Weights Using Visual Scoring (High Perception)

Recalling our low perception model (Figure 4.4), we can now compare it to our high
perception model (Figure 4.9). We see a comparison of the nine CIKRKA alternatives
based on their respective overall risk scores. The model for which perception received a
lower weight and the model for which perception received a higher weight are essentially
identical, aside from the weights of the attributes. The simulated belief degrees input across
the threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception attributes for each of the nine
CIKRKA alternatives remain the same. Therefore these breakdown charts are identical for
each model.
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Figure 4.9. Ranking of Alternatives on Risk Attribute (High Perception)

Figure 4.5 (low perception model) and Figure 4.10 (high perception model) show the
nine CIKRKA alternatives broken down by the attributes of risk (threat, vulnerability,
consequence, and perception). For example, in the high perception model, we see that
threat was assessed highest for KA 1, vulnerability was assessed highest for CI 1,
consequence was assessed highest for both KA 2 and KA 3, and perception was assessed
highest for KA 3. Comparing the two models, we see that in the low perception model, KA
3 did not receive the highest overall risk score even though it was assessed highest for both
consequence and perception; it was ranked 4th. However, in the high perception model, KA
3 moved up in the ranking to 2nd.
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Figure 4.10. Alternative Performances Across Child Attributes (High Perception)

In Table 4.5 we see the threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception attribute
scores for each of the nine CIKRKA alternatives. These child scores remain the same
across all versions of the model because they are based on the simulated belief degrees
input into the model, which are then related to the parent attribute of risk through the
selected belief degrees (based on the identity matrix) and the utilities provided (Table
4.land Table 4.2). The highlighted values show the assets which received the highest child
attribute score. So KA 1 received the highest threat score, CI 1 received the highest
vulnerability score, and KA 2 and KA 3 jointly received the highest consequence score,
whereas KA 3 received the highest perception score.
In the full risk quadruplet model for which the perception attribute was weighted lower
than the other attributes, the overall risk score for CI 1 was 63%. When perception is
weighted higher than the other attributes, the overall risk score for CI 1 was 58%. But when
perception is removed from the model completely, the overall risk score for CI 1 increases
to 66%. Table 4.5 shows the overall risk scores for the reduced model and when compared
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to the risk quadruplet model (whether perception was weighted low or high compared to
the other attributes) all of the CIKRKA alternatives were impacted by the removal of the
perception attribute.
Table 4.5. Risk Quadruplet Model Output Comparison
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Another interesting comparison is to explore the rank order of the CIKRKA across the
three different models. In Table 4.6 we see how the CIKRKA rank changes as the
perception attribute is varied. This helps us to visualize how the scores are impacted by
perception and why that attribute cannot be ignored in our overall assessment of risk, but
should be included in such a way that we can determine how the overall score is impacted
by perception and by how much. There are only three assets (KA 1, KR 2, and KR 3)
whose risk remains ranked the same across all three models. Other assets swing wildly
from a rank of 2 to a rank of 7, in the cases of CI 1 and KA 3.

Table 4.6. Risk Quadruplet Model Ranking Comparison

By incorporating perception into the overall risk score, we have influenced the risk
score and risk rank for these CIKRKA, which, for the purposes of this methodology, is
exactly what we want to see as the entire point of the risk quadruplet is to account for the
discrepancy between reality and perception in a systematic, transparent, and reproducible
manner. With this approach, we can see exactly how perception is affecting the overall risk
score and we also know exactly how the perception attribute is being factored into the
overall risk score (based on the visual scoring method for weighting the attributes). This
cannot be said of any other risk analysis approach, and certainly none used for ranking
assets in homeland security or homeland defense. Future research, might shed some light
on how the selected weights, utilities, and parent-child belief degrees affect the influence of
perception on the parent attribute of risk.

IDS also offers some built-in sensitivity analyses. Figure 4.11 displays a trade-off
analysis chart, found under Sensitivity > Trade-Off Analysis, which shows the overall
risk scores for the nine CIKRKA alternatives, as well as the perceived scores for the low
perception model. We see that the overall risk score for KA 3 was 60% even though it was
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perceived to be 78%, whereas the overall risk score for CI 1 was approximately 63% while
it was only perceived to be 48%.
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Figure 4.11. Risk and Perception Trade-Off Analysis (Low Perception)

More formally, IDS can produce sensitivity analyses based on the weighting of
individual attributes, which look at the overall parent attribute ranking, or the rank change,
of alternatives. Users can select the attribute for which they wish to perform sensitivity
analyses (in our case, perception), then click Sensitivity > Change Weight. This brings up
a dialog box where the user can select which alternatives to explore (we selected all of
them). Initially, we are presented with the weights we input for the model as shown in
Figure 4.12 (we conducted our sensitivity analysis from the model for which perception
was weighted higher, but either of the models would be sufficient baseline models for the
analyses). By clicking Ranking, users can manually adjust the weights of the child
attributes to see how that affects the overall ranking of alternatives. Weights do not remain
normalized automatically, so we manually selected weights for the child attributes that
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summed to 1 (Figure 4.13). Adjusting the weights of the child attributes, we can see how
that affects the overall risk scores for the parent attribute across each of the alternatives.
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Figure 4.13. Child Attributes on Ranking (Manually Adjusted)

Alternately, and perhaps more efficiently, by clicking Rank Change, we can produce a
more controlled sensitivity analysis on individual child attributes. The graphic given in
Figure 4.14 displays the overall risk scores for each alternative as the weight of the
perception attribute is varied from 0 through 1 (we adjusted the y-axis scale, used for the
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overall risk score, in order to better see the relationship between the weight for perception
and the risk rankings). Since we conducted this sensitivity analysis from the model for
which perception received a higher weight, that value is displayed as a vertical line,
denoted as "Given weight", on the chart so that users can compare their current alternative
risk scores and rankings to those that would be produced by adjusting the weight for
perception. It is interesting to note that the overall risk score for each asset varies with the
weight of the perception attribute, but it is not a linear relationship. And while the majority
of the alternative risk scores increase as the weight of perception increases, three of the
assets show a negative correlation (CI 1, KA 2, and CI 3).
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IDS can also produce sensitivity analyses of belief degrees based on adjusting the child
attribute weights. From the same dialog box, the user simply selects Belief Degree. We
explored only two alternatives from the model for which perception received a higher
weight: CI 1 and KA 3, ranked lowest and highest on their overall risk scores, respectively
(Figure 4.15). This shows the belief degrees (our simulated data) for the perception
attribute related to the grades (our linguistic set) based on the weights input for the child
attributes of threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception. However, even as we adjust
the child attribute weights, the belief degrees do not change, and with good reason. If we
recall the belief degree values we chose for relating child attributes to parent attributes
(Table 4.2), we used the identity matrix, therefore, the belief degrees input from our
simulated data for the perception attribute would not be impacted by adjusting the child
attribute weights. Obviously, future research could be conducted to better understand how
the belief degrees would change if we used alternative methods for assigning the input
values of our belief degrees to relate parent and child attributes.
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IDS can also produce sensitivity analyses based on the data, itself. Users can select

Sensitivity > Change Input Data, which brings up a dialog box that produces two sideby-side graphs (Figure 4.17). The first grapli displays the belief degrees input for each
grade (from our simulated data) for a selected alternative. We selected KA 3, which
received the highest perception score (in the model for which perception received a higher
weight). The second graph displays the perception score for all of the alternatives (other
attributes, such as threat, vulnerability, and consequence can also be explored as desired).
The belief degrees do not remain normalized automatically, so we manually adjusted the
belief degrees for KA 3, such that the belief degrees summed to 1. Although we did not
drastically alter the belief degrees from the original values, we still see a marked change in
the overall perception score for KA 3, which dropped from 78% to 68% (Figure 4.18).
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Alternative

Figure 4.17. Input Data (Original)

Alternative

Figure 4.18. Input Data (Adjusted)

4.2 Verification, Validation, and Accreditation
In addition to the data that must be collected, leveraged, or simulated for threat,
vulnerability, consequence, and perception assessments, there is also data required for the
MCDA model selected. For example, the IDS software used to implement ER requires
values such as weights, utilities, and belief degrees in order to describe the model. These
values have nothing to do with the actual assessment data, but rather are used to define the
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way in which our assessment data will be integrated using the MCDA model. While future
research may expand on the in vivo risk quadruplet methodology to include approaches for
determining these values, we have assigned these values as necessary in order to complete
the in vitro viability testing of the risk quadruplet methodology. Sensitivity analyses were
conducted to determine the impact of some of these selected values on the ER model.
Further, a preliminary verification and validation of the assessment integration model
selected for the risk quadruplet was also performed and is presented below. However, a
more thorough Modeling and Simulation (M&S) Verification, Validation, and
Accreditation (W&A) will be necessary in the future.
M&S W&A is crucial to the development and deployment of a model or simulation,
especially if it is to be accepted and employed by stakeholders for decision making (Macal,
2005). The Department of Defense released instructions for W&A of M&S {Department
of Defense Standard Practice Documentation of Verification, Validation, and Accreditation
for Models and Simulations, 2008) and many other agencies have followed suit. However,
DHS does not appear to have a formal instruction for M&S W&A, even though most of
the infrastructure analysis conducted by DHS is heavily reliant upon M&S, such as the
work lead by the Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC) and
the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC) ("About the
Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center," 2012; "About the National
Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center," 2012).
In 2010, the "Review of the DHS Approach to Risk Analysis" was released (it is
discussed further in 5.4APPENDIX C) and it was recommended that DHS improve its
documentation, seek model validation, and leverage reviews by technical experts to
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strengthen its risk M&S practices. Aside from risk analysis models for natural disasters,
there are not "any DHS risk analysis capabilities or methods that are yet adequate for
supporting DHS decision making, because their validity and reliability are untested,"
("Review of the DHS Approach to Risk Analysis," 2010). We do see that the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), a DHS organization, employs Hazus (a natural
disaster model touted as a "nationally applicable standardized methodology that contains
models for estimating potential losses from earthquakes, floods, and hurricanes"), which
has undergone a series of model validation analyses ("FEMA Releases HAZUS-MH
Hurricane Wind Model Validation Study," 2012; "Hazus," 2012; "HAZUS-MH Riverine
Flood Model Validation Study," 2012; "Validation of HAZUS Hurricane Model during
Ike," 2012). But the risk quadruplet is not specific to natural hazards, which could easily be
compared to historical data.
Interestingly, the USCG, another DHS agency, released two Commandant Instructions
(CMDTINST) on the subject of M&S VV&A far in advance of the 2010 review of DHS
risk analysis approaches. However, these instructions are brief and do not seem to be
utilized by DHS for risk analysis models or simulations (COMDTINST 5200.38: Coast
Guard Modeling and Simulation Management, 2006; COMDTINST 5200.40: Verification,
Validation, and Accreditation of Models and Simulations, 2006). The USCG official
definitions of M&S and W&A are provided in Figure 4.19 (COMDTINST 5200.38: Coast
Guard Modeling and Simulation Management, 2006; COMDTINST 5200.40: Verification,
Validation, and Accreditation of Models and Simulations, 2006).
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a physical, mathematical, or otherwise logical
representation of a system, entity, phenomenon, or
process.
a method for implementing a model over time; also, a
technique for testing, analysis, or training in which realworld systems are used, or where real-world and
conceptual systems are reproduced by a model.
the process of determining that a model or simulation
implementation accurately represents the developer's
conceptual description and specifications.
the process of determining the degree to which the
model or simulation is an accurate representation of the
real world from the perspective of the intended uses.

an official determination that a model or simulation is
acceptable to use for a specific purpose.

Figure 4.19. USCG Verification, Validation, and Accreditation Definitions

4.2.1 Risk Quadruplet Model Verification
Verification ensures that a model or simulation is programmed and implemented
correctly. In other words, the model should be free from errors, bugs, accidental omissions,
misapplications of the model or software, or invalid implementations of any algorithms
(Macal, 2005). Verification is the process of determining whether a model is consistent
from concept to requirements, including a review of the model's capabilities and the
specifications associated with each capability. It is important to understand that no model
can ever be completely verified, so the result of model verification is not a verified model,
but rather a model that has passed all verification tests. For the purposes of the risk
quadruplet, verifying the model relies upon verifying the MCDA assessment integration

method selected for the third phase of the risk quadruplet methodology, so ideally we
would verify the ER model deployed using IDS. Our verification plan, therefore, addresses
the following three questions.
1. Does the risk quadruplet model satisfy the intended use of ER?
2. Does the software code provided by IDS correctly implement ER?
3. Does the risk quadruplet model, implemented with ER via IDS, produce the
required results in the desired format to meet the research purpose?

Question 1
Does the risk quadruplet model satisfy the intended use of ER? In an effort to deal with
MCDA problems prone to uncertainties and subjectivity, ER was devised, developed, and
implemented via IDS by Yang, along with his collaborators (Xu & Yang, 2001). ER and
IDS are now used in many areas, such as supply chain management, design decision
support, risk and safety analysis, quality management, and government policy consultations
("IDS," 2010). ER uses a set of attributes, weights, utilities, and belief degrees to assess and
rank a series of alternatives. This approach lends itself nicely to the complex problem of
risk analysis in homeland security which consists of a number of attributes (threat,
vulnerability, consequence, and the newly proposed attribute of perception), and also offers
a series of alternatives in need of ranking (our CIKRKA assets). ER is used to support
decision analyses, assessments, or evaluation activities. The risk quadruplet would also be
used to support decision-making, specifically for risk assessments of CIKRKA. So the
problem of ranking a number of CIKRKA assets based on a set of attributes (threat,
vulnerability, consequence, and perception) is indeed an appropriate application of ER.
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Question 2
Does the software code provided by IDS correctly implement ER? Many MCDA
problems inevitably deal with information under uncertainty, and that is especially true
when dealing with risk. ER provides an alternative way of handling such information
systematically and consistently. ER is a powerful MCDA approach based on a recursive
algorithm that essentially aggregates information nonlinearly. ER has been compared to
other MCDA approaches, such as MAUT, Saaty's left eigenvector method, Belton's
normalized left eigenvector procedure, and Johnson's right eigenvector procedure (J.-B.
Yang, 1999). The results of those comparisons produced comparable rankings of
alternatives. IDS has also been compared to AHP, and while both use a hierarchical
structure to model MCDA problems, there are some distinctions (Xu & Yang, 2001). For
example, ER alternatives are not part of the hierarchy like they are in AHP. AHP uses a
decision matrix whereas ER uses a generalized decision matrix that incorporates belief
degrees (which are not employed in AHP); also, AHP uses average scores from pairwise
comparisons to aggregate data, but ER aggregates the belief degrees in a progressive
manner from lower level attributes to high level attributes. Because of these distinctions,
IDS (the software implementation of ER) can: handle large and complex MCDA problems;
assess new alternatives independently; produce consistent rakings of alternatives even after
new ones are added; create a distributed assessment of alternatives in addition to a ranking
of those alternatives; assess an alternative against standards or criteria (AHP can only
compare the relative importance of alternatives between attributes); handle mixed data
models (with both qualitative and quantitative data, as well as random and deterministic
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data, under uncertainty); and lastly, IDS can actually use AHP as one of its weighting
approaches for attributes (Xu & Yang, 2001).
The detailed problem description, basic evaluation framework, algorithms, axioms, and
theorems utilized by ER have been presented in detail (J.-B. Yang & Xu, 2002) and
demonstrate that the ER approach and IDS have sound theoretical foundations. ER has
undergone mathematical proofs (J.-B. Yang, 1999) and the mechanics of ER along with the
results of ER deployed via IDS have been presented in a number of peer-reviewed journals
and conferences (Sonmez, Yang, & Holt, 2001; Wang, Yang, & Sen, 1996; Xu, 2004; Xu
& Yang, 1999,2003, 2005; Xu, Yang, & Wang, 2005; J.-B. Yang, 1999; J.-B. Yang & Xu,
2002, 2004; J. B. Yang, Dale, & Siow, 2001). In fact, there is even one example for which
ER, using IDS, was used in the fields of risk analysis and homeland security to produce a
maritime security assessment (Z. L. Yang, Wang, Bonsall, & Fang, 2009). This example
offers a degree of face validity for the methodology, the model, as well as the software
code, all of which translates to our research as the risk quadruplet merely leverages IDS to
implement an integrated risk assessment based on threat, vulnerability, consequence, and
perception attributes used to rank CIKRKA alternatives, which is a valid application of ER.
Additionally, as evidenced by the sensitivity analyses provided earlier, as well as the model
validations which will be provided in the next section, we have demonstrated that the
model behaves logically, which implies that the software code is free from mathematical
errors.
Question 3
Does the risk quadruplet model, implemented with ER via IDS, produce the required
results in the desired format to meet the research purpose? The research purpose requires
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that the output of the risk quadruplet is a ranked assessment of CIKRKA (Figure 1.3). ER
is an MCDA approach, which, like other MCDA approaches such as AHP, produces a
ranked list of alternatives as its output. The IDS software implementation of ER thus also
produces a ranked list of alternatives. We have designated the CIKRKA assets as
alternatives in the risk

quadruplet model. We have defined threat, vulnerability,

consequence, and perception as attributes in the model, and assigned risk as the overall
parent attribute. We have supplied the model with sufficient information (including
attribute weights, utilities, and belief degrees) to relate parent and child attributes, as well
as to relate our data (from the threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception
assessments) to the attributes and alternatives. The output of our model is, indeed, a ranked
list of CIKRKA based on an integrated risk assessment and thus adequately meets the
needs of this research.
4.2.2 Risk Quadruplet Model Validation
Validation ensures that the model is useful (Macal, 2005). In other words, the model
should address the correct problem and provide accurate information about the system or
phenomenon being modeled. Validation could also consist of a series of challenges
designed to purposefully address any doubts about the application of the model, in which
case, similar to verification, the results of validation do not necessarily produce a validated
model, but rather a model that has passed all validation tests (or perhaps a model that has
failed some tests, but may be able to pass them in the future after additional model
improvements have been made). Validation of complex models involves demonstrating
that the model has the appropriate underlying relationships to permit an acceptable
representation of the real world. Our validation plan addresses the following three
questions.
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1. Is the risk quadruplet model a valid construct of risk for homeland security?
2. Are the results produced by the risk quadruplet close to the results of the real
world?
3. Under what range of inputs are the risk quadruplet results useful?

Question 1
Is the risk quadruplet model a valid construct of risk for homeland security? Typically,
validation requires that a newly proposed model be compared to some existing "gold
standard" model. However, there really is no such model for risk, so, let us instead explore
whether the model constructed for risk makes sense in the context of homeland security.
This validation depends on the purpose of the model and its intended use, so it is valuable
to understand why we are using a model in the first place. In the case of the risk quadruplet,
we are modeling risk as a function of threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception, in
order to make qualitative or quantitative predictions about the fiiture, namely to rank
CIKRKA assets based on their integrated risk assessment value (produced by the risk
quadruplet model). But we are also using the model to gain insight into how perception
affects threat, vulnerability, consequence, and risk, overall. The risk quadruplet model uses
ER which allows us to explore all four attributes of risk (threat, vulnerability, consequence,
and perception), as well as to explore how those attributes interact, depending on the
weights, utilities, and belief degrees supplied for the model. We have already seen that the
homeland security definition of risk includes threat, vulnerability, and consequence. The
introduction of perception is now obvious after conducting this research, so the risk
quadruplet model seems like a valid construct for homeland security.

Face validation is another technique for validating a model or simulation. Essentially,
face validation determines whether a model or simulation appears to measure a certain
criterion. It is often conducted via peer reviews accompanied by surveys or interviews to
seek the opinions of subject matter experts regarding the model or simulation. There are
even examples of this type of validation being conducted in the fields of homeland security
and homeland defense, once for a vulnerability assessment model (Ezell, Keating, & Old
Dominion University. Dept. of Engineering Management and Systems Engineering., 2005),
and again for a serious gaming approach to infrastructure analysis (Ancel, 2011). The
specific risk quadruplet model proposed in this research has undergone some preliminary,
informal face validation through conference presentations and papers (Norman Hill &
Ezell, 2011; Norman Hill & Gheorghe, 2011), the feedback from which has resulted in
improvements to the research presented in this dissertation. Further, ER and IDS have
undergone extensive face validation by presenting the methodology, mathematics, and
software implementation in numerous peer-reviewed journals and conference proceedings
(Huynh, Nakamori, Ho, & Murai, 2006; Sonmez, et al., 2001; Wang, et al., 1996; Xu &
Yang, 1999, 2003, 2005; Xu, et al., 2005; J.-B. Yang, 1999; J.-B. Yang & Xu, 2002, 2004;
J. B. Yang, et al., 2001; Z. L. Yang, et al., 2009; Zhou, Liu, & Yang, 2010). Therefore, any
model which correctly implements ER and IDS can claim some level of transitive face
validation.

Question 2
Are the results produced by the risk quadruplet close to the results of the real world?
We could validate new models by comparing model predictions to historical data, but how
would we conduct controlled experiments on risk models when historical data is limited,
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inconsistent, and deterministic? The maritime security assessment that leverages ER and
IDS validates its model with benchmarking and sensitivity analysis (Z. L. Yang, et al.,
2009). While we have conducted sensitivity analyses of the risk quadruplet model, a
benchmarking study is not possible within the scope of this research. Ideally, a
benchmarking study would use an existing model supplied with existing data to generate
results. These results would then be compared to the results achieved with the new model
(our risk quadruplet), based on the same data. Therefore, benchmarking requires some
current best practice or model to which we could compare the results of our risk quadruplet.
However, the risk quadruplet actually proposes a shift in the paradigm of risk calculation.
Risk is not currently calculated in homeland security by including perception alongside
threat, vulnerability, and consequence, so there is no comparable model to compare and
contrast against the risk quadruplet. Furthermore, even if a comparable model existed, we
have already discussed the limitations of the data in this research. We were unable to access
threat, vulnerability, or consequence data due to its sensitivity, and we were unable to
collect that data due to the limitations of the scope and schedule of the research. Therefore,
we tested the viability of the model using simulated data, but we have no actual data with
which to compare our results. This is a limitation of the research, but it could (and should)
be addressed in the future through a more formal M&S VV&A process.
Question 3
Under what range of inputs are the risk quadruplet results useful? We have already
conducted sensitivity analyses to explore different versions of the risk quadruplet model.
We have compared the risk quadruplet to the current homeland security risk triplet
(consisting of only threat, vulnerability, and consequence). We have gained a better
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understanding of the effects of weights for the perception attribute on the overall parent
attribute of risk. We have determined the sensitivity of the belief degrees to the selected
weights. And we even explored how changing the input data impacts the perception
attribute score. However, we can conduct some other sensitivity analyses to further validate
the risk quadruplet model.
Ranking on Risk
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Figure 4.20. Attribute Weights Using Visual Scoring (Equal Weights Model)

The output of the risk quadruplet model (the ranked CIKRKA) should change
depending on the weights selected for the child attributes, so we will explore some extreme
weighting cases to test the validity of the model by ensuring that the results align with our
intuitions. From Table 4.5, we know that KA 1 received the highest threat score, CI 1
received the highest vulnerability score, and KA 2 and KA 3 jointly received the highest
consequence score, whereas KA 3 received the highest perception score. In Figure 4.20 we
create a baseline case version of the in vitro risk quadruplet model (Equal Weights Model)
for which we have set all weights equal across the four attributes. The resulting rank of
alternatives (from highest risk to lowest risk) is KA 1, CI 1, CI 3, KR 2, KR 3, CI 2, KR 1,
KA 3, and KA 2. We will now systematically explore the four weighting schemes
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presented below. We would expect the resulting CIKRKA ranks to adjust accordingly. For
example, for the Max Threat Model, we would expect KA 1 (the asset which received the
highest threat score) to be ranked highest with regards to the overall parent attribute of risk.
1. Max Threat Model: threat weight=1.0, vulnerability weight=0.0, consequence
weight=0.0, and perception weight=0.0 (Figure 4.21)
2. Max Vulnerability Model: threat weight=0.0, vulnerability weight=1.0,
consequence weight=0.0, and perception weight=0.0 (Figure 4.22)
3. Max Consequence Model: threat weight=0.0, vulnerability weight=0.0,
consequence weight= 1.0, and perception weight=0.0 (Figure 4.23)
4. Max

Perception

Model:

threat

weight=0.0, vulnerability weight=0.0,

consequence weight=0.0, and perception weight=1.0 (Figure 4.24)
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Figure 4.21. Attribute Weights Using Visual Scoring (Max Threat Model)
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Figure 4.23. Attribute Weights Using Visual Scoring (Max Consequence Model)
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Figure 4.24. Attribute Weights Using Visual Scoring (Max Perception Model)

We condense the results of these different models in Table 4.7 and the highlighted
values were the assets which received the highest overall risk score for that model. For the
baseline case (Equal Weights Model), KA 1 received the highest overall risk score. For the
Max Threat Model, we would expect KA 1 to be ranked highest as it received the highest
threat score, and that is exactly what we see. In fact, when compared to the Equal Weights
Model, the overall risk score for KA 1 increases from 69% to 74% in the Max Threat
Model. This shows that the emphasis of the weight on threat has a positive correlation with
the overall parent attribute of risk. Since CI 1 received the highest vulnerability score, we
expect to see it ranked the highest for risk in the Max Vulnerability Model and that is again
what we see. Since KA 2 and KA 3 jointly received the highest consequence score, it is no
surprise that we see both of them tied for the overall risk score in the Max Consequence
Model. And because KA 3 received the highest perception score, it only makes sense that
KA 3 received the highest overall risk score for the Max Perception Model.
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Table 4.7. Model Validation Comparison of Weighting Schemes

4.2.3 Risk Quadruplet Model Accreditation
Accreditation is the final step in a full M&S W&A process. Accreditation is used to
approve a model or simulation that has demonstrated that it can be employed successfully
and that its results would be beneficial to the decision-making process. Obviously the entire
VV&A process, but especially accreditation, would require close work with the
stakeholders or agency which would be interested in employing the model or simulation.
For the purposes of our research, we would initially look to market the risk quadruplet to
DHS, and perhaps later share the approach with other EPR&R agencies. However, direct
interaction with DHS regarding the risk quadruplet model has been extremely limited. A
few DHS employees were introduced to the risk quadruplet during the 2011 Institute for
Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) Annual Meeting, and
responded favorably to the proposed model; however, the model has not yet been formally
presented to DHS.
While the data in these in vitro models were simulated, it is easy to see how the quick
visual analyses, sensitivity analyses, and preliminary verification and validation of the
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model would be valuable once the risk quadruplet is deployed in vivo with actual data and
stakeholders reviewing the results to inform their decisions. As evidenced by this
preliminary model testing, the risk quadruplet has the potential to assess perceptions of
subject matter experts using an ER model. An integrated assessment methodology, based
on ER, can be employed to integrate threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception
assessments. And this methodology systematically integrates all four types of data in a
meaningful, traceable, and reproducible approach, and provides a ranked CIKRKA list as
its output. Future research would be necessary to better understand the sensitivity of the
model to the selected weights, utilities, and belief degrees selected for the model, but it is
easy to see how IDS could be useful in producing these analyses. Further, these sensitivity
analyses would be invaluable for communicating with participants and stakeholders in the
risk quadruplet integrated assessment.
Many versions of the risk quadruplet model have been tested, in vitro, using simulated
data to rank nine CIKRKA assets. This same risk quadruplet model could be used, in vivo,
to assess the actual perceptions of subject matter experts. It could also incorporate threat,
vulnerability, and consequence assessment data leveraged or collected during the second
phase of the risk quadruplet methodology. The output of this in vivo approach would again
be a ranking of assets, based on the proposed ER approach (using IDS), which could
combine subjective and objective data, both quantitative and qualitative, to improve our
understanding of the risks to CIKRKA.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
"This paper, by its very length, defends itself against the risk of being read"
- Winston Churchill
The three purposes of this research were to assess perceptions of CIKRKA, determine a
risk quadruplet methodology for integrating threat, vulnerability, consequence, and
perception assessments, and to rank CIKRKA based on an integrated risk quadruplet
assessment methodology. Additionally, the two initial contributions of this research were to
propose an MCDA risk quadruplet model for integrating assessments of threat,
vulnerability, consequence, and perception, as well as a methodology for deploying the risk
quadruplet model. The risk quadruplet methodology proposed is capable of integrating
threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception assessments. While the risk quadruplet
methodology was not deployed in vivo, it does detail the approach necessary for all three
phases of the risk quadruplet methodology, from collecting perception data, leveraging or
collecting threat, vulnerability, and consequence data, as well as systematically integrating
those data in a meaningful, traceable, and reproducible model. Further, this methodology
has been subjected to preliminary testing and analysis, in vitro, and has proven to be a
viable approach for ranking CIKRKA in order to improve decision making for homeland
security and homeland defense.
And in fact, though not defined at the onset of the research, additional contributions
have been made to the fields of risk perception, risk analysis, systems engineering, as well
as homeland security and homeland defense. This research challenged the existing
paradigm for risk, not just as it is defined in homeland security (as a function of threat,
vulnerability, and consequence), but as it is typically defined in risk analysis, in general (as
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a function of probability and consequence). This research asserts that risk is inherently
related to our perceptions and that we construct risk methodologies and models based on
those perceptions.
This paradigm shift has a direct and corresponding impact on the practical application
of risk analysis. If we agree that perception affects our assessments of risk, then it is only
logical that we include those perceptions in our risk assessment approaches. This argues for
more robust methods to incorporate perceptions into an integrated risk assessment
approach, as has been proposed by the risk quadruplet. The practical, and potentially
disturbing, implication of this new risk model is that if we change our perceptions, we then
influence our calculated risk. However, this is already the case, although it has not been
formalized. If we conducted an assessment on a given asset's risk in 2000, we might have
produced very different results than if we had repeated that assessment in 2010
(considering all of the risk scenarios that have impacted our psyche since 2000, including
the September 11
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attacks and the Fukushima disaster). And in fact, this correlation

between risk and our perceptions could be further exploited to improve risk communication
and strategic risk planning. As perceptions of risk are incorporated into risk assessments,
decision makers can better understand where gaps exist between our perceptions of risk and
the actual threat, vulnerability, and consequence data known about those risks. This
information can be developed into improved risk visualizations, such as risk maps, or even
graphics like those produced by the WEF for their Global Risks reports. Improving the risk
communication could have a positive effect on risk perceptions, which would, in turn,
result in improved risk assessments.

5.1 Methodology Improvements
Obviously, future research should include an in vivo test of the risk quadruplet
methodology since the risk quadruplet model has only been subjected to in vitro testing
using simulated data. While the in vitro testing proved the viability of the risk quadruplet
model, it did not ensure the entire research methodology was viable, since risk perception
data was not collected from subject matter experts directly. However, had we implemented
the in vivo methodology, we could have encountered a number of issues. For example, in
the proposed in vivo methodology, respondents would have been given CIKRKA local to
them (as volunteer participants would have lived or worked in the National Capitol Region
at the time of perception data collection). It was noted that this might introduce some bias.
Would their perceptions be influenced by their proximity to the region? What if we
presented them with CIKRKA examples specific to Hampton Roads or another region with
which they were less familiar? Further, respondents would only have been asked to
consider Motor Gasoline for VA, as this information was unavailable for DC. However,
these regional choices could introduce some bias to the perception data as respondents were
asked to consider a CI in DC, a KA in DC, but a KR covering the entire state of VA.
Future methodological improvements might also include the exploration of perceptions
from the general public, instead of focusing on subject matter expert opinions. The model
could even be expanded to accommodate a combination of perceptions from both experts
and non-experts. For example, the perception attribute could branch into two sub-attributes:
private and public, where private perception assessments would come from the owners and
operators of the asset and public perception assessments could be split further into
assessments collected from general citizens, regulatory committees, as well as federal,

state, and local government agencies. All of these different entities provide valid
perceptions which could affect decision-making. We have seen that risk is a construct, so it
may be valuable to not only include perception in the assessment process, but to include
multiple perceptions to ensure we are seeing all of the potential risk associated with an
asset from numerous different perspectives.
In addition to the approach presented for collecting perception data, the risk quadruplet
methodology could also be expanded to include options for collecting threat, vulnerability,
and consequence data. It would also be good to explore whether that data could or should
be collected as qualitative or quantitative data, since ER can handle mixed data models.
While it may be valid to continue collecting risk perception using a qualitative linguistic
set, that might not be appropriate for all combinations of CIKRKA and risk scenarios with
regards to the other three attributes of the risk quadruplet model.
It was suggested that threat, vulnerability, and consequence data could be collected or
leveraged from historical assessments for use during the in vivo risk quadruplet approach.
One option would be to code the results (of either collected or leveraged data) to the ER
linguistic set. However, this additional step could introduce some bias as someone would
have to judge how the results align to the linguistic set, but it would treat all data in the risk
quadruplet on a common qualitative scale. Threat, vulnerability, and consequence
assessments are often ad hoc and typically produce inconsistent data, so coding the results
to a single linguistic set would give them commonality. But due to the flexibility of the ER
assessment integration phase of the risk quadruplet, we could collect or leverage threat,
vulnerability, and consequence data however it is available (qualitative or quantitative, for
example). ER can integrate both qualitative and quantitative data and IDS provides that
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option when defining attributes, so we could explore the impact to the risk quadruplet
model when using mixed data. For example, if the attribute is defined as quantitative, then
the user can also decide whether it is a certain or uncertain attribute. This would be useful
for defining uncertain quantitative attributes, which could be random numbers, may be
difficult to assess, or could suffer from missing data ("IDS Multicriteria Assessor Quick
Guide," 2010). We could revisit the in vitro model used to test the risk quadruplet, and
replace some of the simulated qualitative data with simulated quantitative data by inputting
threat and consequence as quantitative variables, using the tornado frequencies and
property damage data presented in 5.4APPENDIX D. However, this research could require
significant contributions to the methodological approach.
The number and types of assets under study in the proposed in vivo methodology
would have been limited to a single CI, KR, and KA, and would have only explored a
single scenario. Even the in vitro viability testing of the risk quadruplet model limited the
number of assets to three CI, three KR, and three KA, and again assumed a single risk
scenario. Future iterations of the risk quadruplet model should explore an increased number
of assets and scenarios (both natural and unnatural). Additionally, it has been shown that
not all assets clearly align to a single type of asset (CI, KR, or KA); many assets are
interrelated. For example, the Hoover Dam produces electricity and serves as a major
transportation route (making it a CI), however it outputs electricity and maintains water
supplies (which are both KRs), but it is also a thriving tourist attraction (making it a KA).
There is no methodology for integrating multiple risk assessments for a single entity from
different perspectives, such as when a CI is aligned to multiple sectors, or when it is also
considered a KA, which is where perception could play a starring role. Future research

could explore ways to handle interrelated CIKRKA. Expanding the risk quadruplet
methodology to include additional (and potentially interrelated) assets and risk scenarios
would drastically improve its value and applicability.
Additionally, the methodology is also adaptable as more research on the model, itself,
is conducted. For example, the risk quadruplet methodology could be expanded to include
details for determining child attribute weighting, utility scoring, and the assignment of
parent-child belief degrees. This could open up a number of areas of research to further
improve the risk quadruplet methodology, such as comparing the child attribute weighting
methods (visual scoring versus pairwise comparison), or the derivation of utility inputs.
Perhaps this could be an opportunity to revisit the MCDA MAUT approach which was
discarded as an improper approach for the assessment integration phase of the risk
quadruplet, but might be a valuable approach for determining those utility values required
by the ER model. This research could also benefit from the study of the selection of parent
to child belief degrees (which were input using the identity matrix for the purposes of this
research, but which could be further explored using sensitivity analyses).
5.2 Model Improvements
First and foremost, the risk quadruplet should undergo formal M&S W&A (a
preliminary verification and validation of the model was discussed in CHAPTER 4). It was
recommended that "DHS should have a well-funded research program to address social and
economic impacts of natural disasters and terrorist attacks" ("Review of the DHS Approach
to Risk Analysis," 2010). Existing risk analyses for infrastructure protection could be
improved by verifying and validating models, improving documentation, or submitting
models to external subject matter experts for peer review ("Review of the DHS Approach
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to Risk Analysis," 2010). The risk quadruplet offers a unique proposal, to not only shift the
paradigm for how risk is calculated by DHS, but to potentially be one of the first models
accredited which formalizes the DHS approach to integrating threat, vulnerability,
consequence, and perception assessments in a meaningful, traceable, and reproducible
manner. Further, as DHS does not have a formal instruction for M&S VV&A, there is an
opportunity for future research to ensure DHS creates such guidance and that it is tailored
to the specific needs for models, simulations, and assessments used by DHS for strategic
decision-making, risk mitigation plans, and budget allocation.
The model could also be expanded to rank a much larger number of CIKRKA assets.
Additionally, replicating the model would allow for the comparison of multiple risk
scenarios. In other words, we would set up one instance of the model to analyze threat,
vulnerability, consequence, and perception data based on a single risk scenario. Another
instance of the model (identical in every way, except for the data) would be used to analyze
a second scenario, and so on. This would allow for apples to apples comparisons of the
same CIKRKA assets (alternatives) across the same attributes. Although it could be argued
that the models should be adjusted to account for differences in utilities, belief degrees, and
weighting depending on the risk scenario (in other words, does perception receive the same
weight when exploring a flood risk scenario for which threat, vulnerability, and
consequence data might be very reliable versus a terrorist attack risk scenario for which
data is less reliable and perceptions tend to be driven by fear more than facts?).
Prospective versions of the model could work with subject matter experts to complete
the pairwise comparison approach for weighting attributes in the ER integration assessment
phase. This tool is provided with the IDS software and is basically an AHP approach for
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weighting the child attributes (threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception) as they
relate to the parent attribute (risk). Additionally, utilities for the parent attribute (risk) were
assigned to grades arbitrarily for this example, but it may be worth exploring how to assess
and incorporate the utilities of those providing inputs for the ER model. These values could
be easily revised in future iterations of the model. Similarly, to relate parent and child
attributes, the belief degrees were assigned arbitrarily for each child (threat, vulnerability,
consequence, and perception). These values could be adjusted in future iterations of the
model. For example, if the child grade is very low, that could relate to a parent grade of
none, very low, and low with belief degrees of .25, .50, and .25, respectively. Developing a
methodology for determining how to define these weights, utilities, and belief degrees
would improve the flexibility and robustness of the risk quadruplet model. Additionally, it
would allow for sensitivity analyses, which might shed some light on how the selected
weights, utilities, and belief degrees affect the influence of perception on all attributes, as
well as the parent attribute of risk.
Similarly, future research could be conducted to better understand how the belief
degrees would change if we used alternative methods for assigning the input values of our
belief degrees to relate parent and child attributes. More intense sensitivity analyses would
be necessary to better understand how the model would behave as the utilities, weights, and
belief degrees that relate child to parent attributes are adjusted. It is easy to see how IDS
could be useful in producing these analyses and how these sensitivity analyses would be
invaluable for communicating with participants and stakeholders in the risk quadruplet
integrated assessment.

81

5.3 Generalizability of the Risk Quadruplet Model
Determining how to generalize the risk quadruplet model would be worthwhile to
demonstrate its applicability across a wider range of homeland security and homeland
defense risk issues, as well as risk challenges in other fields. Conveniently, the risk
quadruplet model is extensible and adaptable, mainly because ER is a flexible and robust
assessment integration approach.
A more complex model could also be explored to address multiple risk scenarios by
introducing them as child attributes of the threat attribute, rather than just replicating the
model. Additionally, the model could be expanded to address additional child attributes,
such as sustainability or resilience (Figure 5.1). Expanding the risk quadruplet
methodology to include additional (and potentially interrelated) assets and risk scenarios
would drastically improve its value and applicability.

Alternative Name
•CI1
•KR1
•KA1
•CI 2
•KR2
&KA2
•CI 3
•KR3
•KA3
•Ci 4
•KR4
•KA4
•CI 5
•KR5
BKA5

• • Risk
iH Threat
• Risk Scenario 1
• Risk Scenario 2
Vulnerability
Consequence
b • Perception
• Subject Matter Experts
• Non-Experts
• Sustailiability
• Resilience

Figure 5.1. Risk Quadruplet Model (Generalized Example)
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Lastly, additional child attributes that relate to the overall parent attribute of risk could
be explored in future iterations of the risk quadruplet. For example, sustainability and
resilience have both become very popular terms in the homeland security and homeland
defense literature. Resilience is defined by DHS as the "ability of systems, infrastructures,
government, business, communities, and individuals to resist, tolerate, absorb, recover
from, prepare for, or adapt to an adverse occurrence that causes harm, destruction, or loss"
(.DHS Risk Lexicon, 2010). Sustainability is generally defined as the development of
infrastructure that not only meet the needs of the present, but do not impact the ability of
future generations to meet their evolving needs (for example, adapting existing
infrastructure, or building new infrastructure, that is compatible with alternative energy
sources). The term sustainability is mentioned in 15 homeland security and homeland
defense documents, but was not specifically defined in any of them (.Agriculture and FooD
Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-Specific Plan, 2007; Communications:
Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-Specific

Plan, 2007; Critical

Foundations: Protecting America's Infrastructures, 1997; Defense Industrial BasE Critical
Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-Specific Plan, 2007; Energy: Critical
Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-Specific Plan, 2007; Information Technology:
Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-Specific Plan, 2007; Interim National
Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2005; National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2006;
National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2009; National Response Framework, 2008;
National Response Plan, 2004; NSHS, 2002; NSPPCIKA, 2003; Quadrennial Homeland
Security Review Report, 2010; Transportation Systems: Critical Infrastructure and Key
Resources Sector-Specific Plan, 2007). It is not too much of a stretch to see how DHS and
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other agencies might wish to conduct sustainability or resilience assessments in the future,
and the results of those assessments could be easily incorporated alongside threat,
vulnerability, consequence, and perception assessments into a risk quintuplet or risk
sextuplet.
Further generalizing the risk quadruplet approach, we could use the risk quadruplet
model to explore anything that would need to be ranked in an overall integrated assessment
of risk for homeland security or homeland defense. For example, it is possible that an
adaptation of the risk quadruplet approach could be useful in future Regional Resiliency
Assessment Program (RRAP) and Strategic National Risk Assessment (SNRA) efforts to
rank regions, cities, or areas, or to rank risk scenarios. Or the risk quadruplet could be used
to rank countries, similar to the country risks reported by WEF ("Global Risks," 2006;
"Global Risks," 2007; "Global Risks," 2008; "Global Risks," 2009; "Global Risks," 2010;
"Global Risks," 2011; "Global Risks," 2012; "OECD Studies in Risk Management:
Innovation in Country Risk Management," 2009). Or the risk quadruplet could be used to
evaluate decisions and lessons learned from crises, to measure the effectiveness of risk
mitigation efforts, to reevaluate risks once vulnerabilities have been addressed, or to ensure
funds for mitigation efforts are allocated based on risk rankings. These areas are critical
deficiencies in many countries' enterprise risk management processes, as identified in the
OECD risk management report ("OECD Studies in Risk Management: Innovation in
Country Risk Management," 2009). Additionally, the risk quadruplet could be used to
explore risk mitigation. Pinto asserts that it is "essential that alternative (risk mitigation)
actions be evaluated" and ranked based on the attributes of cost and benefits (Pinto, 2006).
The risk quadruplet methodology could easily be reengineered for this particular problem

by defining actions as alternatives in the ER model and by defining attributes in the ER
model for cost and benefit, thus outputting a ranked list of mitigation actions. Most
importantly, it is vital to recognize that the risk quadruplet model is not restricted to only
analyzing risk to CIKRKA assets.
And, in fact, the risk quadruplet model is also not limited to the homeland security or
homeland defense markets. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
conducted a survey of risk analysis in a number of government agencies, as well as
throughout the international community (Murdock, Squeri, Jones, & Smith, 2011). CSIS
found a number of key similarities and key differences in both the risk assessment phase
("how risk is defined, identified, analyzed, and assessed") as well as the implementation
phase (how risk assessment affects decision-making and how risk is communicated).
Similar to our findings, the overall risk lexicon was deemed to be inconsistent and
incomplete. Another lesson learned was the need for risk management techniques to
acknowledge uncertainty and variance in risk assessment approaches. Interestingly, CSIS
also notes that "simple models are almost always better than complicated ones" (Murdock,
et al., 2011). A series of case study matrices are presented for DHS, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA), EPA, Nuclear Regulatory Committee, Office of
Management and Budget, Food and Drug Administration, as well as a number of countries
such as Singapore, the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, and France, as well as a
number of international organizations like the United Nations, World Bank, and OECD.
The case studies explore how the agencies or countries define, identify, assess, and
communicate risk, along with information about the organization's strategic environment
and objectives, culture, leadership, and the overall effectiveness of the organization's risk
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management approach (Murdock, et al., 2011). The risk quadruplet may be a good fit for
some of the risk analysis approaches employed by these agencies and countries.
Additionally, many other risk analysis research areas could benefit from this general
model. For example, project management risk analysts are typically interested in technical
risks and programmatic risks (Pennock & Haimes, 2002), where technical risks are those
issues that would keep a project from meeting its performance criteria and programmatic
risks are related to cost and schedule overruns. Often these attributes are assessed
independently and attempts to provide an overall integrated assessment, so as to rank risk
scenarios to the project for the purposes of risk mitigation, are often oversimplified; for
example, some risk analysts might use a straight average of the attribute assessment scores.
The risk quadruplet model could be applied here, where the risk scenarios become the
alternatives and the child attributes underneath the parent attribute of risk would be cost,
schedule, safety, and quality.
5.4 Additional Research Areas
There are also a number of additional research areas that could be explored which do
not directly relate to the risk quadruplet methodology or the model itself, but are still
related to the research presented here. For example, studying the regional component of
risk and perception for homeland security, in and of itself, could open up an entire area of
research, already being explored to some extent in conjunction with Geographic
Information Systems (GIS). For example, are there regional differences in perceptions of
risk to CIKRKA and could that impact risk assessments (if a region does not often
experience flooding, would that risk scenario be overlooked, rendering them vulnerable
should a flood occur)? And could differences in perceptions across different geographical
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areas allow national, regional, or local policy-makers, or infrastructure planners and
vendors, to determine where new CIKR would be best received by local residents (a sort of
geomarketing of CIKR)?
And although it did not make sense to propose a complete Psychometric Model for the
in vivo risk quadruplet methodology presented in this research (given the constraints of the
ER model selected for attribute integration), it would be worth exploring an expanded
Psychometric Model in the future. A full psychometric study could analyze the perceptions
of CIKRKA to see if there is a statistically significant difference between perceptions of
those different assets, the results of which would be very interesting and worthwhile as
DHS continues to refine its definitions and risk analysis approaches for CIKRKA. Further,
surveying experts could result in perceptions different from those of the layperson. Future
iterations of the model could explore perceptions from the general public, or even a
combination of perceptions from both experts and non-experts.
Lastly, it was suggested that KA do not have a traditional systemic purpose and are not
seeking to produce, transform, or transport anything. Future research might shed some light
on how this might impacts the inclusion of KA in the greater CIKR system of systems,
especially for the purposes of ranking those assets based on risk. At the very least, it would
be worthwhile for DHS to revisit and improve their definitions for assets, risk, and riskrelated terms, as it could only have a positive impact on their overall risk management and
analysis program.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
GLOBAL RISKS REPORTS ANALYSIS
Table A.l. Global Risks Reports: Core Global Risks by Year

2006

2007

2009

2008
'.4r'

' •:

•*

Asset
prices/Indebtedness
China
Coming fiscal
crises
Oil prices/energy
supply
US Current
Account deficit and
US dollar

Blow up in asset
prices/excessive
indebtedness
Chinese economic
hard landing
Fiscal crises
caused by
demographic shift
Oil price
shock/energy
supply
interruptions
US current account
deficit/fall in USS

2011

2010

&L
r -H

^wUbic" >

1
*

•

Asset price
collapse

Asset price
collapse

Asset price
collapse

Asset price
collapse

Slowing Chinese
economy (6%)
Fiscal crises in
advanced
economies

Slowing Chinese
economy (6%)

Slowing Chinese
Economy (<6%)

Slowing Chinese
economy (<6%)

Fiscal crises

Fiscal crises

Fiscal crises

Oil and gas price
spike

Oil and gas price
spike

Oil price spikes

Major fall in USS

Major fall in USS

Major Fall in the
USS

Underinvestment in
infrastructure

Underinvestment
in infrastructure

Infrastructure
fragility

Retrenchment from
globalization
(developed)
Retrenchment from
globalization
(emerging)

Retrenchment
from globalization
(developed)
Retrenchment
from globalization
(emerging)

Retrenchment from
globalization

Critical
infrastructures
Retrenchment from
globalization
(developed)
Retrenchment from
globalization
(emerging)

2012

.

Prolonged
infrastructure
neglect
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2006

2007

2008

2009
Food price
volatility
Regulation cost

2010

2011

2012

Food price
volatility
Burden of
regulation

Regulatory failures
Liquidity/credit
crunch
Extreme energy
price volatility
Global imbalances
and currency
volatility
Extreme
commodity price
volatility
Extreme consumer
price volatility

Unforeseen
negative
consequences of
regulations
Recurring liquidity
crises
Extreme volatility
in energy and
agriculture prices
Chronic fiscal
imbalances

Unmanageable
inflation or
deflation
Chronic labour
market imbalances
Hard landing of an
emerging economy
Major systemic
financial failure
Severe income

ty
•'K'

Environmental
Climate change

Climate change

Extreme climate
change related
weather

Extreme climate
change-related
weather

Extreme weather

Climate change

•i'.

•- ,r

Persistent extreme
weather
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2006
Tropical cyclones

Earthquakes

2007
Natural
catastrophE
Tropical storms
Natural
catastrophE
Earthquakes

••••

.a

2008
NatCat: Cyclone

NatCat: Earthquake

2009
Natural
catastrophE
cyclone
Natural
catastrophE
earthquake

2010

2011

NatCat: Cyclone

Storms and
cyclones

NatCat:
Earthquake

Earthquakes and
volcanic eruptions

2012

Loss of ecosystem
services
Natural
catastrophE Inland
flooding
Loss of freshwater
services

NatCat: Extreme
inland flooding

Natural
catastrophE inland
flooding

NatCat: Inland
flooding

Loss of freshwater

Loss of freshwater

Water scarcity

Heatwaves &
droughts

Droughts and
desertification
reduces agricultural
yields
Natural
catastrophE coastal
flooding

Flooding

Droughts and
desertification
NatCat: Coastal
flooding

Air pollution

Air pollution

Air pollution

Biodiversity loss

Biodiversity loss

Biodiversity loss

Irremediable
pollution
Rising greenhouse
gas emissions
Species
overexploitation

Ocean governance
Land and
waterway use
mismanagement
Mismanaged
urbanization
Vulnerability to
geomagnetic
storms
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2006

1
Terrorism

2007

2008

. r.
International
terrorism

......
International
terrorism

Transnational
crime and
corruption

Transnational
crime and
corruption

Interstate and civil
wars
Proliferation of
weapons of mass
destruction
(WMD)
Retrenchment
from globalization
Failed and failing
states

Interstate & civil
wars

2009

2010

International
terrorism

——i
International
terrorism

Transnational
crime and
corruption

Transnational
crime and
corruption

*

2011

Terrorism

2012
Unprecedented
geophysical
destruction
Antibiotic-resistant
bacteria
Failure of climate
change adaptation
r:;-^'MSSSSlBSSjaK'
Terrorism

European
dislocation
Current and future
hotspots

Middle East
instability

Failed & failing
states
Collapse of NonProliferation Treaty
of Nuclear
Weapons
Middle East
instability

Collapse of NonPro liferation Treaty
of Nuclear
Weapons
Afghanistan
instability

Organized crime
Corruption

Weapons of mass
destruction

Diffusion of
weapons of mass
destruction

Fragile states

Critical fragile
states

Nuclear
proliferation
Afghanistan
instability

Entrenched
organized crime
Pervasive
entrenched
corruption

Geopolitical
conflict

Ill

2006

2007

2008

2009
Israel-Palestine
conflict
Violence in Iraq
US/Iran conflict
US/Democratic
People's Republic
of Korea conflict
Global governance
gaps

2010

2011

2012

Global governance
failures

Global governance
failure
Militarization of
space
Widespread illicit
trade
Failure of
diplomatic conflict
resolution
Unilateral resource
nationalization

Israel - Palestine
Iraq
Iran
North Korea
Global
governance gaps

Space security
Illicit trade

Societal

-

"T*

"*
Vulnerability to
pandemics

Global pandemics

Pandemics

Pandemic

Pandemic

Pandemic

Epidemic disease
(developing world)

Infectious diseases
in the developing
world

Infectious disease,
Pandemic,
developing world

Infectious disease

Infectious
diseases

Infectious diseases

Chronic disease in
the developed
world

Chronic disease,
developed world

Chronic disease

Chronic diseases

Chronic diseases

Liability regimes

Liability regimes

Liability regimes

Liability regimes

Slow and chronic
diseases
(industrialized
world)
Liability regimes
Regulation
Corporate
governance
Intellectual
Property rights
Organized crime

Rising rates of
chronic disease
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2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

Food insecurity

Food security
Migration

Migration

Migration
Water security
Demographic
challenges

2012
Food shortage
crises
Unmanaged
migration
Water supply
crises
Mismanagement of
population aging
Unsustainable
population growth

Economic disparity
Backlash against
globalization
Ineffective drug
policies
Rising religious
fanaticism

Nanotechnology

Emergence of risks
associated with
nanotechnology

Emergence of
nanotechnology
risks

Technological
Emergence of
nanotechnology
risks

;

-> ;

_

•
Unintended
consequences of
nanotechnology

Nanoparticle
toxicity

Electromagnetic
fields
Pervasive
computing
Convergence of
technologies
Breakdown of
critical information
infrastructure (CII)

CII breakdown

Critical
Information
Systems (CII)
breakdown

Critical
information
infrastructure
(CII) breakdown

Data fraud/loss

Data fraud/loss

Critical
information
infrastructure
breakdown

Critical systems
failure
Massive incident
of data fraud or
theft
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2006

2009

2010

2011

2012

Online data and
information
security

Cyber attacks

Threats from new
technologies

Unintended
consequences of
new life science
technologies
Massive digital
misinformation
Proliferation of
orbital debris
Mineral resource
supply
vulnerability
Unintended
consequences of
climate change
mitigation
Failure of
intellectual
property regime

114

APPENDIX B
RESEARCH LIMITATIONS (IN VIVO)
Phase 1. Perception Assessment
"The fear of death is the most unjustified of all fears, for there's no risk of accident for
someone who's dead."
- Albert Einstein
Data Collection
The first phase (the perception assessment) must consider a means for collecting
perception data, the framework for obtaining that data, the selection of respondents who
will voluntarily contribute their perceptions, as well as an approach for analyzing the
perception data once it is collected. Expert elicitation is a way to gather the opinions of
experts, often seeking a consensus, regarding a subject characterized by uncertainty,
usually due to insufficient data ("Expert Elicitation," 2011). For that reason, it seems like a
logical approach for gathering perceptions.
Expert elicitation is often used when researching rare events, which typically lack
adequate data to conduct more traditional probabilistic approaches ("Expert Elicitation,"
2011). Expert opinion is also used when observation, experimentation, or simulation is not
possible due to limited resources. Subject matter experts are employed to estimate new,
uncommon, or complicated issues and may also be utilized to forecast future outcomes.
Multiple methods exist to elicit expert judgments, such as focus groups, surveys,
interviews, or even interactive exercises like wargames (Ancel, 2011).
A common goal of expert elicitation is to quantify uncertainty ("Expert Elicitation,"
2011), which lends the technique nicely to risk analysis. There is also a precedence for
employing expert elicitation techniques to the research and design of next generation
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infrastructure (Ancel, 2011), but it is not without its flaws and limitations. Research on risk
judgments usually shows that expert judgments are more valid or accurate than those of the
general public (Wright, Bolger, & Rowe, 2002). However, it has been shown that lay
people are not completely irrational or inaccurate in their judgments of risk-related values
(Baruch Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1982). The selection of respondents for the
perception assessment will be important and it will be important to note whether
participants are considered experts, non-experts, or a mix of both.
It will also be important to determine how to aggregate perception assessment results. If
perception data is to be collected via expert elicitation, then the number of perception
values produced is dependent upon the number of survey respondents. And the number of
values for the threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessments would not depend on the
number of respondents, so synthesizing those two different sized data sets could pose a
problem during the assessment integration phase.
Early work on perception models focused on the variation among means of perception
ratings across multiple risk scenarios and did not examine the variation among the
individual respondents (those rating the risks). This means that, for better or worse, higher
levels of explanatory power can be achieved by stabilizing the means through large
samples (Lennart Sjoberg, 1999). However, some perception models have been scrutinized
for their use of aggregate data (versus disaggregate data), but it is generally recognized that
using disaggregate data changes the focus of the analysis to an exploration of the
distinctions among respondents, rather than an exploration of the distinctions among risk
scenarios (Henry H. Willis, DeKay, Fischhoff, & Morgan, 2005). Since the purpose of this
research is not to explore the differences between the perceptions of individual
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respondents, but rather to explore the differences of their collective perceptions across a
series of combinations of CIKRKA and risk scenarios, this should not have an impact on
the research.
Another challenge to overcome is bias as numerous studies have shown inherent biases
in perception data. There is often a difference between perceived personal risk (risk to
oneself) and perceived general risk (risk to others), where general risk is usually judged to
be higher, especially those risks perceived as uncontrollable along the Controllable Uncontrollable risk scale (Lennart Sjoberg, 1999). Also, women tend to rate risks higher
than men (Lennart Sjoberg, 1999). It is important to note that some studies have shown that
demographic and other participant factors were very weakly related to perception (L.
Sjoberg, 2000).
And not only can bias be introduced in the perception data, but also in the expert
elicitation tool, itself. Survey studies often display a bias, especially in terms of the
respondents' educational levels, but that bias does not appear to be serious in studies of
perception (L. Sjoberg, 2000). One alternative to a survey might be structured interviews
although there is no evidence that suggests that interviews are more valid than surveys
(Lennart Sjoberg, 1999). And while survey questions might introduce bias (Dillman, 2000),
an interviewer could also introduce bias (Moser, 1951). Furthermore, there is always a risk
of low response rates for any survey (Dillman, 2000), and sample sizes for focus groups or
interviews are typically much smaller due to limited resources and time constraints (Moser,
1951), so generalizability and interpolation to the rest of the population is limited,
especially since the sample may not be representative of the entire population, given the
respondents will primarily be subject matter experts.
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Respondents would likely be volunteers, so response rates may be low. Requests for
participation could be announced via email and websites to public organizations that share
common interests in homeland security, homeland defense, Critical Infrastructure
Protection (CIP), risk,

threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessments, risk

management, risk mitigation, risk analysis, and Emergency Preparedness, Response, and
Recovery (EPR&R). As a result, many of these potential respondents would be subject
matter experts, so the perceptions gathered would be those of experts.
We are then assuming some level of homogeneity across the respondents, which might
not be the case if we selected non-experts to provide their perceptions. Future research
might explore a comparison of the risk quadruplet eliciting subject matter expert
perceptions versus common citizen perceptions. Or, perhaps both types of respondents
should participate in the perception assessment phase in order to seek a more complete
picture of the perceived risks to the assets under study. The in vivo risk quadruplet
methodology is easily adaptable to exploring these alternatives in the future.
Other concerns affecting the data collection methodology are the scope of the research.
We will need perceptions within the context of CIKRKA, but how many types of CIKRKA
can be explored in a survey? A reduced number of assets must be selected to the risk
quadruplet research. Should the data be collected via survey or focus group, and would it
make sense to use a blocked experimental design where a certain percentage of respondents
explore CI, the next group provides data on KR, and so on? Furthermore, how many
combinations of threats and assets should be studied? Will each respondent focus on one
scenario, perhaps a power plant asset combined with a terrorist attack threat? Or will a list
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of potential threats be used to gauge perceptions of the asset overall, like a power plant
subjected to threats of flood, earthquake, tornado, insider threat, and terrorist attack?
Perception Models
The models typically used for collecting and analyzing perception data are the Social
Amplification of Risk Framework, the Cultural Theory Model, and the Psychometric
Model. There are pros and cons to each methodology, so they will be explored and the final
perception model will be selected accordingly. This research will explore how a perception
model performs when applied to CIKRKA, but also how the resulting data can be
integrated with threat, vulnerability, and consequence data, so those constraints will affect
our decision and determine which model is selected for the risk quadruplet.
Social Amplification of Risk Framework
The social amplification of risk framework is an interdisciplinary approach, combining
psychology, sociology, anthropology, and communications ("Risk Perception," 2010). It
assumes that communications of risk events travel from the sender to the receiver through
intermediate stations (such as individuals, groups, and the media) and in that process, the
receiver's perceptions are amplified or diminished. The framework attempts to ascertain
why some risks are considered more important and thus receive public attention, and why
other risks are considered less important and thus receive little to no public attention ("Risk
Perception," 2010). While interesting, this framework seems inappropriate and overly
complicated for this research, which is less interested in the impacts of risk communication
and more interested in the perception of risks from certain risk scenarios to CIKRKA.
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Cultural Theory Model
The cultural theory model assumes that people choose to worry about certain risk
scenarios based on their social engagements and the model tends to link world views
(egalitarian, hierarchy, individualistic, and fatalistic) and perceptions using group and grid
indices (Lennart Sjoberg, 1999). Group indices measure one's membership in certain
groups and one's freedom of expressing opinions differing from the norm, whereas grid
indices measure one's respect for others, specifically authority figures. This model usually
only explains approximately 5%-10% of the variance of perceived risk (Lennart Sjoberg,
1999), and again it does not appear to lend itself to easily gauging perceptions of CIKRKA.
Psychometric Model
Psychometrics is a field that studies the measurement of knowledge, perception,
abilities, or personality characteristics. The psychometric model appears to be the preferred
method for studying perceptions of risk. According to the traditional psychometric model
approach, perception is a fiinction
Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1979):

of risk scales, usually nine dimensions (Slovic,
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1. Voluntary - Involuntary
2. Chronic - Catastrophic
3. Common - Dread
4. Certainly Not Fatal - Certainly Fatal
5. Known to Exposed - Unknown to Exposed
6. Immediate - Delayed
7. Known to Science - Unknown to Science
8. Uncontrollable - Controllable
9. New - Old
Using this approach up to approximately 85% of the (aggregate) variance in risk ratings
can be explained (Henry H. Willis, et al., 2005). However, the psychometric model has
been scrutinized for its use of aggregate data (versus disaggregate data). It is true that the
psychometric method explains less variance when data are not averaged over participants
prior to analysis. But, it is generally recognized that using the psychometric model for
disaggregate data changes the focus of the analysis to an exploration of the distinctions
among participants, rather than an exploration of the distinctions among risk scenarios
(Henry H. Willis, et al., 2005). The traditional psychometric model is focused on
aggregate-level risk scenario-focused analysis, which is the goal of this research. Should
the psychometric model be selected, the data will be aggregated to emphasize the
distinctions between risk scenarios (Henry H. Willis, et al., 2005).
But are the nine traditional risk scales (Slovic, et al., 1979) still valid for homeland
security and CIKRKA? In addition to the nine traditional risk scales previously mentioned,
the psychometric model can be further improved by including another risk scale, described
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as "Tampering with Nature" or "Immoral Risk" (Lennart Sjoberg, 1999). This risk scale
might be explained as "Natural - Unnatural" where natural risk scenarios fall on one
extreme and terrorism falls along the other, with manmade accidents perhaps falling
somewhere near the unnatural end of the scale. This scale could be used to address the allhazards approach to homeland security and homeland defense that must deal with EPR&R
to both natural hazards, as well as accidents and terrorist attacks. And for the purposes of
our research, perhaps a new scale could be introduced, something along the lines of "CIKR
- KA" where the extremes are used to determine whether the type of asset affects risk
perceptions.
For the past quarter century, research on perception has been dominated by Slovic,
Fischhoff, and Liechtenstein's psychometric model. Traditionally, participants rank a large
number of risk scenarios with regard to their perceived benefit to society, perceived risk
(personal and/or social), the acceptability of the current risk, and their position along each
of the nine risk scales (Bronfman & Cifiientes, 2003; B. Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein,
Read, & Combs, 1978; Slovic, et al., 1979). The ratings of the nine risk scales are averaged
over participants and the resulting risk scenario versus dimension matrix is analyzed, often
using principal component analysis since many of the risk scales tend to be inter-correlated.
Principal component analysis is a mathematical procedure that converts a set of
correlated variables to a set of uncorrected variables, or principal components, where the
number of principal components is always less than or equal to the number of original
variables ("Principal Component Analysis," 2010). The principal components are selected
to account for as much of the variability in the data as possible, subject to the constraint
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that they are uncorrelated with each other ("Principal Component Analysis," 2010). These
principal components can then be used in regression analyses.
Principal components analysis can be used to explain the variation in risk ratings
(including variation unique to individual attributes) by factoring out the principal
components (comprised of the correlated risk scales) which are often named for their
shared characteristics, such as dread risk or unknown risk. Typically, a few components or
factors account for a majority of the variation (Slovic, 1987). These principal components
are then used as independent variables in regressions to predict the mean ratings of
pertinent dependent variables, such as perceived benefit to society, perceived risk (personal
and/or social), and the acceptability of the risk. Principal components analysis seems like
an unnecessary step in the psychometric model, at least for the purposes of this research as
this additional analysis would not likely be needed for the MCDA model selected for the
assessment integration.
The psychometric model is often used to explore perceptions, and an interesting
example is given for Chile (Bronfman & Cifiientes, 2003). The study examined risk
scenarios along 16 risk scales: Newness, Voluntariness, Catastrophic Potential, Dread,
Immediacy, Severity, Social Knowledge, Social Control, Social Benefit, Number of
Exposed People, Personal Knowledge, Personal Control, Personal Benefit, Personal Effect,
Current Regulation Status, and Desired Regulation. These were defined and rated on 7 or
10 point rating scales (psychometric scales often used with questionnaires). Three risk
constructs were explored, including social risk, personal risk, and acceptability. Finally, 54
risk scenarios were analyzed, grouped by type of risk scenario, and each risk scenario was
scored along the risk scales and risk constructs in a survey. The design was blocked into
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four surveys and administered to approximately 500 people, only 100 of which actually
completed all four surveys (Bronfman & Cifuentes, 2003).
Once the data was collected, principal components analysis was performed and three
main factors were identified. Factor 1 (Dread Risk) included Catastrophic Potential, Dread,
Severity, Voluntariness, and Social Control. Factor 2 (Unknown Risk) included Social
Knowledge, Newness, and Immediacy. Factor 3 (Personal Effect) included Number of
Exposed People, and Personal Effect. Additional analysis compared social versus personal
results, using regression models with the three factors to model personal risk, social risk,
and risk denial (the difference of the two). Analysts also conducted regressions using the
three factors to model acceptability, desired regulation, and the difference between the
desired regulation and the current regulation.

16 Risk Scales
•Catastrophic
Potential
•Dread
•Immediacy
•Severity
•Social
Knowledge
•Social Control
• .

3 Risk
Constructs
•Social Risk
•Personal Risk
•Acceptability

54 Hazards
•grouped by
type of hazard
•each hazard
scored along
risk scales and
risk constructs

4 Survey
Blocks

•~500
•~100 took all
4 surveys

Principal
Components
Analysis
•Factor 1:
Dread Risk
•Factor 2:
Unknown
Risk

'/

* *> ' «•

•Desired
Regulation

Figure B.l. Psychometric Model Example

•Factor 3:
Personal
Effect

124

Using this example as a guideline for the first phase of the risk quadruplet methodology
might be the most appropriate application of a risk assessment methodology to the risk
quadruplet. Participants could be asked to rate a number of risk scenarios, specific to
CIKRKA along a series of risk scales. Mean ratings could be computed for each risk
scenario along each scale. The resulting risk scenarios versus risk scales matrix could be
analyzed using principal components analysis to determine which factors explain the most
variance. The survey could be limited to social risk scales and risk constructs. It may not be
possible to test so many risk scenarios, but it may be possible to test a small sample of
natural and unnatural risk scenarios, perhaps using a taxonomy to randomly select risk
scenarios. The survey design could be blocked into three surveys, one each for CI, KR, and
KA, so that perceptions could be compared and contrasted across asset type. The CIKRKA
could even be randomly selected from the DHS Infrastructure Data Taxonomy (IDT).
However, given the many challenges discussed already, a full blown psychometric
model may not be possible or even necessary. While the psychometric model is probably
the best candidate for collecting and analyzing perception data for CIKRKA, that is not the
only goal of this research. The other goal of this research is to determine a risk quadruplet
methodology

for

integrating

threat,

vulnerability,

consequence,

and

perception

assessments, ultimately ranking CIKRKA based on that integrated assessment. The
outcomes of the traditional psychometric model may not be compatible with the assessment
integration model selected for the third phase of the risk quadruplet.
It is common to use questionnaire studies to consider the levels of acceptable risk or the
perceived seriousness of a wide variety of natural and man-made hazards (B. Fischhoff, et
al., 1978). And expert judgment-based risk methodologies might use descriptive words like
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high, medium, or low to describe the characteristics that play a role in the risk scenario
(Mallor, Garcia-Olaverri, Gomez-Elvira, & Mateo-Collazas, 2008). Therefore, a reduced
psychometric model, based on a much simpler questionnaire that elicits qualitative expert
judgments could still be a valid perception assessment approach for the purposes of this
research.
So, after reviewing the risk perception models available to us, the psychometric model
seemed like the most appropriate candidate for the first phase of the in vivo risk quadruplet
methodology. However, given the ER model and IDS software selected for the assessment
integration phase, a full blown psychometric model seems unnecessary, especially as it
would not provide data immediately compatible with ER, the selected assessment
integration model. Therefore, a reduced psychometric model, based on a much simpler
questionnaire that elicits qualitative expert judgments will be employed for the purposes of
the risk quadruplet methodology. Inquisite provides a survey tool for designing and
deploying the survey, as well as for collecting the perception data. IDS provides a data
input tool and data warehouse for us to load the perception data after it has been collected.
This risk quadruplet methodology will be discussed further in APPENDIX D.
Technology
Many of the research limitations discussed in the first phase of the risk quadruplet
would drastically affect the collection of perceptions. Concerns such as respondent
selection and participation, as well as the design of a survey (or other data collection tool)
could greatly impact the type and amount of data able to be collected. The data collection
tool and analysis could become unwieldy if multiple assets and risk scenarios are
considered. And while blocking by CIKRKA may reduce respondent burden, it could pose
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a technological challenge whether disseminating a survey or conducting a focus group. All
of these matters will be intertwined with the perception model chosen, as well as the
technology available at the time of the study.
Regardless of the data collection methodology, or the model selected, the first phase of
the risk quadruplet will require a means to assess perceptions. Technology can be used to
assist with some of these challenges. Inquisite is software that can be used to design and
deploy surveys, collect data, as well as analyze respondent data ("Inquisite," 2011). Using
this software it would be possible to select a sample of experts and ask them a series of
perception questions tailored to fit the models selected for the first and third phases of the
risk quadruplet methodology.

Phase 2. Threat, Vulnerability, and Consequence Assessments
"The dangers of life are infinite, and among them is safety. "
- Goethe
Data Collection
Understanding the different types of threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessment
data, whether those data are available to be leveraged, collected, or simulated is extremely
important to the risk quadruplet methodology. One option would be to leverage data from
threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessments. However, risk data are not often
collected or displayed consistently. However, risk data are often not collected or displayed
consistently. This data could still contain an element of subjectivity, depending on how the
assessments were conducted, but it could also incorporate objective data. For example, if
the risk scenario under study was flooding, there is historical data available on the impact
of flooding to a particular region and its assets. There would be documented information on
the consequences such as causalities or cost to repair damages. It might even be possible to
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determine whether any recommended fortifications provided additional security against
flood damage over the years to provide some insight on vulnerabilities. These assessments
might provide scores, which could be used directly or which could be coded to a linguistic
set, similar to one used for collecting perception data. Assessments that use risk scores are
rarely normalized, so comparing a risk score from one study to that from another study is
like comparing apples to oranges. For example, some may calculate risk where threat has
an associated threat severity probability distribution, vulnerability is a conditional
probability (the probability of a successful attack, given the attack is identified), and
consequence is based on some loss function (McGill, Ayyub, & Kaminskiy, 2007). Other
assessments use risk words like low, medium, or high, or color coding like red, yellow, or
green to describe the severity of a risk. For example, expert judgment-based risk
methodologies might use descriptive words like high, medium, or minimal to describe
certain characteristics that play a role in the threat scenario (Mallor, et al., 2008). However,
access to this type of information is obviously restricted due to its sensitivity.
If the data are not available, it is possible that those assessments could be conducted to
produce results, but this would have a significant impact on the time and scope of the
research. We could attempt to collect that data during the perception assessment phase of
the risk quadruplet methodology, but that would again impact the time and scope of the
research. Additionally, it could make it more difficult to segregate perception data from
threat, vulnerability, and consequence data. We would basically be forced to collect
perception data on the impact of a risk scenario to CIKRA, as well as perception data on
threat, vulnerability, and consequence to CIKRA. Actual threat, vulnerability, and
consequence assessments might rely in part on subject matter expertise, but could also
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contain quite a bit of objective data, as well, so relying solely on perceptions would defeat
the purposes of integrating threat, vulnerability assessments with perception assessments.
The goals of this research are to assess perceptions of CIKRKA, determine a
methodology for integrating threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessments with the
CIKRKA perception assessment, and to ultimately rank those CIKRKA accordingly
(Figure 1.3). Therefore, it is not within the scope of this research to determine a
methodology to collect (or to translate leveraged) threat, vulnerability, or consequence data.
These assessments are already being conducted by asset owners and operators, DHS, or
DoD. We can assume that real-world data for threat, vulnerability, and consequence
assessments exists and could be fit to our model, allowing us to focus on how to integrate
that data with the perception data.

Phase 3. Assessment Integration
"Living at risk is jumping off the cliff and building your wings on the way down."
- Ray Bradbury
The final phase (assessment integration) is the most crucial. Many approaches exist that
could integrate these disparate perception, threat, vulnerability, and consequence
assessments. Based on the goals of this research, the result of this phase of the risk
quadruplet methodology must be a ranking of CIKRA from highest risk to lowest risk
(Figure 3.5).
Multi Criteria Decision Analysis Models
The research is dependent upon the MCDA model used to integrate the threat,
vulnerability, consequence, and perception assessments. Options for an integrated risk
quadruplet assessment methodology include AHP, ANP, ER, and MAUT. However, each
of these approaches would require complex software. The research may be limited based
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on the availability of software at the time of analysis. It is valuable to analyze these
different alternatives in order to select the most appropriate MCDA model.
Analytic Hierarchy Process
There are benefits to using AHP and there is precedence for using it to assess risk
(Millet & Wedley, 2002). The hierarchy provides a means for systematically evaluating the
complex problem of ranking CIKRKA. It also provides a method for quantifying the
relative weights of different criteria and factors making it easier to compare
incommensurable items (such as CI versus KA; or loss of life versus loss of money).
However, AHP is not without criticism. When ranking alternatives in terms of their
attributes, some experts would argue that as new alternatives are added to a problem, the
ranking of the old alternatives must not change, in other words, rank reversal should not be
permitted. But, as we know all too well, especially in the realm of homeland security and
homeland defense, new alternatives do (and should) cause rank reversal sometimes. For
example, the September 11th terrorist attacks were considered a black swan event,
unforeseeable, and forever changing the landscape of threat, vulnerability, and consequence
assessments for CIKRKA. Most AHP software can handle both approaches, either allowing
for rank reversal or not, depending on the preference of the user.
Furthermore, AHP is sensitive to the hierarchical model proposed. If the model is
incomplete, or otherwise inadequate, then all results of the AHP would be questionable.
The AHP model would need to be vetted with stakeholders and experts, in the hopes of
adequately reflecting the complex decision making problem of integrating threat,
vulnerability, consequence, and perception assessments to rank CIKRKA. If AHP were
selected for this research, Figure B.2 offers an example of our potential model. The goal
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would be to rank CIKRKA using threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception
assessments.
/

.

\

CIKRKA

Figure B.2. Analytic Hierarchy Process Example

Analytic Network Process
While both AHP and ANP use pairwise comparisons to measure weights and rank
alternatives, there are some fundamental differences between these two approaches (Figure
B.3). AHP structures a decision problem as a hierarchy with a goal, decision criteria, and
alternatives. It also requires independence of all elements in the hierarchy, so the decision
criteria must be independent, and the alternatives to be considered must also be
independent, not only from each other, but also from the decision criteria. ANP, on the
other hand, does not require independence among elements. Often there is interdependence
among alternatives and decision criteria, so this is an improvement over AHP. The way
ANP handles this is to structure the decision problem as a network, which might be useful
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for the purposes of our research as threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception are
most likely interrelated, not independent.

•Uses pairwise comparisons to rank
alternatives
•structures a decision problem as a
hierarchy
•requires independence of all elements in
the hierarchy

•Uses pairwise comparisons to rank
alternatives
•structures a decision problem as a
network
•does not require independence of all
elements

Figure B.3. Analytic Hierarchy Process versus Analytic Network Process

Multi Attribute Utility Theory
MAUT builds utility functions for multiple attributes, independently, then combines
these utility functions using weighted multi attribute models (additive models are common,
but more complicated models exist). Next, one must determine the indifference probability
between a sure thing and a gamble. This requires strong assumptions of independence,
including (mutual) preferential independence and (mutual) utility independence.
Attribute Y is preferentially independent of X if preferences for specific outcomes of Y
do not depend on the level of X. For example, say that Y is number of days to complete a
job, maybe 5 or 10 days. And the cost to perform the job, X, is either $100 or $200.
Assume that the cost is $100 no matter what, whether it takes 5 days or 10 days. If we
prefer a 5 day time frame, then even if we raise the cost to $200 (again, for both 5 and 10
days), then we would still prefer 5 days. In this case, Y is preferentially independent of X.
For mutual preferential independence, we also need X to be preferentially independent of
Y, so we need to prefer the lower cost, no matter how many days it takes to perform the
job.
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Utility independence is basically a stronger form of preferential independence. Y is
utility independent of X if preferences for uncertain choices involving different levels of Y
are independent of the value of X. In other words, if there is a 50% chance that Y is 5 days,
and a 50% chance that Y is 10 days, then regardless of whether X is fixed at $100 or $200,
we would still prefer 5 days. For mutual utility independence, then we just need to reverse
X and Y and see if the independence still holds.
If these assumptions are validated, then we would set up a reference gamble to
determine the indifference probability. In our example, the sure thing would be that X is
some cost between the best case (X+) and worse case (X-) scenarios ($100 < X < $200),
and Y would be some duration for the job to be completed. In this case Y+ would be the
lesser of the two values, assuming we wish the job to be completed in a shorter period of
time, so Y+ < Y < Y- (or 5 < Y < 10). We are interested in the utility, U(X, Y) versus the
utility of a gamble. The gamble would have two scenarios based on a chance outcome.
There is a best case scenario, (X+, Y+) or ($100, 5), which has probability p. There is also
a worst case scenario, (X-, Y-) or ($200, 10), which has probability 1-p. Then we find p
such that we are indifferent between the sure thing and the gamble (Figure B.4).
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Figure B.4. Multi Attribute Utility Theory Example

However, these assumptions of independence do not always hold. Without the
assumptions of independence, MAUT could become extremely challenging to implement.
Furthermore, this model requires significantly more time in order to conduct these
reference gambles and determine each respondent's utility. Due to lack of resources,
MAUT is not a viable option for this research. In fact, regardless of resources, the model
does not lend itself to integrating the types of data available for threat, vulnerability,
consequence, and perception assessments.
Evidential Reasoning
An appealing option for a risk quadruplet integrated assessment methodology is ER,
which deals with problems having both quantitative and qualitative criteria under
uncertainty, such as ignorance or randomness (Huynh & Nakamori, 2005; Huynh, et al.,
2006). It is used to support decision analyses, assessments, or evaluation activities. It
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addresses the decision problem using a belief structure to model an assessment with
uncertainty, a belief decision matrix to represent a problem under uncertainty, ER
algorithms to aggregate criteria for generating distributed assessments, and belief and
plausibility functions to generate a utility interval which measures the degree of ignorance.
It may be easier to understand ER by walking through an example (Figure B.5).
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Figure B.5. Evidential Reasoning Example
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Assume that your company wants to upgrade their computers, so they hire a consulting
company to choose between Macs, Vaios, ThinkPads, and Dells. The consulting company
has four departments: cost analysis, system analysis, risk analysis, and technology analysis.
Each department provides an evaluation vector, assessed in linguistic terms (none, very
low, low, medium, high, very high, and perfect). A model is used to solve the problem
consisting of two steps. First, obtain a collective performance value, Xj, for each option.
Where P(X;>Xj) loosely translates as the "performance of a; is as at least as good as that of
a/'. Then

apply a

selection

process based

on collective

performance vector

V(ai)=IP(Xi>Xj) where i^j and the best alternative would be the one for which V(aj) was
maximized.
We could use a similar approach for our integrated risk assessment. The alternatives
would be different assets. The evaluation vectors would be threat, vulnerability,
consequence, and perception. The linguistic set would be very similar (none, very low, low,
medium, high, and very high) to describe the level of threat, vulnerability, consequence, or
perception for that particular asset. IDS will ensure that the data is captured consistently for
all four assessments. Then the ranked performance vectors would output an overall ranking
of assets from highest (riskiest) to lowest.
Both ER and AHP use a hierarchy to model a MCDA problem, however, ER differs
from AHP in a number of ways. With AHP all of the alternatives comprise the lowest level
of the hierarchy, but with ER the alternatives are not included in the hierarchy at all (Xu &
Yang, 2001). Further, ER uses a generalized decision matrix where each element of the
matrix is an assessment of a given attribute using belief degrees. The decision matrix in
AHP merely describes the relative importance of one attribute over another, therefore, "ER

137

can be used to assess an alternative against a set of standards, while AHP can only compare
the relative importance between attributes" (Xu & Yang, 2001). Finally, ER aggregates the
belief degrees of lower level attributes to higher level attributes gradually, until it achieves
and overall score, whereas AHP aggregates average scores based on pairwise comparison
(Xu & Yang, 2001). One implication of these differences is that ER can tackle large-scale
MCDA problems (without limits on the number of alternatives or attributes). Also, as new
attributes are added, an ER model does not need to be re-evaluated since each attribute is
scored for each alternative separately. ER also does not suffer from a common AHP
problem known as rank reversal, which can occur when new attributes are added to an
AHP model. Perhaps most importantly, ER can handle mixed data, including random and
deterministic, qualitative and quantitative, as well as incomplete data for some attributes.
And ER can even incorporate AHP procedures into certain aspects of a model, such as
using pairwise comparisons to weight attributes against each other (Xu & Yang, 2001).
Technology
Technology will have a significant impact on the MCDA models, as the availability of
software to conduct such analyses at the time of research could be limited. Software for
AHP is widely available, but can be very expensive. Software for ANP and MAUT are not
as common. ER appears to be the preferred MCDA approach for the risk quadruplet and
conveniently, there is free ER software available. IDS uses a belief decision matrix to
model MCDA problems under uncertainty, "including subjectivity, randomness, and
incompleteness" ("IDS," 2010). It can communicate risk and decisions through graphical
data visualizations, making it a logical choice for this research.
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APPENDIX C
LITERATURE REVIEW
International Risks: Risk Management and Risk Perception in a Global Context
Risk Management by Country
The OECD is a collection of 30 democratic governments which work together to
address the economic, societal, and environmental challenges of globalization. OECD
members include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the
Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the US
("OECD Studies in Risk Management: Innovation in Country Risk Management," 2009).
The OECD provides a neutral forum for governments to compare policy experiences, seek
answers to shared concerns, and identify best practices. A recent OECD report commented
on National Level Risk Assessments conducted by six countries, including the United
Kingdom, Canada, the Netherlands, Singapore, and Japan, as well as the US which
conducted its SNRA with FEMA soon after the OECD report. The report focused on each
country's risk management approach to large scale events such as natural disasters, terrorist
attacks, and pandemic diseases, all of which pose serious consequences for the country's
population and national assets.
Risk Management Programs
Each of the six countries have assigned at least one government agency to oversee an
all-hazards risk management framework (DHS and FEMA are the main entities for the US,
but they obviously work closely with many other agencies). All six countries have also

adopted an all-hazards approach to risk management (for example, the US follows the DHS
National Response Framework and National Preparedness Goal). Singapore's Whole-ofGovernment Integrated Risk Management framework stood out as a best practice as it
identifies cross-agency risks, not just the risks associated with disasters, themselves.
Additionally, each country has a policy coordination body in place (the US equivalent is
the Homeland Security Council), which conducts policy-planning for large-scale disasters,
usually reporting to the highest levels of government (the Homeland Security Council
consists of Secretaries from a number of related departments and agencies and reports
directly to the president). The report also reviews each country's approach to mitigation
planning, cost-wise risk mitigation, resilience and continuity of operations, risk financing,
risk transference, but of particular interest to this research, OECD also explored protection
of CI. Only four of the six countries maintain an infrastructure protection program ("OECD
Studies in Risk Management: Innovation in Country Risk Management," 2009); in the US,
this is covered by the NIPP. While it is recognized that there is not a unanimous view
across countries about which infrastructure sectors are critical, each of the four countries
understood the need to protect both physical and cyber systems "essential to the minimum
operations of government and their individual economies". All six countries recognize the
importance of risk concepts such as interdependent vulnerabilities which can lead to
cascading effects. And even though only four of the six countries have a program in place
to address infrastructure protection, each of the six countries has identified those assets it
considers crucial ("OECD Studies in Risk Management: Innovation in Country Risk
Management," 2009).
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The OECD study identified 16 CI sectors (some of which we would classify as KR
and/or KA sectors based on our definitions). Of these sectors, most of them map to those
given in Table C.5, with a few exceptions. OECD listed Public Safety as a sector, and the
US does not include that in its 18 CIKR sectors. Furthermore, the US identifies three
additional categories not included in the OECD report (Information Technology, Postal and
Shipping, and Critical Manufacturing). OECD also noted that approximately 80% of CI in
the four countries listed above were privately owned and operated, making public-private
coordination extremely important.
Risk Management Tools
Also of interest to this research is the OECD review of the risk management tools
leveraged by the six participating countries. The United Kingdom uses a National Risk
Assessment, which is basically a traditional risk matrix used for visually scoring risks along
a scale of likelihood and impact (Figure C.l). The descriptions of likelihood, impact, and
risk are given qualitatively using terms like "negligible" to describe an estimated likelihood
of less than 0.005%, which is also given as a ratio of less than a 1 in 20,000 chance.
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Figure C. 1. United Kingdom National Risk Assessment

Three of the countries in the study conduct short-, medium-, and long-term risk
assessments. In Singapore, risk scenarios are identified and reviewed every three years
("OECD Studies in Risk Management: Innovation in Country Risk Management," 2009).
Many of the countries are also looking at multidisciplinary risk assessment approaches,
combining GIS and probabilistic risk assessment models to produce hazard maps, a
valuable tool for communicating risk. Other disciplines are being leveraged, as well,
including economics, sociology, and of special note for our research (as it relates to risk
perception), the field of psychology.
Global Risks
In 2006, the WEF began to release an annual series of reports in an effort to work
"towards a more sophisticated understanding of global risks" ("Global Risks," 2006). The
original purpose of these reports was to identify and assess current and emerging global
risks, study their interdependencies, determine the potential consequences for different
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markets, and to improve the mitigation of these global risks. WEF consistently categorized
global risks into five classes in their annual Global Risks Reports from 2006 to 2012
(Figure C.2).

Figure C.2. Global Risks: Risk Categories

In 2006, economic risks included oil prices and energy supply, asset prices and
indebtedness, the current account deficit and state of the dollar in the US, impending fiscal
crises, China, and critical infrastructures. Societal risks included regulation, corporate
governance, intellectual property rights, organized crime, global pandemics, chronic
diseases in the industrialized world, epidemic diseases in the developing world, and
liability regimes. Environmental risks included tropical cyclones, earthquakes, climate
change, and the loss of ecosystem services. Technological risks included convergence of
technologies,

nanotechnology,

electromagnetic

fields,

and

pervasive

computing.
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Geopolitical risks included terrorism, European dislocation, as well as current and future
hotspots.
While the five main global risk categories remain the same from 2006 through 2012,
the number and categorization of risk events within those categories evolves over time
(Table C.l). For example, retrenchment from globalization was considered a Geopolitical
risk in 2007, but from 2008 through 2011 it was considered an economic risk. Interestingly,
at least for the purposes of this research, we see that critical infrastructures (to include
underinvestment in infrastructures, infrastructure fragility, and infrastructure neglect) are
considered economic risks in 2006, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012. But critical information
infrastructures (and specifically, the breakdown of those infrastructures) appear under
technological risks from 2007 through 2012. A more detailed comparison of the risks cited
over the years by the WEF Global Risk Reports can be found in Table A.1.
Table C.l. Global Risks: Core Global Risks by Year

2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

25
23
26
36
36
37
50

Risk Assessment
The risk assessment process in 2006 was basically a risk matrix approach, where the
likelihood (Table C.2) and consequence severity (Table C.3) of different risk scenarios
(events) for each risk category, were predominantly estimated by subject matter experts on
a scale of 1 to 4 ("Global Risks," 2006). When sufficient data existed, WEF employed
statistical and actuarial methods to analyze data, but most of the estimates were qualitative.
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Risks were estimated along two timelines (short-term and long-term), and across two cases
(base-cases, or the likely trend for the risk given current information, and worst-cases,
representing the most severe outcome). Consequences were broken down into three
dimensions: asset damage, human impact, and financial impact as measured by the percent
growth of the aggregate global Gross Domestic Product.
Table C.2. Global Risks 2006: Likelihood Key

1

Low

2

Below 1%
1-10%

Moderate

3

10-20%

High

4

Above 20%

Very High

Table C.3. Global Risks 2006: Severity Key

Asset Damage
1

USS 10-50 Billion
USS 50-250 Billion

2
3

US$ 250 Billion - USS 1 Trillion
> USS 1 Trillion

4
Human Impact

< 100

1
2

100-10,000

3

10,000-1 Million

4

> 1 Million
Financial Impact

1

<2

2

.2-/7

3

.7-1.5
> 1.5

4

So, for example, in the Economic global risks category, four impending fiscal crisis
scenarios were explored: a short-term base-case where fiscal deficits decline modestly, a
short-term worst-case where fiscal positions become unsustainable, a long-term base-case
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where fiscal positions come under demographic pressure, and a long-term worst-case
where fiscal deficits are seriously challenged by demographic pressure ("Global Risks,"
2006). The likelihood and severity estimates collected and aggregated by WEF for these
four scenarios are given by (3,1), (1,1), (2,2), and (3, 3), respectively.
In 2007, the WEF seems to maintain a similar risk assessment methodology to the one
described for 2006. While the 2007 Global Risks Report alludes to a more detailed
description of their methodology ("Global Risks," 2007), the link to the extended version of
the report is broken and an online search proved fruitless. However, the number of
dimensions of consequences is obviously reduced (asset damage is eliminated), as there are
two graphics alluding to severity, one for economic loss, another for number of deaths.
Additionally, an examination of the core global risks analyzed in each year of the WEF
Global Risks Report (Table A.l) shows that the number of risks decreased slightly from
2006 to 2007 (Table C.l).
In 2008, the number of core risks increases slightly, but aside from the addition of a
completely new risk, food security, the risk assessment process is comparable to previous
years. We see that the likelihood and severity scales evolved (Table C.4) from those
displayed in 2006. One anomaly in the methodology appears when reviewing the 2008
report appendices, one of which includes a detailed taxonomy of global risks, comprising
31 risks even though only 26 core global risks were explored in the report.
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Table C.4. Global Risks 2008: Likelihood and Severity Tables

1

below 1%

2-10 billion

below 1%

1,600-8,000

2

1-5%

10-50 billion

1-5%

8,000-40,000

3

5-10%

50-250 billion

5-10%

40,000-200,000

4

10-20%

250 billion-1 trillion

10-20%

200,000-1 million

5

above 20%

>1 trillion

above 20%

> 1 million

In 2009, the number of core global risks jumps from 26 to 36. The risk assessment
methodology appears to remain comparable to that of previous years; however, the Global
Risk Network conducted a series of additional workshops and meetings, focusing on
regional risk and released three regional risk reports for Africa, Europe, and India, as well
as one topical report on global growth which looked at emerging markets and high-growth
companies ("Global Risks," 2009).
The 2009 Global Risks Report also discusses its general methodology for a number of
the tables and graphics presented. The Risk Interconnection Map is derived from results of
the WEF Global Risks Perceptions Survey, which was a web-based survey completed by
approximately 120 risk experts in 2009. The 2009 regional risk maps were created using a
methodology similar to statistical cluster analysis. Most interestingly, in 2009 what
constitutes a global risk is defined and, in general, the criteria includE global scope, crossindustry relevance, uncertainty, economic impact, public impact, and a multi-stakeholder
approach ("Global Risks," 2009).
In 2010, the core global risks remained identical to the 36 reviewed in 2009. The
methodology for the Risk Interconnection Map and the Global Risks Perception Survey
remains the same in 2010, although the number of experts which completed the survey
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increases to 200. The 2010 regional risk maps were again created using a methodology
similar to statistical cluster analysis. And the criteria for what constitutes a global risk also
remain the same ("Global Risks," 2010).
In 2011, the number of core global risks increases by one to 37, however, it is not a
simple addition of one new risk. Rather, a number of core global risks from previous years
are dropped from the assessment, while many others are introduced, such as extreme
energy price volatility, ocean governance, space security, demographic challenges, or
threats from new technologies. The number of experts that responded to the Global Risk
Perceptions Survey increases to 580. The criteria for what constitutes a global risk also
remain the same ("Global Risks," 2011).
In 2012, the number of core global risks shot from 37 to 50, which included the
introduction of a number of new risks, such as severe income disparity, antibiotic-resistant
bacteria, failure of diplomatic conflict resolution, rising religious fanaticism, and
proliferation of orbital debris. While only 489 experts participated in the 2012 survey, the
details of the survey, including the questions, demographics, and detailed results, are
included in appendices of the Global Risks Report ("Global Risks," 2012). Interestingly,
there is no breakdown of risks comparing severity by economic loss or number of deaths,
rather impact is measured on a scale of 1 to 5, as is likelihood. However, it is implied in the
appendix detailing the Global Risks Perception Survey that impact is "to be interpreted in a
broad sense, beyond just economic consequences" ("Global Risks," 2012), so impact in this
case could include economic loss, number of deaths, and even other types of consequences.
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Risk Communication
Similarly, the WEF worked to stay at the cutting edge of risk communication and risk
visualization techniques. In 2006, the WEF Global Risks Report only a few graphics were
used to display and communicate risk ("Global Risks," 2006). There was a summary table
of the likelihood and severity of the core global risks, displayed by the five risk categories
(economic, environmental, societal, technological, and geopolitical) and four cases (shortterm base-case, short-term worst-case, long-term base-case, and long-term worst-case).
There was also a set of graphics to display the top short-term risks with the highest
severity, the top long-term risks with the highest severity, and similar graphics were broken
down by the 5 risk categories (Figure C.3).
The Top Short-term Risks With the Highest Severity Ranking

The Top Long-toim Risks With the Highest Severity Ranking

i

£
• UktBtood

1

2

3

4

Figure C.3. Global Risks 2006: Top Risks

The 2007 WEF Global Risks Report displayed 23 core global risks in three dimensions
(Figure C.4): likelihood, severity (in terms of economic loss), as well as a dimension
described as "increasing consensus around risk" ("Global Risks," 2007). Each risk was
displayed along its coordinates for likelihood and severity, but its marker was displayed as
varying hues of blue to denote the level of consensus around the risk. A similar graphic was
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displayed for the 23 core global risks, only severity was displayed in terms of the number
of deaths associated with the risk. WEF also introduced a global risk barometer, a table that
showed the 23 core global risks and whether their overall risks had increased, stabilized,
decreased, or caused expert disagreement. The barometer was used to compare these risks
not to the past, but to the future, looking at whether the significance of the risk for the next
ten years has become more or less critical ("Global Risks," 2007). Additionally, the report
included a correlation matrix graphic, which helped to visualize, through the use of a
network diagram (Figure C.5), the fact that risks do not manifest independently, but are
often interrelated with other risks ("Global Risks," 2007). The correlation matrix helps us
visualize the strength of the high-level correlations between risks, as they are perceived by
experts to exist. The strength of the correlation is represented by the thickness of the lines
connecting the risks ("Global Risks," 2007).
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Figure C.5. Global Risks 2007: Correlation Matrix

The 2008 Global Risks Report used a graphic very similar to the 2007 one to display
likelihood and severity (by economic loss, as well as number of deaths), but abandoned the
additional dimension regarding the consensus around the risk. It also display a network
graphic to depict the interrelationships amongst the core global risks, however the graphic
is reimagined and includes additional risk information ("Global Risks," 2008). Though
originally called a correlation matrix, in 2008 the graphic is referred to as a social
networking diagram (Figure C.6). Again, the thickness of the lines represents the strength
of the correlation between the risks connected, but now the size of the nodes indicates the
assessment of the risk and the proximity of the nodes relates to the similarity of the
correlations.
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Figure C.6. Global Risks 2008: Social Network Diagram of Global Risks

In 2009, the 36 core global risks were visualized by likelihood and severity, both
economic loss and number of deaths (Figure C.7), however, this time around they used
color coding to show whether that risk was a new risk, or if it had increased, decreased, or
remained stable since the 2008 Global Risks Report ("Global Risks," 2009). Additionally,
some nodes were split to show that the likelihood had increased, but the severity had
decreased (or vice versa). It appears that this is merely a way of communicating the
information from the risk barometer alongside all of the other global risk information. The
risk barometer is still included in the report, but as an appendix.
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Figure C.7. Global Risks 2009: 36 Core Global Risks

The Risks Interconnection Map (Figure C.8) evolved slightly. Node size continued to
denote severity, line thickness continued to refer to the strength of the interconnection
between nodes. And the proximity of the nodes indicates that those risks are closely
interlinked. Additionally, the node colors which indicate to which category the risk is
aligned (red - economic; dark green - geopolitical; light green - environmental; purple technological; blue - societal). And the direction of a thicker line segment demonstrates
that of the two interconnected risks, one risk has a stronger dependence or interdependence
("Global Risks," 2009).
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Figure C.8. Global Risks 2009: Risks Interconnection Map

A new graphic was introduced in 2009, which shows a country's exposure to risks
(Figure C.9). Interestingly, four of the risk categories displayed in the graphic align to the
global risk categories, but one (health) seems to be a substitute for the societal global risk
category. The graphic aligns the country's exposure to risk along two scales: economic
risks versus a combined scale of geopolitical, environmental, health, and technical risks
("Global Risks," 2009). Similar graphics were included in the report to display a country's
exposure to asset bubbles and economic risks, as well as geopolitical risks versus oil
dependency.
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Figure C.9. Global Risks 2009: Exposure of 160 Countries to Global Risks

Also new in this report, the Risks Interconnection Map is spliced and reorganized in
later sections of the report to highlight certain risks and their relationships, such as water,
which is described as being at the "nexus of many risks", including infectious disease,
infrastructure, food prices, amongst others ("Global Risks," 2009). An example pertinent to
this research is given in Figure C.10, which shows the infrastructure risk and all of its many
interconnected risks, noting that an investment in risk mitigation for infrastructure is
extremely important as it could impact so many related risks ("Global Risks," 2009).
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Figure C.10. Global Risks 2009: Infrastructure

The 2010 Global Risks Report again displayed 36 core global risks (Figure C.ll), but
this time it only displays those risks by severity of economic loss; there is not a separate
graphic showing the severity by number of deaths ("Global Risks," 2010). Additionally, the
graphic did not include the barometer information (whether the risk had increased or
decreased), although the barometer was again included in an appendix. Instead, the color
coding only shows the categories to which each risk aligns (economic, geopolitical,
environmental, societal, and technological).
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Figure C.l 1. Global Risks 2010: 36 Core Global Risks

An example of a breakdown of the 2010 Risk Interconnected Map is given in Figure
C.l 2 for the risk of underinvestment in infrastructure. The severity of the risk is denoted by
the width of the line around the node, the likelihood of the risk is given by the size of the
node, the category of the risk is shown in the color of the node, the proximity of the risks
indicate they are highly interconnected, and the degree of interconnectedness is displayed
in the width and darkness of the line between nodes ("Global Risks," 2010). A country risk
map, similar to Figure C.9 is given in the 2010 report, but only to compare the global
retrenchment risk versus the global governance gap risk. A Risks Interconnection Map
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similar to Figure C.8 is also displayed, though it is much more complex and dense given
the increase in the number of core global risks.
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Figure C.12. Global Risks 2010: Infrastructure Interconnect Risks

The 2011 report again displayed the core global risks by likelihood and (economic)
severity (Figure C.13), where the size of the node related to an increased perceived
likelihood, the darkness of the node related to an increased perceived severity, and the color
of the node related to the category of the risk ("Global Risks," 2011). The Risks
Interconnection Map received a comparable face-lift (Figure C.14), where the nodes
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provide the same information as the core global risks chart, and again the thickness and
darkness of the line indicate a strong, perceived interrelationship between the nodes.
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Figure C. 13. Global Risks 2011: 37 Core Global Risks

In 2011, the fact that the estimates of risk likelihood, severity, and connectedness are
based on perceptions is really highlighted in the 2011 report. It was always described in
previous reports that these charts and graphs were based on data collected in the Global
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Risks Perception Survey, but now the charts and graphs actually include the word
perceived in their keys. The report breaks down the Risks Interconnection Map to examine
a subset of risks, dubbed "risks in focus" (Figure C.15), to include the macroeconomic
imbalances nexus, the illegal economy nexus, and the water-food-energy nexus ("Global
Risks," 2011).
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Figure C.15. Global Risks 2011: Risks in Focus

In the 2011 report appendices, we see a breakdown of the survey results, to include a
top ten list of risks by combined likelihood and impact, the highest ranking of which was
global climate change. Further analysis of the Risks Interconnection Map also results in a
top ten list of risks based on the average strength of their interconnections, the highest
ranking of which was economic disparity. Very interestingly, the survey results also
include a comparison of the risk perceptions amongst respondents given basic demographic
information (Figure C.16), such as whether they were representatives of government,
business, academia, or international organizations, and whether they are from North
America, Europe, or Asia ("Global Risks," 2011). The categories of risk about which each
group was most concerned seems pretty logical. For example, government representatives
were concerned mostly with societal risks, whereas business representatives were
concerned with economic risks. This was the first Global Risks Report to explore how our
unique perspectives affect our risk perceptions. The global risks barometer is mentioned in
an appendix, but it is relocated to the web as an online resource.
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Figure C.16. Global Risks 2011: Differences in Risk Perception Among Respondents

In 2012, the graph of the 50 core global risks displays likelihood and impact, instead of
severity (Figure C.17), where impact is shown along a generic scale from 1 to 5, which is
also the scale used for likelihood ("Global Risks," 2012). The color of the node relates to
the category of risk to which it is aligned. It appears that the size of the node relates to its
combined increase in likelihood and severity, but there is no key to confirm this. There are
also 5 charts which break down the core global risks by each category of risk (economic,
environmental, geopolitical, societal, and technological).
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Figure C.17. Global Risks 2012: 50 Core Global Risks

Again, the 2012 report included information on the participants in the Global Risk
Perception Survey, as well as additional graphics detailing the risk landscape broken down
by respondent regions (Figure C.18). Similar charts were shown to compare the risk
landscape broken down by respondent affiliation (business, academia, government, etc.). A
new, and interesting visual comparison was presented in this report, which showed how
risk perceptions differed between experts in different areas. For example, a risk landscape
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is shown in Figure C.19 for respondents who claimed to be experts on issues related to one
of the risk categories (economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal, or technological)
versus all other respondents (also considered experts, but perhaps not in that particular
area). Interestingly, the only risk landscapes that appear to differ is the one for
environmental issues, otherwise, subject matter area experts and other respondents seem to
agree on the likelihood and impact of risks across the different categories ("Global Risks,"
2012).
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Figure C.18. Global Risks 2012: Risk Landscapes by Region

<3

165
EtparknooanofMctnMDS

Oftaratpart*

j* _

-

*

* •

l(MM

**

• « !

*U

^

Btports in jgwtegnanm t&wos

Othar oKpertx

#

• •
I •
*

I 1MM

*

h

w

n

I

^ Bcpafe to gacftfMfc* ttHQft

•

••

•%
•

i
BtparkfeisocMMtKKKK

•

%
*

I
OthariMyli

••
*•

&pork m tocrvaatogieai ^stuei

Ottvar aKparts

Figure C.19. Global Risks 2012: Risk Perception Comparison of Experts

166

National Risks: Homeland Security in the United States
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Figure C.20. Homeland Security Timeline

In Figure C.20, a timeline of homeland security and CIP in the United States (US) is
provided, consisting of government directives, acts, and plans. In 1996, Executive Order
13010 (EO 13010) introduced the concept of cyber threats and their potential impact to CI
(Executive Order 13010: Critical Infrastructure Protection, 1996). In 1998, Presidential
Decision Directive NSC-63 (PDD-63) set up a national program of CIP (Presidential
Decision Directive (PDD-63/NSC-63), 1998). After the September 11th attacks, the
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) authorized additional measures to
prevent terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act, 2001). By 2002, the Homeland Security Act (HSA)
created DHS, whose mission was to protect the US from terrorists and natural disasters. It
also included the Critical Infrastructure Information Act (CILA), which allows for the
voluntary submission of sensitive information regarding CIKR to DHS with the assurance
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that the information will be protected from public disclosure (Homeland Security Act of
2002,2002).

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 3 (HSPD-3) created a Homeland Security
Advisory System (HSAS) with color-coded threats to inform government and public of the
current risk of terrorist acts (HSPD-3, 2002). The National Strategy for Homeland Security
(NSHS) outlined the strategic considerations for cooperation between federal, state, and
local government, as well as the private sector, in order to anticipate future terrorist attacks,
natural disasters, or other incidents of national significance. It included the National
Response Framework (NRF) which acts as a comprehensive emergency management
guideline for implementing EPR&R (NSHS, 2002). HSPD-5 established the National
Incident Management System (NIMS) to cover the prevention of, preparation for, response
to, and recovery from terrorist attacks, disasters, and emergencies (HSPD-5, 2003). The
National Strategy of the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets
(NSPPCIKA) established a national policy to protect CI and KA from terrorist attacks
(NSPPC1KA, 2003). In 2003, HSPD-7 added cybersecurity and additional risk management
functions to the DHS mission and established the National Infrastructure Protection Plan
(NIPP), a framework for CI identification, prioritization, and protection (HSPD-7, 2003).
HSPD-8 mandated the development of a National Preparedness Goal and the National
Preparedness Guidelines, aimed at helping entities at all levels of government build and
maintain the capabilities to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from major
events "to minimize the impact on lives, property, and the economy," (HSPD-8, 2003).
HSPD-9 merely added agriculture to the list of industries for CIP (HSPD-9, 2004).
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The 2006 NIPP established a partnership structure for coordination across 18 CIKR
sectors, as well as a Risk Management Framework (RMF) to identify assets, systems,
networks, and functions whose loss or compromise would pose the greatest risk {National
Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2006). In 2007, the National Preparedness Guidelines were
released and were considered to be a call to action for an all-hazards, risk-based, umbrella
for a range of readiness activities (.National Preparedness Guidelines, 2007). In 2008, DHS
introduced the DHS Risk Lexicon, which attempted to establish a comprehensive list of
terms and meanings relevant to the practice of homeland security risk management and
analysis (DHS Risk Lexicon, 2008). The NIPP was updated in 2009 (National
Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2009) and the DHS Risk Lexicon was updated in 2010
(DHS Risk Lexicon, 2010). In 2011, the National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS)
replaced the color-coded threat alert system HSAS ("National Terrorism Advisory
System," 2011).
Even more recently, DHS released the National Preparedness Goal, the National
Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF), as well as the National Preparedness System
(NPS) (.National Disaster Recovery Framework, 2011; National Preparedness Goal, 2011;
National Preparedness System, 2011). The National Preparedness Goal defines its mission
areas as prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery {National Preparedness
Goal, 2011). The NDRF provides guidance that enables effective recovery support to
disaster-impacted state and local areas, allowing disaster recovery managers at all levels of
government to operate in a collaborative effort. It emphasizes restoration, redevelopment,
and revitalization, specifically in the areas of health, social, economic, natural, and
environmental aspects of the community, making the nation more resilient to disasters or
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attacks (National Disaster Recovery Framework, 2011). The NPS relates directly to the
National Preparedness Goal and the National Preparedness Guidelines. It has six mission
area components which repeat cyclically: identifying and assessing risk, estimating
capability requirements, building and sustaining capabilities, planning to deliver
capabilities, validating capabilities, and reviewing and updating {National Preparedness
System, 2011).
Risk in Homeland Security

Figure C.21. Theorems on Communication

"Not infrequently confusion arises when experts from different fields attempt to
communicate with one another or with laymen about risks," (Becker, et al., 1993). This can
probably be attributed to Kaplan's two theorems of communication (Kaplan, 1997)
presented in Figure C.21. Kaplan also defined his risk triplet as the set of a scenario, a
likelihood, and consequences (Kaplan, 1997), which is still a very common definition
throughout the risk literature today.
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R = f (Threat,Vulnerability, Consequence)
Equation C.l. Homeland Security Risk Function

However, risk, at least in the context of homeland security (Equation C.l), is
considered to be quite a different triplet, a function of threat, vulnerability, and
consequence (National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2009). It is challenging to integrate
these disparate assessments to establish an overall picture of risk and exploring their
definitions helps us to understand why (Figure C.22). Threat is defined as a likelihood of
accident or attack (DHS Risk Lexicon, 2010). This may be hard to measure, but at least we
know what to measure: a probability. However, risk analysis literature sometimes refers to
threat as a scenario and not a probability at all. And the probabilities of certain events (like
low probability high consequence events, such as terrorist attacks) are unknown and
difficult to estimate due to their infrequency. Vulnerability is more loosely defined and the
actual measurement is not defined at all, making it difficult to know what kind of data we
would need to collect and analyze (DHS Risk Lexicon, 2010). Is vulnerability also a
probability? Is it a state of the system where either you are, or are not, vulnerable? Or is it a
conditional probability, where the likelihood of vulnerability is contingent upon a
successful risk scenario?
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natural or man-made
occurrence, individual,
entity, or action that
has or indicates the
potential to harm life,
information,
operations, the
environment, and/or
property;
however, for the
purpose of calculating
risk, the threat of an
intentional hazard is
generally estimated as
the likelihood of an
attack (that accounts
for both the intent and
capability of the
adversary) being
attempted by an
adversary;
for other hazards,
threat is generally
estimated as the
likelihood that a
hazard will manifest.

physical feature or
operational attribute
that renders an entity,
asset, system,
network, or
geographic area open
to exploitation or
susceptible to a given
hazard;
characteristic of
design, location,
security posture,
operation, or any
combination thereof,
that renders an entity,
asset, system,
network, or
geographic area
susceptible to
disruption,
destruction, or
exploitation.

effect of an event,
incident, or
occurrence;
commonly measured
in four ways: human,
economic, mission,
and psychological, but
may also include other
factors such as impact
on the environment.

Figure C.22.Threat, Vulnerability, and Consequence (DHS Risk Lexicon)

It is acknowledged that consequences could include loss of life (measured in number of
deaths or injuries) or loss of money (measured in loss of profit or cost of repairs), but the
other types of consequences are more abstract (DHS Risk Lexicon, 2010). How would we
measure mission or psychological impacts? For example, what were the psychological
impacts of 9/11 or of the combined disasters in Japan? Since natural disasters or attacks
will almost certainly have psychological impacts, this seems like a pretty important aspect
of risk, however, no means of measuring psychological impacts is given. And, perhaps
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more importantly, how do these psychological impacts affect our future perceptions of
risk? Furthermore, how do we integrate different types of consequences, let alone all three
components of risk?

potential for an unwanted outcome resting from an incident, event, or
occurrence, as determined by its likelihood and the associated
consequences;
potential for an adverse outcome assessed as a function of threats,
vulnerabilities, and consequences associated with an incident, event, or
occurrence the potential for an unwanted outcome is often measured and
used to compare different future situations;
may manifest at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels; for terrorist
attacks or criminal activities, the likelihood of an incident, event, or
occurrence can be estimated by considering threats and vulnerabilities

systematic examination of the components and characteristics 01 ns

product or process which collects information and assigns values to risks for
the purpose of informing priorities, developing or comparing courses of
action, and informing decision making;
resulting product created through analysis of the component parts of risk

M)
MliiplHaMK.

subjective judgment about the characteristics and/or severity
ity of risk; may be
driven by sense, emotion, or personal experience
Figure C.23. Risk and Related Terms (DHS Risk Lexicon)

In Figure C.23, we see definitions of risk and other related terms (DHS Risk Lexicon,
2010). By its very definition, risk analysis is the process by which the components of risk
are studied. And risk assessment is the process of collecting data and calculating risk
values. But perception, which seems to be a significant component of risk, is segregated,
almost ignored, as mere opinion.
Additional definitions from the literature add to the confusion. Ezell reviewed the many
definitions of vulnerability, which ranged from the ability to resist and recover from
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adversity, the actual susceptibility to a threat or risk scenario, or the resilience or
survivability of a system to a hazard (Ezell, et al., 2005). He further expands on this by
saying that, "vulnerability is a term that is often confused with risk," (Ezell, 2007). While
he concludes that vulnerability is a condition of a system, as understood within the context
of a risk scenario, others see vulnerability as a probability, or even a conditional
probability. For example, risk might be calculated where threat is a scenario with an
associated threat severity probability distribution, vulnerability is a conditional probability
(the probability of a successful attack, given the attack is identified), and consequence is
based on a loss function (McGill, et al., 2007). Other expert judgment-based risk
methodologies might simply use descriptive words like high, medium, or low to describe
the characteristics of risk (Mallor, Garcia-Olaverri, Gomez-Elvira, & Mateo-Collazas,
2008). Many risk keywords have numerous, and sometimes conflicting, definitions, such as
threat which might be considered the description of a scenario or the likelihood of a
scenario. And there are also many words which have similar definitions, such as threat,
hazard, and scenario, all of which refer to an event, but not necessarily its probability. In
order to be consistent throughout this research, we will redefine a number of pertinent
terms (Figure C.24).
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Figure C.24. Threat, Vulnerability, Consequence, and Perception (Revised)

Similar to Kaplan, we will also use the term risk scenario. Basically, risk scenarios are
the answers we provide when we are asked, "What can go wrong?" (Kaplan, Haimes, &
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Garrick, 2001). More formally, a risk scenario is a natural or man-made occurrence,
hazard, individual, entity, or action that has or indicates the potential to damage an asset. So
this distinguishes the term risk scenario from threat, and when we refer to threat, we speak
of the likelihood of a risk scenario. Vulnerability is considered the ability of an asset to
endure a risk scenario (Gheorghe, et al., 2008). And consequence is a measure of the
impacts resulting from a successful risk scenario. Risk perception is a subjective judgment
about the severity of a risk scenario to an asset, and will be referred to as perception
throughout this research. For the purposes of this research it is considered possible to
estimate threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception quantitatively or qualitatively.
Finally, we define risk as the potential for an unwanted outcome resulting from a risk
scenario, as determined by the threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception of that
risk scenario to an asset.

• agree
•' document risk
* ensure that
•are
on common assess
• incorporate
Recommendations

Figure C.25. Review of the DHS Approach to Risk Analysis Recommendations

In 2010, based on a request from congress, the National Research Council (NRC)
established a committee which issued the "Review of the DHS Approach to Risk Analysis"
("Review of the DHS Approach to Risk Analysis," 2010). The committee examined how

DHS was building its capabilities in risk analysis for decision making. It evaluated the
quality of the current DHS approach to estimating risk and applying those estimates in its
management, planning, and resource allocation (including grant-making) activities, through
the review of a committee-selected sample of models and methods. It assessed the
capability of DHS risk analysis methods to appropriately represent and analyze risks from
across the spectrum of activities and responsibilities, including both terrorist threats and
natural disasters and how well they support DHS decision making. The committee
reviewed the feasibility of creating integrated risk analyses covering the entire DHS
program areas, including both terrorist threats and natural disasters, and made
recommendations for best practices, including outreach and communications. And finally,
the committee made recommendations for how DHS could improve its risk analyses and
how those analyses could be validated to provide improved decision support. The
committee

uncovered

many

of

the

problems

already

discussed,

including

a

recommendation to "incorporate diverse perceptions of risk impacts", a key element of the
proposed risk quadruplet. Some highlighted recommendations are given Figure C.25.
DHS maintains the Regional Resiliency Assessment Program (RRAP) to assess CIKR,
including interdependencies, along with a regional analysis of the surrounding area
("Regional Resiliency Assessment Program," 2012). Similarly, DHS conducts a Strategic
National Risk Assessment (SNRA) to support FEMA with respect to the National
Preparedness Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-8) and the DHS National Preparedness
Goal (National Preparedness Goal, 2011; Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-8): National
Preparedness, 2011; "Strategic National Risk Assessment," 2012). PPD-8 states that, "The
national preparedness goal shall be informed by the risk

of specific threats and
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vulnerabilities..." (Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-8): National Preparedness, 2011).
The National Preparedness Goal states that, "All levels of government and the whole
community should present and assess risk in a similar manner to provide a common
understanding of the threats and hazards confronting our Nation..." (National
Preparedness Goal, 2011), noting that the information gathered during a risk assessment
also allows for the prioritization of preparedness efforts. While the specific results of the
SNRA are classified, it affirmed the need for an all-hazards, capability-based approach to
preparedness planning. The analytic approach to the SNRA leveraged "data and
information from

a variety of sources, including existing Government models and

assessments, historical records, structured analysis, and judgments of experts from different
disciplines" (The Strategic National Risk Assessment in Support of PPD 8: A
Comprehensive Risk-Based Approach toward a Secure and Resilient Nation, 2011). The
SNRA assessed the risk of identified risk scenarios (which were broken down into three
categories: natural, technological or accidental, and adversarial or human-caused).
Interestingly, risk for the SNRA was assessed as a function of frequency (that a risk
scenario would occur) and consequence (the impacts should the risk scenario occur);
vulnerability was not assessed. Additionally, six categories of consequence were explored
including, "loss of life, injuries and illnesses, direct economic costs, social displacement,
psychological distress, and environmental impact" (The Strategic National Risk Assessment
in Support of PPD 8: A Comprehensive Risk-Based Approach toward a Secure and
Resilient Nation, 2011).
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Critical Infrastructure, Key Resources, and Key Assets
The definitions of CIKRKA have evolved over time (Critical Infrastructure and Key
Assets: Definition and Identification, 2004). After a review of the authoritative literature
which addresses CIKRKA, it is clear that there exists some confusion over these terms,
which provide the foundation of, and context for, CIP in the realm of homeland security
and homeland defense. Most federal documents now refer to the combined term CIKR. KA
is now an outdated term after being officially replaced by DHS in a footnote of the NIPP
(National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2006). However, it is recommended that we
resurrect the defunct definition because these items are unique and deserve to be explored
independently.
The official definitions are given below:
•

Critical infrastructure: assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or
virtual, so vital to the US that their incapacitation or destruction would have a
debilitating effect on security, national economic security, public health or
safety, or any combination thereof (DHS Risk Lexicon, 2010)

•

Key resources: publicly or privately controlled resources essential to the
minimal operations of the economy and government (DHS Risk Lexicon, 2010)

•

Key assets: individual targets whose attack—in the worst-case scenarios—
could result in not only large-scale human casualties and property destruction,
but also profound damage to our national prestige, morale, and confidence
(NSPPCIKA, 2003)

But even these definitions are not ideal; they are self-referential and they are not
mutually exclusive. Of course, given the inherent overlap between CIKRKA, such as the
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Hoover Dam, it may be impossible to craft mutually exclusive definitions. Revised
definitions are proposed below (Figure C.26). Additionally, we will define the term assets,
the collective, generalized term used to represent the combination of all CIKRKA.

jl

1
• government and
private systems
essential to the
operation of our
nation in any or all
aspects of the lives of
its citizens (health,
safety, economy, etc.),
such as utilities,
facilities, pipelines,
etc.

• public or private
resources essential to
the operation of our
nation's government
and economy, such as
fuel or goods.

• those buildings,
geographic regions,
monuments, or icons,
whose destruction
would cause a
crushing blow to our
nation's ego, morale,
and identity, but which
are not essential to the
operation of our
nation, such as the
Washington
Monument or the
Statue of Liberty.

Figure C.26. Critical Infrastructure, Key Resources, and Key Assets (Revised)

In a Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, the definitions of CIKRKA were
explored. A table was presented that illustrated the introduction of CIKR sectors over time,
based on their mention throughout different government documents (Critical Infrastructure
and Key Assets: Definition and Identification, 2004). This table has been updated (Table
C.5) and is presented below to show how the list of sectors has evolved over time, even
since the table was first presented in 2004.
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Table C.5. History of Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Sectors

Banking and Finance
Communications
Emergency Services
Energy
Government Facilities
Transportation Systems
Water
Healthcare and Public Health
Information Technology
Agriculture and Food
Chemical
Defense Industrial Base
Commercial Facilities
National Monuments and Icons
Postal and Shipping
Dams
Nuclear Reactors, Materials and
Waste
Critical Manufacturing

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X

X
X

There are greater system of systems comprised of multiple CI, which in conjunction
with the KR (the inputs and outputs from these system of systems), aim to meet the daily
essential operating needs of our nation. For example, a water treatment plant (CI) requires
electricity (KR) to operate and that electricity reaches the plant through an electric power
grid connected to a power plant. But that power plant requires fuel in order to generate
electricity, and in most cases, that fuel must be transported to the power plant via train or
truck, and so on. So that water treatment facility might be directly compromised by any
number of CI failures, such as a delayed delivery of fuel to a power plant, which leads to a
power outage. But, that same water treatment plant not only requires power, but it also
requires water (KR), so if water pipelines (a CI system necessary for delivering a KR) are
compromised, or if there is a drought, then a similar problem exits: there would be no clean
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drinking water. Furthermore, this domino-effect could continue, because the lack of clean
drinking water could cause a local health epidemic, which could create a strain on
hospitals, which may lack the capacity to treat the influx of patients or which may also be
suffering from the power loss. Examining individual CI is not sufficient if the goal is the
protection of the greater system of systems of CIKR.
Below is a list of the latest DHS CIKR sectors (Table C.6). Using the new definitions
of CIKRKA given above, the National Monuments and Icons, Commercial Facilities, and
Government Facilities sectors are comprised mostly of KA, not CI or KR. The remaining
sectors typically consist of both CI and KR. For example, the Energy sector consists of not
only power plants and power lines, but also of the coal or gas used to generate that power,
and the Critical Manufacturing sector consists of the iron and steel which it produces and
processes in mills or plants. There are also many obvious dependencies and
interdependencies which add to the complexity of CIKRKA protection. For example, the
Energy sector is dependent upon the Communications sector to provide the information
technology infrastructure required to operate power plants or natural gas pipelines, such as
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, while the Communications
sector would be nearly paralyzed if there were a power failure.
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Table C.6. Critical Infrastructure and Key Resource Sectors

Energy
Government Facilities
Healthcare and Public Health
Information Technology
National Monuments and Icons
Nuclear Reactors, Materials and Waste
Postal and Shipping
Transportation Systems
Water

Agriculture and Food
Banking and Finance
Chemical
Commercial Facilities
Communications
Critical Manufacturing
Dams
Defense Industrial Base
Emergency Services

Furthermore, there is also an obvious overlap between some CI and KA (Figure C.27).
In these situations, if the KA has a primary function as a CI, then it is aligned to that sector,
although the secondary sector, for which the CI is a KA, may also collaborate with the
primary sector, at least for the purposes of risk assessment. For example, the Hoover Dam,
while iconic, is aligned to the Dam sector (National Monuments and Icons: Critical
Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-Specific Plan, 2007).

Critic aI 111fra st ructii re
Key Resources

Hoover Dam
(.olden <Jate Bridge

Military

I w in lowers

Bwato

Sear* Tower

L'*

Pentagon
Capitol Building

Kev Assets

Casino#
Amusement Parks
Stadiums
Washington Monument
Statue of Liberty
St. Louis Gateway Arcb
Yellowstone National Parte
Smltlmiu Museums

Figure C.27. Intersection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets
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Systems and System of Systems
According to general systems theory, there are a number of attributes that define
systems. Systems are comprised of interrelated or interdependent objects. Systems exhibit
holistic properties not necessarily evident at the level of individual objects or subsystems.
Systems seek to achieve some final goal or state, and in order to reach this goal they
transform inputs into outputs. Systems tend to devolve into entropy without regulation and
are typically organized in a hierarchical system of nested subsystems where the subsystems
are specialized with different functions within the system. Finally, a system either diverges,
in which case it has many ways of achieving a single goal, or it converges, where, from an
initial state, it could achieve many different goals (Skyttner, 2005).
Quite simply, many of these same attributes hold true for a system of systems, just on a
much larger scale (Figure C.28). Skyttner describes the system of systems phenomenon as
a "hierarchy of systems" in which systems are components of, or rather, subsystems of,
other systems (Skyttner, 2005). A system would be considered a "system of systems" when
its component systems each have a purpose of their own and would continue to operate
even if separated from the overall system, and if those component systems are managed
individually, rather than being managed within the context of the entire system of systems
(Maier, 1998). However, this does not address the issue of scale. By this definition, a single
condominium unit could be a system of systems, having many subsystems such as heating
and running water, each of which are managed separately by the different utility
companies, or, examined from a different perspective, the entire condominium complex
could be a system of systems where each condo is managed separately by its owner, and so
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on. Often, the concepts of complexity and geographic distribution are also introduced when
referring to system of systems (Maier, 1998).

•comprised of interrelated or
interdependent objects
•exhibit holistic properties not evident in
subsystems
•seek to achieve some final state by
transforming inputs into outputs
•devolve into entropy without regulation;
hierarchically organized
•diverge or converge

•hierarchy of systems in which entire
systems are subsystems of other systems
and those component systems each
•have their own purpose and would
operate separately from the overall
system
•are managed individually
•often display complexity and widespread
geographic distribution

Figure C.28. General Systems Theory and System of Systems

It is obvious that system of systems face different issues from traditional systems
(Sheard & Mostashari, 2009). Typically, system of systems seek to integrate many
independent systems which were built for other, albeit related, purposes. These system of
systems must often develop quickly in order to continue to meet the demands of the user, as
well as the demands of the overall system of systems, such as policy demands or
technological demands. As with complex systems problems, there are many different
stakeholders, each with different perspectives and requirements, some of whom do not
wish to participate in, or simply do not understand that they are a part of, a greater system
of systems. System of systems also usually depend on integrated computing infrastructure.
Further complicating things, there is distributed development for these systems, not just
geographically, but managerially, and technologically. For example, the individual
management of one system in California could require its computing infrastructure to be
upgraded, but the upgrade then renders the individual system incapable of communicating
with its related systems in New York (Sheard & Mostashari, 2009).
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Traditional systems engineering can solve system problems and even some complex
system problems. However, systems are increasingly complex, and systems engineers are
inundated with systems information, some of which may be conflicting without clear
authoritative sources, they are overwhelmed by the seemingly infinite interdependencies of
systems, and they struggle to keep up with the constantly changing missions and policies
governing different systems (Keating, Sousa-Poza, & Mun, 2004). Systems engineers
typically focus on a single complex problem and engineer (or modify) a single complex
system to address that problem. System of Systems engineers must focus on "integrating
multiple complex systems," which could be achieved by integrating existing systems into a
larger system of systems, or by engineering new systems in order to integrate existing
systems, or by replacing existing subsystems so that the larger system of systems is more
interoperable, or by replacing the entire system of systems all together (Keating, et al.,
2003).
The risk management approach to system of systems also presents its own list of issues.
For example, differences in the perspectives and goals of multiple stakeholders could lead
to problems with funding or scheduling; differences in risk management practices across
different

subsystems

could

lead

to

risk

oversights;

and

risk

integration,

or

interdependencies, are often not evaluated, rather subsystems focus on their individual risks
(Conrow, 2005). All of these concerns may ultimately increase risk for system of systems.
The 2009 NIPP mentions system of systems once, and only in reference to the
international dimension of homeland security and CIP (National Infrastructure Protection
Plan, 2009). The Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002 makes reference to a
protected system, which is defined as "any service, physical or computer-based system,
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process, or procedure that directly or indirectly affects the viability of a facility of CI or
KR; and includes any physical or computer-based system, including a computer, computer
system, computer or communications network, or any component hardware or element
thereof, software program, processing instructions, or information or data in transmission
or storage therein, irrespective of the medium of transmission or storage" (Critical
Infrastructure Information Act, 2002). It could be argued that the more appropriate term
here would be a protected system of systems as the viability of a single CIKRKA could be
compromised by its interaction with, and interdependence upon, multiple systems.
System of Systems: Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources
It can be easily argued that CI are not only systems, but system of systems. It is also
quite simple to extend the definition of system of systems to include the systems
responsible for KR as they relate directly to CI. In fact, infrastructure (not just CI, but all
infrastructure) has already been defined as a system of systems which transfers
fundamental goods or services from one point in the system to another point in the system
(Gheorghe, et al., 2008).
Maier suggests that each component system must have a purpose of its own such that it
would continue to operate even if disconnected from the overall system of systems and he
also argues that the component systems must be primarily managed individually, rather
than managed from within the context of the entire system of systems (Maier, 1998). There
are a number of ways of disaggregating system of systems and there are many more models
for managing systems, but the Transportation Systems sector has actually generated an
elegant approach for disconnecting and reconfiguring its unwieldy system of systems
(Figure C.29). They propose four different risk views, used for the purposes of analyzing

187

risk, which offer a systematic way of disaggregating or reorganizing system of systems into
more manageable components, and one of those views even teases out the system owners
and operators (the individual system managers). These four views include modal,
geographic, functional, and ownership and are depicted in Figure C.29 (Transportation
Systems: Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-Specific Plan, 2007). Looking
at the Transportation Systems infrastructure from different perspectives also allows for the
observation of emergent system of systems properties which might not be apparent across
all perspectives.

Figure C.29. Transportation Systems Sector Risk Views

The modal view consists of six modes: aviation, maritime, mass transit, highway,
freight rail, and pipeline. Delineating the sector along its different modes of transportation
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is the most common way of viewing the sector and it allows all assets from a given mode to
be collectively evaluated as a single system. The functional view disaggregates the
Transportation Systems sector by function, which is described as "the service, process,
capability, or operation performed by specific infrastructure assets, systems, or networks".
In this view, all assets that share a specific function or service, usually supply chainfocused, are grouped together. The geographic view looks at the system of all
transportation assets in a particular region, state, or city. The ownership view groups all
assets that are owned and operated by the same company or agency. Together, these four
views capture different ways of looking at transportation systems and their dependencies
and interdependencies, allowing for a robust assessment of the sector.
From a system of systems perspective, these different views offer a very interesting
approach, which in and of itself, almost perfectly addresses Maier's two components for
defining a system of systems. Each of these component systems would function
independently, regardless of whether they comprise a greater system of systems. For
example, the aviation system operates independently from the highway system or,
geographically speaking, the Seattle system operates independently from the Miami
system. Furthermore, many of these systems (or groups of systems) are managed
individually, so while highways might be managed by their respective state's department of
transportation, marine ports might be managed by the navy or the state's port authority.
The complicated integration of these systems through necessity (transportation is a vital
service for any nations' citizens) or through overarching policies (like those of the National
Transportation Safety Board, in this case) creates a massive system of systems, which,
itself is only one system within the even greater and even more complex system of systems
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which includes all of the nation's CIKR (for example, the Transportation Systems sector is
extremely dependent upon the Energy sector for fuel).
Interestingly, Gheorghe's definition of a system of systems refers directly to CI
(Gheorghe, et al., 2008). A system of systems is defined by Gheorghe as the combination
of several interdependent CI showing the characteristics of a single system, but lacking on
overarching management entity. In the latter part of the definition, he and Maier seem to
agree that the greater system of systems lack centralized command and control, so to speak.
However, with the advent of DHS and its CIKR protection initiatives, do these CIKR
system of systems now possess central management?
Another attribute often ascribed to system of systems is the notion of geography;
typically a system of systems is spread over a much larger geographic region than a single
system. Gheorghe notes that the "ever-accelerated geographical expansion of the energy,
transportation, and telecommunications infrastructure has resulted in the emergence of
enormous networks that transcend national borders and even continental shores"
(Gheorghe, et al., 2008). Again, the Transportation Systems sector offers itself as a
wonderful example of how a large system of systems can quickly span a major
metropolitan area through highways and mass transit, then suddenly expand to include the
air above the region, the water along its coastlines, even the pipelines beneath the ground.
A geographically widespread system composed of independent and individually
managed

CIKR systems, which, when

integrated, exhibit dependent, or even

interdependent, component systems, should most definitely be considered a system of
systems. However, describing such a system of systems is sort of like describing a fractal;
every time you get to one node in the complex system of systems, there are multiple nodes

«
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which split and regenerate in similar or slightly altered ways, some even turning back in on
themselves. Starting at what might be considered an initial system node in the Energy
sector, we can pinpoint the CI, such as oil rigs, which are designed specifically for the
production of KR, such as oil and gas. Then there are CI designed to distribute that crude
oil and gas to nearby refineries or processing plants. Refineries and processing plants
transform KR, as they are designed to input crude oil and gas, and output refined oil and
gas fit for end users. Additionally, there are CI systems which further distribute these KR,
such as pipelines which transport natural gas to homes for cooking or heating. Sometimes
the fuel is further transformed by a system, like when natural gas is used in a power plant to
generate electricity. And speaking of electricity, there are even more CI to distribute the
KR of electricity, which powers countless other assets, including the very oil and gas
production facilities described at the beginning of this example.
System of Systems: Key Assets
The National Monuments and Icons sector is composed of assets, systems, networks,
and functions throughout the US, many of which are listed in the National Register of
Historic Places or the List of National Historic Landmarks {National Monuments and
Icons: Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-Specific Plan, 2007). In general,
these assets do not have a purpose or function which aligns to one of the other CIKR
sectors. This sector includes KA which may be physical structures like monuments,
operational staff (and visitors), historical or significant documents and objects, as well as
geographic areas, like parks or historical areas.
The Commercial Facilities sector is similar to the National Monuments and Icons sector
in that it is also comprised of KA, such as arenas, stadiums, museums, casinos, amusement
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parks, and malls ("Commercial Facilities Sector: Critical Infrastructure and Key
Resources," 2010). The Government Facilities sector consists of buildings such as
embassies and courthouses, which could also be considered KA ("Government Facilities
Sector: Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources," 2010). Further distinguishing these
sectors, is their lack of extreme interdependencies with other sectors, which is so apparent
when examining other CIKR system of systems. These KA usually depend on other sectors
for the operation of the physical structures (power, water, communications, etc.), but the
relationship is one way; there is no case where a CI or a KR would be directly dependent
on a KA, unless that KA overlapped with another sector, in which case it would be
classified as a CI. For example, the Hoover Dam, while iconic, is aligned to the Dam
sector, and considered primarily a CI, and similarly the Golden Gate Bridge is aligned to
the Transportation Systems sector.
Maier's definition for system of systems seems to apply when first examining KA. KA
are individually managed and would, indeed, operate for their own purpose if separated
from a greater system of systems. For example, the Statue of Liberty would continue to
operate even if the Mall of America in Minneapolis was closed, and KA are not typically
managed by the same agency or company, although some groups of monuments are
managed collectively such as the Lincoln Memorial and the Washington Monument
(among others), which are all part of the National Mall and Memorial Parks, operated by
the National Park Service with the US Department of the Interior (DOI) ("Lincoln
Memorial," 2011b). However, Maier's definition requires KA to first be considered a
system, before being considered components of a greater system of systems (Maier, 1998).
And, according to Skyttner, KA may not be considered systems because they do not seek to
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achieve some final goal or state by transforming inputs into outputs (Skyttner, 2005). KA
do not have a traditional systemic purpose and are not seeking to produce, transform, or
transport anything. Future research might shed some light on how this distinction impacts
the inclusion of KA in the greater CIKR system of systems, especially for the purposes of
ranking those assets based on risk.

Risk Analysis
Defining risk and risk management is no easy feat. However, it is a necessary step
before we can explore how we calculate risk, or how we perceive risk. Linguistically, risk
suffers from risk-archipelago syndrome (Althaus, 2005), in other words, a number of
distinct specializations have evolved due to the wide range of definitions for risk (such as
risk perception, risk analysis, risk mitigation, and so on). The origin of the term is disputed,
but reviewing the possible etymology of the word may explain why we still struggle to
define this word today. Risk could be derived from the Arabic word risq which basically
translates as something you received from which you can profit; or from the Latin word
risicum which refers to the challenge posed to sailors by a barrier reef (Althaus, 2005).
More recently, different professional organizations describe risk as "the potential for
realization of unwanted, adverse consequences", the "(perceived) feeling of insecurity and
fear due to undesirable consequences", the "probability of the occurrence of (the risky)
event multiplied by the consequence of the event, given that it has occurred", or even as
"events that if they occur can jeopardize the successful completion of the projects" (Pinto,
2008).
Further complicating risk analysis, systems now consist of many separate parts which,
together, provide an overarching capability not achievable at the level of the individual
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subsystems (Garvey & Pinto, 2009). These system of systems do not have clear boundaries,
requirements, or specifications, so managing these risks is much more challenging (Garvey
& Pinto, 2009). Additionally, the analysis of risk is typically considered to be scenariodriven, in other words, we cannot analyze a risk unless we can conceive of such a risk
(Pinto, 2008), and obviously that brings us back to our perceptions of risk.
Risk Calculation
Risk is often calculated as the product of the probability that a risk event will occur and
the magnitude of the consequences should the risk event occur (Kasperson, et al., 1988).
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) and Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) are direct
applications of this definition, in which both assessments typically aim to answer the same
three questions: 1) what can go wrong? 2) how likely is it? and 3) what are the
consequences? (Apostolakis, 2004). Later, the concept of vulnerability was introduced to
form the current risk triplet often shown in a deceivingly straightforward equation given in
Equation C. 1 where Risk is a function of threat, vulnerability, and consequence. Threat is
usually the probability of an attack (or accident) occurring, vulnerability is often considered
to be the probability of a successful attack, and consequence is the magnitude of the impact
given that the attack occurs and that it was successful (based on the level of vulnerability at
the time of the attack). Others have argued that this equation is inadequate and misleading
(Cox, 2008), citing a multitude of reasons. Just one example would be the arithmetic
distortions which could reverse the proper risk ranking of two risks if one has high
vulnerability and low consequence while the other has high consequence and low
vulnerability. Algebraically reorganizing Equation C.l produces an alternate equation
(Equation C.2) that, when examined, would lead to some interesting results.
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Vulnerability = Risk/(Threat * Consequence)
Equation C.2. Homeland Security Risk Function (Rearranged)

Ignoring for the moment that threat and vulnerability are probabilities, and simply
examining the relationships implied by Equation C.2, we see that vulnerability is inversely
proportional to threat, so as threat increases, vulnerability would decrease, but that does not
make sense. Vulnerability, intuitively, cannot decrease unless measures are taken to either
reduce the likelihood of an attack (if that is possible to control), or to reduce the potential
for success of an attack. This might be akin to a soccer team which wants to have a good
offense, and failing that, a good defense. Vulnerability is also inversely proportional to
consequence, so as consequence increases, vulnerability would decrease. Again,
vulnerability can only be altered by the measures taken to reduce the probability of success
of an attack, and increasing the potential consequences of an attack would not be a good
way of reducing the vulnerability of an attack.
More interesting relationships are uncovered when we account for the fact that threat
and vulnerability are often both considered probabilities and while the product of positive
integers results in a larger integer, the product of probabilities results in smaller
probabilities. Table C.7 shows the variables from

Equation C.2 and assigns random

numbers between 0 and 1 to represent the probabilities and random numbers between 0 and
100 to represent the consequences. We also include a baseline which we will use to
compare different scenarios.
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Table C.7. Risk Equation

0.233234094
0.601075973
86
12.05646128

Threat
Vulnerability
Consequence
Risk

0.5
0.5
50
12.5

Because there are four variables and there are two possible deviation options from their
baseline values (up or down), we have 4 , or 16, possible scenarios, given in Table C.8.
There was a randomly generated instance for each of the following scenarios, except for the
completely illogical ones (down-down-down-up and up-up-up-down). The down-downdown-down and up-up-up-up scenarios make sense, intuitively. However the remaining
scenarios are not intuitive and could greatly misrepresent risk. Even if we hold
consequence constant, we see similar results in Table C.9.
Table C.8. Risk Equation Simulation Scenarios

Tlireat

Down

Up

Down

Down

Down

Down

Down

Down

Vulnerability

Down

Down

Up

Down

Down

Up

Up

Down

Consequence

Down

Down

Down

Up

Down

Up

Down

Up

Risk

Down

Down

Down

Down

Up

Down

Up

-

V *

Up
*

**

X.

Threat

Up

Down

Up

Up

Up

Up

Up

Up

Vulnerability

Up

Up

Down

Up

Up

Down

Down

Up

Consequence

Up

Up

Up

Down

Up

Down

Up

Down

Risk

Up

Up

Up

Up

Down

Up

Down

Down

Table C.9. Risk Equation Simulation Scenarios (Constant Consequence)
'.J3

Threat

Down

Up

Down

Down

Down

Up

Up

Up

Up

Vulnerability

Down

Down

Up

Down

Up

Up

Down

Up

Down

Consequence

Same

Same

Same

Same

Same

Same

Same

Same

Same

Risk

Down

Down

Down

Up

Up

Up

Up

Down

Down
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These results do not necessarily jive with our feelings about risk, in general. For
example, if threat is reduced from a probability of 0.50 to 0.10, but vulnerability increases
from 0.50 to 0.99 and consequence increases from 50 to 99, Risk actually decreases from
12.5 to 9.8. While the probability of a successful threat has been reduced, there is still some
level of threat, and now, if that threat were to occur, there is such a dramatic increase in the
probability of success of that attack, coupled with an increase in the potential consequence
of that impact, the attack would be devastating. These low-probability, high-consequence
events really throw a wrench into the mix when trying to calculate risk.
The type of consequence and the order of magnitude of the consequence can also cause
problems. For example, if threat and vulnerability are both increased to 0.70, but
consequence is reduced to 20 instead of 50, then Risk decreases from 12.5 to 9.8. If
consequence is defined by billions of dollars, then reducing the Risk from 12.5 to 9.8
billion dollars does not seem all that significant. But if consequence is defined by
thousands of fatalities, then the difference between 13,000 deaths and 10,000 deaths does
seem significant. But is death even acceptable for the risk under discussion? And how do
we integrate multiple consequences? We could determine a risk value based on monetary
consequences, then another risk value based on fatalities, and somehow try to integrate
them. Or we could assign death a monetary value, based on life insurance policies, perhaps.
Or we maybe could perform a weighted linear model, where the weight for consequence of
fatalities is significantly higher than that of money, then we could integrate the
consequences and try to calculate an overall risk. But with either approach, we are still
adding apples and oranges in the hopes of producing pears.
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Furthermore, how do we integrate multiple assessments into a single, meaningful
assessment, score, or report? Data from multiple assessments could be drastically different
depending on data collection methods or data sources. And what about risk assessments for
CI that are also considered KA? Or what if the asset falls into multiple CI sectors, as well
as KA sectors? How do we integrate risk assessments from all of these different
perspectives? While traditional probabilistic risk assessments might be applicable to CIKR,
are they applicable to KA? The current risk assessment methodology for handling KA is
basically a semi-quantitative risk prioritization approach (.National Monuments and Icons:
Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-Specific Plan, 2007). But the Hoover
Dam can be aligned to the Dam, Water, Transportation, and Energy sectors, not to mention
the National Monuments and Icon sector since it is also a KA, so which sector produces the
right risk assessment? Are all of the different risk assessments incorporated into a single
estimate of risk for the Hoover Dam? Can that overall score be compared against the risk
scores of other CIKRKA?
Risk Perception
Risk has been described as a construct. In other words, "risk is all in the mind"; it is not
just something that we can observe, rather it is something which affects everything that we
observe (Becker, et al., 1993). Depending on the filter affecting our perceptions, we may
see risks differently. A policeperson might see a busy intersection and see the risk of car
accidents, where as an environmentalist might see the risk of pollution from all of the car
exhaust, yet the driver of a car whizzing through the intersection sees only the risk of a
speeding ticket as he notices the police car in his rear view mirror. The way we attempt to
define, assess, and model risk, is thus, a construct, as well.
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Early risk perception research focused on the cognitive aspects of the acceptability of
risk, such as how and why we make the decisions we do, how we factor risk into those
decisions, what we consider to be acceptable risk, whether or not we are capable of
estimating risk accurately, and why we underestimate or overestimate some risks. The
question we are seeking to answer through risk analysis and risk assessments is whether or
not a given product (action, technology, asset, resource, or infrastructure) is safe. But risk
perception asks, "How safe is safe enough?" (B. Fischhoff, et al., 1978).
In more recent years, risk perception has been introduced to the field of homeland
defense and homeland security, or, rather, the pressing issues of homeland defense and
homeland security have unfolded before our very eyes, no doubt affecting our collective
risk perceptions. During the September 11th attacks, we became aware of our own
vulnerability in an instant (Small, Lerner, & Fischhoff, 2006). Risk perceptions after a
tragic event are bound to be shaped by emotions (Small, et al., 2006), but reacting based on
those risk perceptions, rather than based on unbiased evidence, could lead to further
tragedy. Risk perceptions changed so drastically after this pivotal event that the US went to
war (to reduce threat likelihood) and simultaneously created a new department, DHS with
its mission to protect our nation's borders, CIKRKA, and citizens (to reduce vulnerability
likelihood).
Fischhoff was one of the first to realize the implications for the field of risk perception
and subsequently contributed a handful of articles dealing with terrorism. He even
supported the proposal to allow the public to rank (some of the) risks for regulatory policy
(Fischbeck, 2001). This approach was intended to be expanded to "ecological, social, and
other quality-of-life risks" (Fischbeck, 2001), but it could definitely be extended to
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CIKRKA risks. Soon after the September 11th attack, "Effects of Fear and Anger on
Perceived Risks of Terrorism: A National Field Experiment" was published and it explored
the effects of anger or fear on risk perceptions and policy partiality, determining that fear
increased risk estimates of terrorism and the desire for protective measures, whereas anger
had the opposite effect (Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003).
Fischhoff also noted the importance of September 11th in our quotidian risk perception,
remarking that the attack "has thrown many everyday choices into sharp relief' (B.
Fischhoff, De Bruin, Perrin, & Downs, 2004). Deciding where and when to travel is no
longer just a matter of personal preference or price, but could require consulting the current
HSAS to determine the threat level (B. Fischhoff, et al., 2004). Of course, the threat level is
almost always yellow, which is described as "Significant Risk of Terrorist Attack"
("Homeland Security Advisory System," 2010), so how does that play into our risk
perceptions of terrorism? When the threat level is truly elevated, does anyone even notice?
Are we the nation who cried terrorist?
Slovic also offered some unique post-September 11th opinions on risk perception,
beginning with an emphasis on a persistent problem with the risk quantification of largescale terrorist attacks such as September 11th; they are extreme events, black swans, highconsequence low-probability events (Slovic, 2002). Slovic actually called these events "a
new species of trouble" (Slovic, 2002). Slovic stated that people "respond to the hazards
they perceive" (Slovic, et al., 1979). And if the risk perceptions of those risk scenarios are
not in sync with reality, decision makers cannot make adequate judgments in order to
mitigate those risks.
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Slovic was aware that risk management had become political and controversial in 1999,
but it undoubtedly became more so after September 11th (Slovic, 1999). He argues that
"danger is real, but risk is socially constructed" and since the government controls the
definition of risk, it also controls the risk response and risk mitigation plans, which can
cause the public to mistrust the government if the public disagrees with the definition of
risk or the proposed response to, or mitigation of, that risk (Slovic, 1999). Judgments about
risk are influenced by emotion and this is the only common denominator amongst the
public, policy makers, and even risk analysts who supposedly look at risk as a science;
none of us are immune to the effects that our emotions have on risk determination. For
example, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) spent the majority of its budget for
years on hazardous waste because the public perceived that to be the most serious
environmental priority for the nation, even though indoor air pollution is actually
considered to be a more serious health risk by experts (Slovic, 1999). Slovic proposes that
public participation in both the risk assessment and risk decision making process would
improve the scientific assessments of risk, as well as increase the public's acceptance of the
resulting decisions (Slovic, 1999).
The supposed laws of acceptable risk (Table C.10) were first developed by Starr early
in the history of risk perception (B. Fischhoff, et al., 1978). They were derived from an
analysis of risk versus benefit based on historical data of fatalities per hours, an approach
that is very similar to a failure rate analysis in reliability engineering. Risk was defined as
the expected value of the number of fatalities for every hour that one was exposed to the
risk event. Benefit was defined as the average amount of money spent on the risk activity
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or the average amount of money the risk activity would contribute to one's annual income
(Starr, 1969).
Table C.10. Laws of Acceptable Risk

Risk Acceptability (RA) is proportional to the cube of the Risk Rewards (RR)

(RA a RR3)

The public generally accepts risks from voluntary activities that are about 1,000
greater than involuntary activities, even if both activities offer equivalent
rewards

(RA,=
1,000*RAv)

RA is inversely related to the size of the population exposed to that risk

(RA a (l/nE))

The level of risk tolerated for voluntarily accepted hazards is approximately
equal to the level of Risk from Disease (RD)

(RAV = RD)

Do Starr's laws of acceptable risk still hold true? Are they applicable to CIKRKA
risks? If RA is still proportional to the cube of RR, then what constitutes a RR in risk
assessments of CIKRKA? Does the public still tend to accept risks from voluntary
activities more than involuntary activities? If RA is inversely related to the size of the
population exposed to that risk, how does RA relate to the region of the risk, or the time of
the risk, both of which could affect the size of the population exposed to the risk? Is RD
still a good measuring stick for voluntarily accepted risk scenarios, or has the
communication of information about RD (an involuntary risk, after all) over the past 30
years altered this relationship?
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Figure C.30. Perceived Risk Scales

Many talk about risk as a function of threat, vulnerability, and consequence (H. H.
Willis, 2007), but it seems obvious that the risk triplet is inadequate. Risk is also a function
of our risk perceptions, and through risk perception, other factors influencing our risk
perception of risk can be explored, such as those given in Figure C.30. And other factors
may influence our risk perceptions, such as the location of an asset, the time of day, month,
or year of an attack on that asset, or even the type of asset at risk (CI, KR, or KA).
It has long been a challenge to evaluate multiple assessments of risk. Multiple risk
assessments, even those which all seek to assess the same risk event or facility, etc., could
vary widely. Risk assessments could be based on risk data or risk perceptions. The data
from one assessment could be drastically different from the data of another assessment if
the data collection methods or data sources differ significantly; furthermore, one
assessment could incorporate factors such as whether the risk was voluntary or involuntary,
while another might attempt to calculate risk using traditional risk equations (Turner,
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1994). Even the definition of consequences can drastically affect the risk calculations, and
there are many types of consequences (economic, environmental, or in some cases loss of
life) which must all be assessed in order to give the best possible overall risk picture.
A great example here would be the integration of risk assessments for CI which are also
considered KA. Traditional probabilistic risk assessments, which might be applicable to
CIKR, are probably not applicable to KA such as the Washington Monument or the St.
Louis Arch. Still, an attack on such assets would have significant repercussions on our
nation's morale and would, in turn, affect our risk perceptions. Haimes remarks that it may
not matter whether the threat to CIKRKA is a natural risk scenario or an unnatural risk
scenario, as the consequences may be similar, however "the psychological and political
impacts are likely to be significantly different" (Haimes, 1999) and an attack on a KA is
most likely to be a manmade attack, aiming to affect our national psyche.
The current risk assessment methodology for handling KA is basically a semi
quantitative risk prioritization approach {National Monuments and Icons: Critical
Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-Specific Plan, 2007). Could risk perceptions be
incorporated into an overall risk assessment methodology for KA? Could risk perceptions
be used to integrate multiple risk assessments of the same asset? For example, the Hoover
Dam would have a traditional risk assessment viewing the facility from the perspective of
CIKR (the structure itself, as well as the water it controls), but it could also have a risk
assessment which views the facility from the perspective of a KA (in addition to its primary
function as a dam, the structure is also a national icon and tourist site). But how are these
two risk values aggregated to provide an overall risk profile?
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Perhaps risk perception could learn from

the field of CIP in this case. The

Transportation Systems sector introduced the concept of risk views. These risk views
describe the types of transportation systems in terms of four views: mode, geography,
function, and ownership (Transportation Systems: Critical Infrastructure and Key
Resources Sector-Specific Plan, 2007). Together, these four views capture different ways
of viewing transportation systems, allowing for a robust assessment of the sector. From a
systems analysis perspective, this is a very interesting systematic risk management
approach incorporating risk perception. Furthermore this approach could be expanded to all
other sectors and subsectors. In addition to the Transportation Systems views, there could
be Energy risk views for Oil, Gas, as well as Electricity.
Even if we calculate risks accurately, we may not be able to subjectively estimate those
risks independently. We might not be able to accurately recall the frequency of risk events,
which would influence our estimates of risk. Or we might give weight to other factors in
our subjective estimates of risk, such as whether the risk is voluntary or not (Kasperson, et
al., 1988). We are often called upon to factor risk into our everyday decisions, but we are
not likely to refer to calculated risks, or any other data for that matter, in order to make
common decisions, like whether to go for a run after dark, or whether it is safer to take a
plane or a ship to reach our vacation destinations.
Risk biases can even be introduced by our vernacular. For example, when asked the
chances of a rainy day next Saturday, a person might respond, "fifty-fifty". It is possible
that the speaker places equal probability on both hypotheses (either it will rain, or it will not
rain), but it is probably more likely that the speaker is not sure which probabilities to use in
order express her belief, because quite frankly she does not know whether it will rain or not
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and has no information to make a more educated guess, so rather than researching data to
inform her response, ignoring the question all together, or saying, "I don't know," she
offers a pseudo-probability (B. Fischhoff & Bruine De Bruin, 1999). Incidentally, when
attempting to incorporate perceived risks into risk calculation, the misuse of this "I don't
know" probability of 0.50 could artificially inflate the average response for events which
might typically be assigned smaller probabilities or vice versa (B. Fischhoff & Bruine De
Bruin, 1999).
We can also introduce bias through the availability heuristic (Slovic, et al., 1979), the
result of which makes us more likely to focus on frequently occurring risk events, or events
with a vivid impact (such as the September 11th attack). Slovic is quick to point out that
even the mere "discussion of any low-probability hazard may increase the judged
probability of that hazard" regardless of whether the evidence contradicts that conclusion
(Slovic, et al., 1979). Well, the future is ripe with unforeseen low-probability risk scenarios,
and if the availability heuristic, or any other bias, precludes us from imagining potential
threats, or inadvertently ignoring threats which are infrequent, then we cannot prepare for
those threats, rendering us vulnerable.
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Figure C.31. Observed Risk Versus Controllable Risk

Our estimates of risks are affected by extraneous factors which can cloud our
quantitative judgments. Figure C.31 introduces two scales or dimensions of risk:
observability and controllability (Morgan, 1993). Observable risks are described here as old
risks. These are risks for which the consequences are immediate and noticeable and
because of this, there exist rich data sets which have been studied extensively. Furthermore,
those exposed to these kinds of risks are aware of the potential consequences; automobile
accidents are plotted here as observable risks because we are all aware that we could end up
in an accident any time we drive or ride in a vehicle (Morgan, 1993). Unobservable risks
are those risks for which those exposed to the risks are unaware of the consequences
because the consequences might remain unknown or could be delayed, therefore data and
research on these risks may be limited or unavailable (Morgan, 1993). The controllability
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scale basically boils down to two factors, whether the risk is voluntary or involuntary, and
whether the consequences incite dread or not (Morgan, 1993).
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Figure C.32. Unknown Risk Versus Dread Risk

Slovic also mentions voluntariness, knowledge (or observability), and dread when
discussing risk perception (Slovic, 2002). However, as opposed to only two scales, he
proposes nine risk scales. We see in Figure C.30 that nuclear power has a more negative
risk profile (looking across the nine risk characteristics), than that of x-rays. These risk
scales influence our risk perceptions, and as a result, the public required a greater reduction
in nuclear power risk before that risk would be tolerated by society. In Figure C.32, we see
that risk perception can also be visualized in three dimensions with powerful results. Risk
events are shown on the known/unknown and dread/non-dread risk scales, but for each risk
event, the size of the point increases as the public's desire for risk regulation increases
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(Slovic, 1987). We see points where the risk is known and there is no dread associated with
the risk, and yet the public still demands increased risk regulation, because other factors are
influencing their risk perceptions.
The tools for capturing risk perceptions can even introduce bias in our responses. For
example, people are generally not as comfortable with decimals, leading them to
overestimate very small risks if a survey asks for answers in the form of percentages, rather
than asking for answers in the form of odds (B. Fischhoff, 2010). Thankfully, a welldesigned survey can be crafted to reduce most of these biases, and surveys are still an
extremely useful method for determining the levels of socially acceptable risk, as well as
other risk perceptions (B. Fischhoff, et al., 1978).
For some risk scenarios, we can temper our risk perceptions with objective statistical
data and robust risk assessments. For other, more nebulous risk scenarios, such as terrorist
attacks, we lack reliable data and must depend on our risk perceptions. This is analogous to
going with our gut and sometimes our gut is wrong. This bias can ripple through the riskbased decision making process and result in disproportionately allocated budgets. For
example, DHS allocated $675 million in Fiscal Year (FY) 2004 to 50 metropolitan regions,
all of which were perceived to be most vulnerable to terrorist attacks, based on a formula
that supposedly accounts for a number of factors, including the presence of CIKRKA,
vulnerability, population size and density, as well as law enforcement activity (H. H.
Willis, 2007). Based on a new approach which focused on regional risk, $765 million was
allocated in FY 2006, but only 35 metropolitan areas were eligible (H. H. Willis, 2007).
Someone thought that looking at risk regionally was a better approach, and it may be, but
as a result of the discrepancies in budget allocation, DHS was criticized for its inability to
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adequately calculate risk, especially risk as abstract as that of a terrorist attack, for which
there is insufficient data to use traditional probabilistic risk analysis methods. Risk
perception is most certainly playing a role here, both in the ability of DHS to calculate
these risks and allocate resources appropriately, but also in the public's criticism of DHS. A
better understanding of risk perception, calculated risk, along with the communication of
that valuable risk information, could pave the way for mutual understanding between the
public and DHS.
If the risk of a terrorist attack is perceived to be significant, regardless of the actual risk,
then policy makers may decide to allocate the majority of available funds to protecting
assets against terrorist attacks, when perhaps the true risk to an asset is deterioration due to
age and lack of repairs. We have all seen examples of overlooked infrastructure failing with
disastrous results, such as the incapacitation of the levies during Hurricane Katrina. Risk
assessments are supposed to protect us from this bias by omission, but in fact, a risk
assessment, itself, could introduce bias by drawing the decision maker's attention to all of
the potential risks, some of which might not have been obvious and could cause the
decision maker to emphasize those new risks over other more significant risks.
We ask our policy makers to "weigh the benefits against the risks" (B. Fischhoff, et al.,
1978), but there are few tools for them to determine societal RA. Fischhoff proposes
expressed preferences, a method using surveys to measure the public's attitudes towards the
risks and benefits from various activities (B. Fischhoff, et al., 1978). An approach like this
could be extended with the significant advancements in survey methodology (which could
reduce risk biases), along with online survey applications or even online tools for
performing MCDA.
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The vision statement of DHS is "a secure America, a confident public, and a strong and
resilient society and economy" (One Team, One Mission, Securing Our HomelanD US
Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2008-2013,2008). One way
to ensure the public is confident in its nation's CIKRKA is for them to actively participate
in determining the acceptable risks of those assets. Risk perception models could be used to
gauge the public's risk perceptions regarding risk to CIKRKA, similar to the public risk
ranking methods proposed for environmental, health, and safety policies (Fischbeck, 2001).
Now let us examine how perception might affect risk calculation. Often in order to
estimate threat, vulnerability, and consequence, we rely on subject matter expertise because
actual data is unavailable or difficult to collect. So, perception is inadvertently and
haphazardly incorporated into Risk (Equation C.3). In other words, we are already
integrating perception into the risk equation, but we are doing it in such a way that we
cannot tease apart what is fact and what is opinion.
Risk

f (Th.Te(ltperceptioni VulTieVClbilityperception' COnSeCJUetlCeperception)
Equation C.3. Current Risk Calculation Revisited

We need a way to systematically incorporate subject matter expertise, or even public
opinion, alongside actual data (no matter how limited that data may be). With the risk
quadruplet, we propose separating perception from threat, vulnerability, and consequence,
as its own component of Risk (Equation C.4). We would collect actual data for threat,
vulnerability, and consequence in a consistent and systematic approach, and then integrate
that data with perception data in a transparent and reproducible manner.
Risk = /(Threat,Vulnerability, Consequence, Perception)
Equation C.4. Proposed Risk Calculation
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APPENDIX D
RISK QUADRUPLET METHODOLOGY (IN VIVO)
The in vivo risk quadruplet methodology describes the data collection and model
building efforts that must be accomplished to complete this research. This is not the
methodology which will be used to test the viability of the risk quadruplet; the in vitro
methodology was discussed in CHAPTER 3 and CHAPTER 4. Rather, this is the
methodology that would be used in vivo, vice in vitro, to actually deploy the methodology
in the real world. The first phase is the perception assessment. The second phase consists of
threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessments. The final phase of the research is the
assessment integration phase, where the assessments of threat, vulnerability, consequence,
and perception are all assimilated. The three-phased methodology for the risk quadruplet
consists of three sub-methodologies, one for each phase (Figure 3.3).
To deploy the risk quadruplet in vivo, a perception survey, crafted with Inquisite,
would be used to capture perception scores along a six level scale (the linguistic set of
none, very low, low, medium, high, and very high). The survey results would be
aggregated across all respondents to determine the frequencies with which respondents
selected different grades of the perceived risk to a CI, KR, or KA given a risk scenario. ER,
via IDS, would be used to integrate the survey results for the perception attribute with the
data leveraged or collected for the remaining attributes (threat, vulnerability, and
consequence). The output of the ER model would be a ranking of the CIKRKA in order of
most to least risk, where risk is defined in the model as a systematic, traceable, and
reproducible function of threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception.
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The main driver of the in vivo methodology was the MCDA model selected for the
final phase. ER was an ideal choice for integrating the four disparate types of CIKRKA
assessments as it can cope with relationships between parent and child attributes, as well as
across all child attributes, through the use of weighting, utilities, and belief degrees. It can
also handle both quantitative and qualitative data. And lastly, it can output a ranked series
of assets based on all attributes. Once this ER model was selected and the free IDS
software was identified as the tool which could be used to implement this model, it was
soon realized that IDS could be leveraged throughout all three phases of the risk
quadruplet.
In order to implement the risk quadruplet model in vivo, we would need to provide
consistent definitions and examples for the CIKRKA, as well as an overall risk scenario.
The risk quadruplet model can be adapted and expanded to handle more complex and
lengthy lists of CIKRKA alternatives, multiple risk

scenarios, improved threat,

vulnerability, and consequence assessment data, and could even be used to integrate
perception data from experts and non-experts. However, for the purposes of demonstrating
how the risk quadruplet approach would be implemented in the real world, a simple model
is proposed consisting of a CI, a KR, a KA, and one risk scenario. Threat, vulnerability, and
consequence data would be leveraged from existing assessments or collected anew, and
perception data would be gathered via survey from volunteer experts.
The risk scenario would describe the hazard which poses a danger to the CIKRKA.
Providing a single risk scenario would allow respondents to consider their perception of
risk across the different CIKRKA. Once those common elements have been defined, the
respondent would select their perception (based on the risk scenario) for the three separate
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CIKRKA selected. That perception data would be used, in conjunction with the leveraged
or collected threat, vulnerability, and consequence data in order to provide an overall
integrated assessment of the CIKRKA.
To demonstrate how the in vivo methodology might look, it was assumed that this
methodology might first be deployed in a small setting with subject matter experts as the
survey participants. It was assumed that those experts would live and work in the
Washington, DC metropolitan area, so that region was chosen to set the stage for the
examples of CIKRKA, as well as the risk scenario. This means that we could be
introducing some bias, as we would not only be eliciting the perceptions of homeland
security experts, but we would also be seeking their opinions based on familiar assets and
regions. In practice, this methodology could be expanded to include a much larger and
more diverse list of assets, as well as an increased sample of respondents, which might
eliminate this regional bias. However, for the purposes of explaining how to deploy the risk
quadruplet in vivo, it makes sense to scope the model. The National Capital Region (as it is
often called by DHS) includes the cities, counties, and districts shown in Table D.l
("Washington Metropolitan Area," 2012).
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Table D.l. National Capitol Region

DC
MD
MD
MD
MD
MD
VA
VA
VA
VA
VA
VA
VA
VA
VA
VA
VA
VA
VA
VA
VA
VA
WV

Washington
Calvert County
Charles County
Frederick County
Montgomery County
Prince George's County
Arlington County
Clarke County
Fairfax County
Fauquier County
Frederick County
Loudoun County
Prince William County
Spotsylvania County
Stafford County
Warren County
City of Alexandria
City of Fairfax
City of Falls Church
City of Fredericksburg
City of Manassas
City of Manassas Park
Jefferson County

We chose a representative example for each CIKRKA in the National Capitol Region
(Table D.2). The CIKRKA were chosen such that they were mutually exclusive. In other
words, there was no ambiguity as to whether the CI could also be categorized as a KA or if
it could have a direct impact on KR. Obviously these overlaps and interactions exist, as
discussed in the Literature Review (APPENDIX C), and future research of the risk
quadruplet model could explore ways to handle these interrelated CIKRKA, but for the
current exercise, we wanted the CIKRKA to be unique and unambiguous.
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Table D.2. Definitions and Examples for Alternatives

CI

government and private systems essential
to the operation of our nation in any or all
aspects of the lives of its citizens (health,
safety, economy, etc.), such as utilities,
facilities, pipelines, etc.

The George
Washington
University
Hospital
900 23rd
St., NW
Washington,
DC 20037

Facts and Figure s (2010
Statistics)
371 beds
17,016 inpatient admissions
86,414 outpatient visits a year
Over 810 physicians on the
hospital medical staff
Nursing staff of over 713
The emergency department is a
Level I Trauma Center seeing
71,242 patients a year.
Additional Information
Street parking is limited and
metered.
Access via Metro is
recommended, if possible.
Energy Information
Administration
Reserves & Supply (September
2011)

Motor Gasoline Stocks (Excludes
Pipelines): 266K barrels (US
Share: 0.7 %)

KR

public or private resources essential to the
operation of our nation's government and
economy, such as fuel or goods.

Motor
Gasoline in
Virginia

Distribution & Marketing
(2008)

Fueling Stations: 4,140 (US Share:
2.6%)

Consumption (2009)
Motor Gasoline Consumed: 94.5M
barrels (US Share: 2.9 %)
Environment (2008/2009)
Alternative-Fueled Vehicles in
Use: 21,505 (US Share: 2.8 %)
Ethanol Plants: 0
Ethanol Consumed: 8,616K
barrels (US Share: 3.3 %)
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KA

those buildings, geographic regions,
monuments, or icons, whose destruction
would cause a crushing blow to our
nation's ego, morale, and identity, but
which are not essential to the operation of
our nation, such as the Washington
Monument or the Statue of Liberty.

Lincoln
Memorial

Located on the National Mall in
Washington, DC
Surrounded on three sides by
water
Approximately 6M people visit
annually
Open to the public 24 hours a day
Free to visit
The memorial was built to honor
Abraham Lincoln, but it has
become a symbol of the American
Civil Rights movement as it is also
the site of Martin Luther King,
Jr.'s famous "I Have a Dream"
speech.

The CI selected for testing the risk quadruplet model was The George Washington
University (GWU) Hospital, located at 900 23rd St., NW, Washington, DC 20037. From
their website, a list of quick facts and figures was available to provide additional context
for the facility. The hospital (according to 2010 statistics) has 371 beds, 17,016 inpatient
admissions, 86,414 outpatient visits a year, over 810 physicians on the hospital medical
staff, a nursing staff of over 713, and its emergency department is a Level I Trauma Center
seeing 71,242 patients a year (GWU, 2011). Additional information available on their
website noted that street parking is limited and metered, so accessing the hospital via Metro
is recommended, if possible (GWU, 2011).
The KR selected for this exercise was motor gasoline for the state of VA. The Energy
Information Administration (EIA) publishes state energy profiles including economic,
price, reserves and supply, distribution and marketing, consumption, as well as
environmental data (EIA, 2011). In the month of September 2011, VA had 266 thousand
barrels of motor gasoline in stocks (excluding pipelines). This represents 0.7% of the US
share. In 2008, VA had 4,140 fueling stations for motor gasoline, a 2.6% share of the US.
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VA consumed 94.5 million barrels of motor gasoline (a 2.9% share of the US) in 2009.
Additionally, some related information was also provided on this KR for context. VA had
21,505 alternative-fueled vehicles in use (a 2.8% share of the US) in 2008, and while there
were no plants to produce ethanol (as of 2008), VA consumed 8,616 thousand barrels of
ethanol in 2009, which is a 3.3% share of the US totals for ethanol consumption (ELA,
2011).
The KA selected for research was the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, DC, which is
operated as part of the National Mall and Memorial Parks by the National Park Service
with the US DOI ("Lincoln Memorial," 201 lb). It was a memorial built to honor Abraham
Lincoln, the 16th President of the US, although it has also become a symbol of the
American Civil Rights movement as it is the site of Martin Luther King, Jr.'s famous "I
Have a Dream" speech ("Lincoln Memorial," 2011a). It is located on the National Mall,
approximately 6 million people visit the memorial annually, it is open to the public 24
hours a day, and it is free to visit ("Lincoln Memorial," 201 la). The location is surrounded
on three sides by water, meaning, from an EPR&R perspective, that incidents could be
easily contained ("Lincoln Memorial," 201 la).
Scenarios are one of the main elements of models, simulations or serious games,
(Ancel, 2011). It would be possible to choose any type of risk scenario and use all sorts of
resources for describing and exploring those scenarios with stakeholders. For example, a
recently developed website, NukeMap, went viral amongst social media sites. The
website's author was interested in visualizing the impacts of nuclear detonations in
different cities and regions (Figure D.l). Using Google's interactive base map, NukeMap
allows users to select a location and type of bomb, then detonate it to see the impacts,

218

represented visually as concentric color coded circles ranging out from the impact site
which describe the consequences most likely to be experienced in those regions
(Wellerstein, 2012).

$ i.se.js*y nukemap

Figure D.l. NukeMap

Google has announced the release of Public Alerts, a new emergency alert system
developed by their Crisis Response division ("Google Public Alerts," 2012). It is designed
to display alerts issued by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),
the National Weather Service, and the US Geological Survey right on Google Maps,
offering an instantaneous visualization of risk (Figure D.2). Google is encouraging
authorized local public safety officials to post alerts at no cost. These visualizations could
make consequence and perception assessments much more informative and interactive.
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Figure D.2. Google Public Alerts

The risk scenario selected for the risk quadruplet in vivo methodology was a tornado.
Table D.3 below gives descriptions of the Fujita Tornado Damage Scale, used by the
NOAA National Climatic Data Center (NCDC) to determine the magnitude of tornadoes
(NOAA, 2012a). In February of 2007, this scale was revised (NOAA, 2012a) and the
Enhanced Fujita Tornado Damage Scale is now based on 28 damage indicators from which
a degree of damage is calculated and then translated to the magnitude scale, however, the
definitions and damage descriptions for the original scale are sufficient for the purposes of
this research, especially considering the majority of the dataset provided by NOAA NCDC
was data collected prior to the implementation of the Enhanced Fujita Tornado Damage
Scale.
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Table D.3. Fujita Tornado Damage Scale

<73
74112
113157
158206
207260
261318

Some damage to chimneys; branches broken off trees; shallow-rooted trees pushed
over; sign boards damaged.
Peels surface off roofs; mobile homes pushed off foundations or overturned; moving
autos blown off roads.
Roofs torn off frame houses; mobile homes demolished; boxcars overturned; large
trees snapped or uprooted; light-object missiles generated; cars lifted off ground.
Roofs and some walls torn off well-constructed houses; trains overturned; most trees in
forest uprooted; heavy cars lifted off the ground and thrown.
Well-constructed houses leveled; structures with weak foundations blown away some
distance; cars thrown and large missiles generated.
Strong frame houses leveled off foundations and swept away; automobile-sized
missiles fly through the air in excess of 100 meters (109 yds); trees debarked;
incredible phenomena will occur.

We examined NCDC historical records from April 30, 1950 (the start date of the
NOAA storm events data set) through September 30, 2011 (the most recent data published
at the time of this research) and recorded all tornadoes to hit the National Capitol Region,
as it was defined earlier (NOAA, 2012b). We also collected data about the magnitude of
the tornadoes, the number of deaths and injuries, as well as the cost of property damage.
Table D.4 shows the summary of these results. It is interesting to note that out of 83
tornadoes to hit the National Capitol Region, only one touched down in Washington, DC,
an F0 at the Lincoln Memorial, resulting in $2,000 worth of damage.
Table D.4. National Capitol Region Tornadoes

, Location or .County
Lincoln Memorial
Frederick
Frederick
Montgomery
Prince George's
Frederick
Montgomery
Frederick
Frederick
Frederick
Prince George's
Frederick

9/24/2001
4/5/1952
4/5/1952
8/31/1952
5/26/1953
5/3/1954
7/1/1959
11/19/1960
4/16/1961
7/19/1963
7/19/1963
2/13/1966

F0
Fl
Fl
Fl
Fl
F0
Fl
Fl
Fl
Fl
Fl
Fl

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

$2,000
$25,000
$25,000
$25,000
$3,000
-

$3,000
$3,000
$3,000
$25,000
$25,000
$25,000
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Frederick
Montgomery
Prince George's
Frederick
Charles
Charles
Montgomery
Charles
Charles
Calvert
Charles
Frederick
Frederick
Calvert
Charles
Frederick
Calvert
Frederick
Calvert
Frederick
Montgomery
Montgomery
Prince George's
Prince George's
Prince George's
Calvert
Frederick
Frederick
Frederick
Fairfax
Fauquier
Fauquier
Loudoun
Stafford
Frederick
Frederick
Fairfax
Warren
Fairfax
Fauquier
Clarke
Clarke
Prince William
Fairfax
Loudoun
Loudoun
Stafford
Loudoun
Fairfax
Fairfax
Falls Church
Fauquier

6/28/1966
8/26/1967
9/12/1971
3/3/1972
4/1/1973
1/28/1974
5/12/1974
6/5/1975
7/13/1975
6/27/1978
6/20/1978
7/31/1978
8/28/1978
9/5/1979
9/5/1979
5/30/1982
10/13/1983
5/22/1983
5/8/1984
5/13/1990
10/18/1990
8/20/1991
8/4/1992
8/4/1992
11/23/1992
8/17/1994
6/16/1998
8/14/1999
6/6/2002
8/31/1952
5/17/1953
9/7/1954
5/3/1954
2/18/1960
7/13/1961
6/2/1962
8/9/1969
7/9/1970
4/1/1973
4/1/1973
8/4/1975
3/21/1976
1/26/1978
9/5/1979
9/5/1979
9/5/1979
9/5/1979
6/3/1980
7/28/1981
10/13/1983
10/13/1983
10/13/1983

F1
F1
F2
F1
F1
F1
F1
F0
F1
F2
F2
F2
F2
F1
FO
F1
F2
F3
F0
F1
F1
F1
F1
F0
F1
F0
F0
F1
F0
F1
F1
F1
F0
F1
F2
F1
F2
F0
F3
F3
F2
F0
F3
F3
F2
F2
F1
F2
F2
F0
F2
F0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
37
0
0
0
10
6
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

$25,000
$25,000
$250,000
$250,000
$25,000
$3,000
$3,000
$3,000
$250,000
$250,000
$25,000
$25,000
-

$250,000
$25,000
$3,000
$25,000
$25,000
$25,000
$250,000
$2,500,000
$25,000
-

$25,000
$2,500,000
$1,000
$10,000
$800,000
$15,000
$25,000
$3,000
$25,000
$3,000
-

$3,000
$25,000
$250,000
$3,000
$25,000,000
$25,000
$250,000
$25,000
$250,000
$2,500,000
$250,000
$250,000
$25,000
$25,000
$25,000
-

$2,500,000
$3,000
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Clarke
Clarke
Fairfax
Loudoun
Prince William
Fairfax
Fauquier
Fauquier
Fairfax
Fauquier
Fauquier
Loudoun
Fredericksburg
Alexandria
Arlington
Fredericksburg
Manassas
Manassas Park
Jefferson

8/2/1986
8/2/1986
7/12/1987
7/12/1987
7/21/1987
10/18/1990
7/12/1990
10/18/1990
8/4/1992
4/16/1993
4/16/1993
4/16/1993
7/24/1999
9/24/2001
9/24/2001
9/17/2004
9/17/2004
9/17/2004
4/28/2008

F1
F1
F1
F1
F0
F0
F0
F1
F1
F0
F1
F1
F1
F0
F1
F0
F1
F1
F1

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0

-

$3,000
$3,000
$2,500,000
-

$250,000
$3,000
$5,000
$500,000
$500,000
$20,000
$8,000
$1,000,000
-

$15,000

Over the 61 years reviewed, the National Capitol Region suffered 83 tornadoes, none of
which were F4 or F5 tornadoes. The counts of tornadoes by magnitude, as well as the sums
of deaths, injuries, and property damage are provided in Table D.5. Percentages are also
provided to show the percentage contribution by tornado magnitude (based on the total sum
of counts, deaths, injuries, and property damage, respectively). The total property damage
for all years was $8,049,000, approximately 75% of which was the result of FO and F1
tornadoes. Only 2 lives were lost in the National Capitol Region as a result of tornadoes,
both of which were caused by F3 tornadoes, however 61 injuries were caused by tornadoes.

Table D.5. Percentages of National Capitol Region Tornadoes, Casualties, and Costs

1950-1959 1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009

Figure D.3. Count of Tornadoes by Decade

Tornadoes were also counted by decade and the distribution is shown in Figure D.3.
Table D.6 below shows the average number of casualties (deaths and injuries combined), as
well as costs over the period from which the data was collected. F3 tornadoes were
responsible for the highest average number of casualties over the 61 years; however, F0
tornadoes had the highest average property damages.
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Table D.6. Average Casualties and Property Damages

0.113636364
0.214285714

With IDS we are able to build an ER model for the risk quadruplet using a combination
of collected perception data and simulated threat, vulnerability, and consequence data. A
simple model was described in IDS to demonstrate the in vivo methodology, consisting of
three alternatives (CI, KR, and KA), and four child attributes (threat, vulnerability,
consequence, and perception) nested under an overall parent attribute (risk). The model
also uses weighting (to determine the contribution of the child attributes to the parent
attribute), utilities (to determine the relationship between the grades and the child
attributes), and belief degrees (to determine the beliefs held for the grades selected).
Pe fcSt MSjBWr &}odefl«ng foput

Alternative Name

Report Sensitivity Window

b

if

Risk
threat
Vulnerability
Consequence
Perception

Figure D.4. Risk Quadruplet Model (In Vivo)
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Figure D.5. Dialog Box for Description of Attributes

An example of how this model appears in IDS is shown in Figure D.4. The definitions
for each attribute (threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception) were input into IDS,
based on the definitions provided in CHAPTER 1 (Figure D.5). The attributes were then
assigned six possible grades, mapped from the following linguistic set: none, very low,
low, medium, high, and very high. A threat of none was defined as, "This risk scenario
poses no risk to this CI, KR, or KA," and similar definitions were used across all
combinations of grades and attributes (Table D.7).
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Table D.7. Definitions and Examples for Attributes and Grades

Vulnerability

1
H

the threat of a risk scenario to an asset;
the threat of an intentional risk scenario
is generally estimated as the likelihood
of an attack (that accounts for both the
intent and capability of the adversary)
being attempted by an adversary; for
other risk scenarios, threat is generally
estimated as the likelihood that the risk
scenario will manifest; however, threat
can also be estimated qualitatively.
ability of an asset to endure a risk
scenario despite physical features,
operational attributes, characteristics of
design, location, security posture,
operation, or any combination thereof
that renders an asset open to exploitation
or susceptible to a given risk scenario;
can be estimated qualitatively, or
quantitatively as the likelihood of a
successful risk scenario given the risk
scenario is identified, which implies that
vulnerability is also related to resilience.

None
Very Low
Low
Medium
High
Very High
None
Very Low
Low
Medium
High
Very High

Consequence

None
effect of a successful risk scenario on an
asset; consequence is commonly
assessed along four scales: human,
economic, mission, and psychological,
but may also include other factors such
as impact on the environment;
consequence can also be measured
qualitatively either along a set of scales
or along a single integrated consequence
scale for which all consequence scales
are considered as a whole.

Very Low

Low

Medium

High

Very High

Perception

None

subjective judgment about the severity of
a risk scenario to an asset; may be driven
by sense, emotion, or personal
experience; generally measured
qualitatively; referred to merely as
perception throughout this research.

Very Low
Low
Medium
High
Very High

This risk scenario poses no risk to
this CI, KR, or KA.
This risk scenario poses very low risk
to this CI, KR, or KA.
This risk scenario poses low risk to
this CI, KR, or KA.
This risk scenario poses medium risk
to this CI, KR, or KA.
This risk scenario poses high risk to
this CI, KR, or KA.
This risk scenario poses very high
risk to this CI, KR, or KA.
This CI, KR, or KA has no
vulnerability to this risk scenario.
This CI, KR, or KA has very low
vulnerability to this risk scenario.
This CI, KR, or KA has low
vulnerability to this risk scenario.
This CI, KR, or KA has medium
vulnerability to this risk scenario.
This CI, KR, or KA has high
vulnerability to this risk scenario.
This CI, KR, or KA has very high
vulnerability to this risk scenario.
This CI, KR, or KA would have no
consequences from this risk scenario.
This CI, KR, or KA would have very
low consequences from this risk
scenario.
This CI, KR, or KA would have low
consequences from this risk scenario.
This CI, KR, or KA would have
medium consequences from this risk
scenario.
This CI, KR, or KA would have high
consequences from this risk scenario.
This CI, KR, or KA would have very
high consequences from this risk
scenario.
I perceive this CI, KR, or KA to have
no risk from this risk scenario.
I perceive this CI, KR, or KA to have
very low risk from this risk scenario.
I perceive this CI, KR, or KA to have
low risk from this risk scenario.
I perceive this CI, KR, or KA to have
medium risk from this risk scenario.
I perceive this CI, KR, or KA to have
high risk from this risk scenario.
I perceive this CI, KR, or KA to have
very high risk from this risk scenario.
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Phase 1. Perception Assessment Methodology
The survey proposed for the in vivo methodology also provides the definitions and
examples for the CIKRKA, definitions of the attributes, as well as the overall risk scenario
which poses a danger to the CIKRKA. Providing a consistent risk scenario is necessary in
order for respondents to consider their perception of risk across the different CIKRKA.
After reviewing those common elements, the respondent would select a grade to qualify the
perceived risk (based on the risk scenario) to the three separate CIKRKA selected.
In IDS the perception data would be captured as qualitative data, aligned to the
linguistic set defined above. This same linguistic set would be used for the grades across all
of the different attributes (threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception). IDS could be
used to collect perception data for a single respondent, however there is not an immediate
and obvious way to incorporate the perceptions of multiple respondents into an ER model.
Upon further examination, one way this could be done is to use the distribution of the
frequencies of respondents' selections from the linguistic set as the belief degrees for the
grades. For example, we would create a simple survey that would collect the data required
for the IDS data entry dialog box. The linguistic set would be used as the perception
options in the survey. If that survey had ten respondents and for the CI alternative, one of
them choose a grade of very low for the perception attribute, one of them chose low, and
eight of them choose medium, then the belief degrees could be assigned to those grades as
.1, .1, and .8, respectively.
Inquisite is software that can be used to design and deploy surveys, collect data, as well
as analyze respondent data ("Inquisite," 2011). Using this software, it would be possible to
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select a sample of experts, ask them a series of perception questions tailored to fit the ER
model selected for the third phase of the risk quadruplet. The definitions for each attribute
were input into Inquisite and each CIKRKA alternative definition and example as
discussed above was populated in Inquisite (Figure D.6). The attributes were then assigned
six possible grades, mapped from the same linguistic set as the one used in IDS: none, very
low, low, medium, high, and very high.

Alternatives
Critical Infrastructure
Definition: government and private systems essential to the operation of our nation in anyoraHaspects of
flie lives of its citizens (health, safety, economy.etc), such as utilities, facilities, pipelines, etc.
Example:
The George Washington University Hospital
900 23rd St., NW
Washington, DC 20037
http://www gwhospital com
Facts and Figures (2010 Statistics)
371 beds
17,016 inpatient admissions
86,414 outpatient visits a year
Over 810 physicians on the hospital medical staff
Nursing staff of over 713
The emergency department is a Level I Trauma Center seeing 71,242 patients a year.
Additional Information
Street parking is limited and metered
Access via Metro is recommended, if possible.

Figure D.6. CI Example
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Grades
None

Example: "I perceive this CI, KR, or KA to have no risk from this scenario."
Very Low
Example: "I perceive this CI, KR, or KA to have very low risk from this scenario."

Low

Example: "I perceive this CI, KR, or KA to have low risk from this scenario."
Medium

Example: "I perceive this CI, KR, or KA to have medium risk from this scenario "
High

Example: "I perceive this CI, I®, or KA to have high risk from this scenario."
Very High

Example: "I perceive this CI, KR, or KA to have very high risk from this scenario."

Figure D.7. Grade Examples

The threat, vulnerability and consequence attributes will not be explored in the survey
as they would be leveraged or collected and then entered into IDS separately, so they are
not defined nor described in the survey. However, the grades, along with their definitions
from above, were populated for the perception attribute in the Inquisite survey, as well as
for the threat, vulnerability, and consequence attributes in IDS (Figure D.7 and Figure D.8).
If one user was providing perception input into IDS, that user could select very low with a
belief degree of .5 and low with a belief degree of .5, so long as a belief degree between 0
and 1 was entered for each grade selected, and so long as the sum of all belief degrees was
less than or equal to 1 (similar to the example we see in Figure D.8).
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Figure D.8. Dialog Box for Data Input

Unlike ER, respondents to the survey are only able to make one selection for each
alternative. Since we will be surveying multiple respondents, we intend to use the
frequencies of their responses as the belief degrees. If we were to allow users to choose
more than one grade, we would end up with inflated frequencies for each grade, meaning
that when those frequencies are entered as belief degrees, we could potentially have belief
degrees that sum to greater than 1 for each alternative within the perception attribute. To
avoid this, we are normalizing the perception data by restricting the survey respondents to
only one grade for each alternative within the perception attribute (Figure D.9).
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Instructions
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Figure D.9. Grade Selections

This survey was crafted using Inquisite and a version which was converted to plain text
is given in APPENDIX E. It would give respondents all of the pertinent background
information such as the CIKRKA definitions and examples, the risk scenario, and a means
for providing their perceptions. However, upon review, it is easy to see why deploying this
survey online might not be advisable. The survey is eight pages and only the last page is the
actual questionnaire, the other seven pages include details necessary for respondents to
determine their perceptions. In a traditional online deployment of such a survey, the user
would not be able to easily refer to the background information, having to navigate back
and forth throughout the survey in order to review the information provided.
Therefore, the perception assessment should probably be conducted in the form of a
stakeholder meeting. We would be relying on expert elicitation and providing all
respondents with a common context is necessary prior to seeking perception data, so it
would be prudent to engage the stakeholders in person. This would allow each respondent
to review a packet of information and to have that information at their fingertips throughout
the perception elicitation process. After reviewing the materials with respondents, the
survey could still be provided online for ease of completion and data collection. The data
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would be collected and the frequencies of the grades selected for the perceptions of
CIKRKA would be input into IDS as belief degrees.
The survey would be deployed with a small set of respondents in an informal meeting
with volunteer stakeholders. An Informed Consent Document is also provided in
APPENDIX F to ensure respondents anonymity, absolving them from any concerns about
providing their perceptions of risk to CIKRKA outside the context of their formal,
professional risk analysis careers. All respondents would likely have a strong background
in homeland defense, homeland security, infrastructure analysis, and risk analysis. While
surveying experts would obviously result in perceptions different from those of the
layperson, the risk quadruplet model is extensible and adaptable, so future iterations of the
model could explore using perceptions from the general public, or even a combination of
perceptions from both experts and non-experts.

Phase 2. Threat, Vulnerability, and Consequence Assessments Methodology
Complicating the in vivo methodology for the risk quadruplet is the means for
leveraging or collecting threat, vulnerability, and consequence data to integrate with the
perception data we would collect via survey. These data are not typically collected
consistently. Some assessments use risk scores and these are rarely normalized, so
comparing a risk score from one study to that from another study could be like comparing
apples to oranges. Some assessments may calculate risk where threat is a scenario with an
associated threat severity probability distribution, vulnerability is a conditional probability
(the probability of a successful attack, given the attack is identified), and consequence is
based on some loss function (McGill, et al., 2007). Other assessments use risk words like
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low, medium, or high, or color coding like red, yellow, or green to describe the severity of
a risk (Mallor, et al., 2008).
However, IDS can handle mixed data types all within the same ER model, such as
stochastic versus deterministic, qualitative versus quantitative, or even incomplete data or
data with uncertainties (Xu & Yang, 2001). One option for our in vivo methodology would
be to leverage data from threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessments. For example,
if the threat under study was flooding, there is historical data available on the impact of
flooding to a particular region and its assets. There would be documented information on
the consequences such as causalities or cost to repair damages. It might even be possible to
determine whether any recommended fortifications provided additional security against
flood damage over the years to provide some insight on vulnerabilities.
A taxonomy could be used to identify scenarios specific to CIKRKA (Luiijf &
Nieuwenhuijs, 2008). Similarly, the results of an existing vulnerability assessment on a
given CIKRKA, such as the Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessment Model (I-VAM)
which employs MAUT for its assessment approach (Ezell, 2007), could be incorporated
into the overall risk quadruplet model. Or for another example, we could look at a
methodology proposed for identifying and ranking infrastructure vulnerabilities due to
terrorism (should a terrorist attack be the scenario chosen) (Apostolakis & Lemon, 2005).
In order to leverage these assessments, it might make sense to code the results to our
common linguistic set (none, very low, low, medium, high, and very high), in order for this
data to be normalized across all attributes (threat, vulnerability, and consequence), and thus
to be integrated consistently with our perception data. However, the ER model does not
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require this consistency as it can handle mixed data models, so assessment inputs could be
entered independently, or coded to a common and consistent format, if desired.
Another in vivo option would be to conduct new and independent threat, vulnerability,
and consequence assessments. With this approach, we could have more control over the
type of data we collect. We could opt to remain consistent with the common linguistic set,
or thanks to the flexibility of ER and IDS, we could opt to collect these data distinctly. For
example, we may wish to collect threat data as a probability based on historical reports
related to the risk scenario. But vulnerability data may not be available quantitatively, so
we could collect it qualitatively based on vulnerability reports conducted by the owners and
operators of an asset. Consequence data may again be quantitative, but instead of a
probability, it could be the number of deaths related to the risk scenario. IDS would also
allow us to load the leveraged or collected threat, vulnerability, and consequence data in
advance of the perception assessment, such that we could provide overall ranked,
integrated assessments of CIKRKA immediately following the perception assessment,
which might be valuable if we are already conducting a live stakeholder meeting to assess
perceptions, as we could provide feedback instantaneously. If those stakeholders were also
decision-makers, this quick turnaround could be very valuable.

Phase 3. Assessment Integration Methodology
The assessment integration approach selected for our in vivo (and in vitro) risk
quadruplet methodology was ER, a MCDA approach, and IDS was the software selected to
implement ER. Prior to deploying this risk quadruplet model in vivo, it is important to
understand the data required for the model. It is also important to understand the ER
software available and ensure that it is implemented correctly.
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Describe the following alternative:

Help

a
Definition: Critical Infrastructure (CI): government and private systems essential to
the operation of our nation in any or all aspects of the lives of its citizens (health,
safety, economy, etc.), such as utilities, facilities, pipelines, etc.

Cu|

Easte
Example: (The George Washington University Hospital
900 23rd St NW
Washington. DC 20037
http://www.gwhospital.com
Facts and Figures (Statistics are based on 2010)
371 beds

Copy

jjncto

|

17,016 inpatient admissions
86.41 4 outpatient visits a year
Over 810 physicians on the hospital medical staff

Nursing staff of over 713
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Figure D.10. Dialog Box for Description of Alternatives

We previously chose a representative example for each CIKRKA in the National
Capitol Region and included pertinent information about the CIKRKA both in IDS (Figure
D.10) and Inquisite (Figure D.6). Each of the attributes (threat, vulnerability, consequence,
and perception) were defined in IDS as qualitative, so as to grade them using the same
linguistic scale. Utilities for the overall or parent attribute (risk) were assigned to these
grades (from our linguistic set of none, very low, low, medium, high, and very high) as
shown in Table D.8. The utilities were chosen arbitrarily, but it may be worth exploring,
during future research, how to assess and incorporate the utilities of those providing inputs
for the ER model. These values could easily be revised in future iterations of the model.
For our purposes, a risk grade of none would be ideal and thus would receive a Utility of 1.
The remaining grades were ranked accordingly. Utilities, unlike probabilities, need not sum
to 1.
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Table D.8. Grades and Utilities

None
Very Low
Low
Medium
High
Very High

1
.9
.7
.5
.3
.1

To relate parent and child attributes, the following belief degrees were used for each
child (threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception). These values could also be
adjusted easily in future iterations of the model. For example, if the child grade of threat is
very low, that could relate to a parent grade of none, very low, and low risk with belief
degrees of .25, .50, and .25, respectively. However, in the interest of keeping this model
simple, belief degrees were assigned using the identity matrix (Table D.9). These belief
degrees that relate the parent and child grades are not the same belief degrees that are
selected by respondents during data collection when they chose the grade they deem
appropriate for a given combination of alternative and attribute.
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Table D.9. Belief Degrees for Relating Parent and Child Grades

1
0
0
0
0

o

0
1
0
0
0
0

0
0
1
0
0
0

0
0
0
1
0
0

0
0
0
0
1
0

0
0
0
0
0
1

Weights are then used to relate the child attributes to the parent attribute. This can be
done using visual scoring or using a pairwise comparison of attributes. Again, future
versions of the model could work with respondents or subject matter experts to complete
the pairwise comparison approach provided with the IDS software, which is basically an
AHP approach for weighting the child attributes. For this example, we used the visual
scoring approach, selected normalized to ensure the weights added to 1, and while the
weights initially started as equal (.25, .25, .25, and .25), it was decided that perception
might not be considered equally important as the other attributes, so it was valued as
approximately half as important as the other attributes (where the other attributes were
weighted equally) as shown in Figure D.l 1.
Relative Weights of Attributes

O) 0 20
9> 0 16

Threat

Vulnerability

Consequence

Perception

Attributes
Figure D.l 1. Attribute Weights Using Visual Scoring
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Finally, if this model were to be deployed in vivo, we would provide data for each
attribute. For each combination of alternative (asset) and attribute (threat, vulnerability,
consequence, and perception), a user would select a grade and a belief degree. The user
could select more than one grade, so long as the sum of the belief degrees is less than or
equal to 1. IDS would initially value the belief degrees equally across the selections, but the
user could override these values (Figure D.ll). Instructions provided by IDS would guide
the user through the data entry process. The user would have access to the definitions of the
alternatives, attributes, and grades from this dialog box. And the user could also provide
evidence and comments to explain their selections (these are merely typed responses).
For the perception attribute, this is where we would use the distribution of the
frequencies of respondents' Inquisite survey selections (captured during the first phase of
the risk quadruplet) as the belief degrees for the grades. Respondents would complete a
simple survey to select the grade they feel most adequately reflects their opinion of the risk
to each of the CIKRKA alternatives. If 10% of respondents choose a grade of very low for
the perception attribute of the first asset, CI, whereas 10% of them chose low, and 80% of
them choose medium, then the belief degrees would be assigned to those grades as . 1, . 1,
and .8, respectively. For the threat, vulnerability, and consequence data we would use the
data leveraged or collected during the second phase of the in vivo risk quadruplet
methodology.
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APPENDIX E
INQUISITE RISK QUADRUPLET SURVEY (IN VIVO)
Page 1: Introduction
Please review the following pages which provide definitions and an example for three
alternatives:
• Critical Infrastructure - The George Washington University Hospital in
Washington, DC
• Key Resource - Motor Gasoline in Virginia
• Key Asset - The Lincoln Memorial in Washington, DC
Next, a scenario will be described:
• Risk Scenario - Tornado
Then, perception and a series of perception grades will also be defined.
Please use all of this information to select the perception grades which you feel most
closely reflect your opinion of the risk to each of the alternatives.
Page 2: Alternatives — Critical Infrastructure

Definition: government and private systems essential to the operation of our nation in
any or all aspects of the lives of its citizens (health, safety, economy, etc.), such as
utilities, facilities, pipelines, etc.
Example: The George Washington University Hospital, 900 23rd St., NW, Washington,
DC 20037, http://www.gwhospital.com
Facts and Figure s (2010 Statistics)
• 371 beds
• 17,016 inpatient admissions
• 86,414 outpatient visits a year
• Over 810 physicians on the hospital medical staff
• Nursing staff of over 713
• The emergency department is a Level I Trauma Center seeing 71,242 patients a
year.
Additional Information
• Street parking is limited and metered.
• Access via Metro is recommended, if possible.
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Page 3: Alternatives - Key Resource
Deflnition: public or private resources essential to the operation of our nation's
government and economy, such as fuel or goods.
Example: Motor Gasoline in Virginia, Energy Information Administration
Reserves & Supply (September 2011)
• Motor Gasoline Stocks (Excludes Pipelines): 266K barrels (US Share: 0.7 %)
Distribution & Marketing (2008)
• Fueling Stations: 4,140 (US Share: 2.6%)
Consumption (2009)
• Motor Gasoline Consumed: 94.5M barrels (US Share: 2.9 %)
Environment (2008/2009)
• Alternative-Fueled Vehicles in Use: 21,505 (US Share: 2.8 %)
• Ethanol Consumed: 8,616K barrels (US Share: 3.3 %)
• Ethanol Plants: 0
Page 4: Alternatives - Key Assets
Deflnition: those buildings, geographic regions, monuments, or icons, whose destruction
would cause a crushing blow to our nation's ego, morale, and identity, but which are not
essential to the operation of our nation, such as the Washington Monument or the Statue
of Liberty.
Example: Lincoln Memorial
Facts and Figure s (2011)
• Located on the National Mall in Washington, DC
• Surrounded on three sides by water
• Approximately 6M people visit annually
• Open to the public 24 hours a day
• Free to visit
Additional Information
• The memorial was built to honor Abraham Lincoln, but it has become a symbol of
the American Civil Rights movement as it is also the site of Martin Luther King,
Jr.'s famous "I Have a Dream" speech.
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Page 5: Risk Scenario - Tornado
Definition: natural or man-made occurrence, hazard, individual, entity, or action that has

or indicates the potential to damage an asset.
Example: Tornado, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),

National Climatic Data Center (NCDC)
•
•
•

•

•
•

FO (<73mph): Some damage to chimneys; branches broken off trees; shallowrooted trees pushed over; sign boards damaged.
F1 (74-112mph): Peels surface off roofs; mobile homes pushed off foundations or
overturned; moving autos blown off roads.
F2 (113-157mph): Roofs torn off frame houses; mobile homes demolished;
boxcars overturned; large trees snapped or uprooted; light-object missiles
generated; cars lifted off ground.
F3 (158-206mph): Roofs and some walls torn off well-constructed houses; trains
overturned; most trees in forest uprooted; heavy cars lifted off the ground and
thrown.
F4 (207-260mph): Well-constructed houses leveled; structures with weak
foundations blown away some distance; cars thrown and large missiles generated.
F5 (261-318mph): Strong frame houses leveled off foundations and swept away;
automobile-sized missiles fly through the air in excess of 100 meters (109 yds);
trees debarked; incredible phenomena will occur.

NOAA NCDC Data r4 /30/1950 - 9/30/2011)
• Magnitude: Count, Deaths, Injuries, Property Damage
• F0: 20, 0, 0, $2,653,000
• Fl: 44, 0,5, $3,468,000
• F2: 14, 0,3, $1,628,000
• F3: 5, 2, 53, $300,000
• F4:0
• F5:0
• Totals: 83, 2, 61, $8,049,000
Page 6: Attribute - Perception
Definition: subjective judgment about the severity of a risk scenario to an asset; may be

driven by sense, emotion, or personal experience; generally measured qualitatively;
referred to merely as perception throughout this research.

242

Page 7: Grades
Below are the perception grade choices and examples.
•
•
•
•
•
•

None: "I perceive this CI, KR, or KA to have no risk from this risk scenario."
Very Low: "I perceive this CI, KR, or KA to have very low risk from this risk
scenario."
Low: "I perceive this CI, KR, or KA to have low risk from this risk scenario."
Medium: "I perceive this CI, KR, or KA to have medium risk from this risk
scenario."
High: "I perceive this CI, KR, or KA to have high risk from this risk scenario."
Very High: "I perceive this CI, KR, or KA to have very high risk from this risk
scenario."

Page 8: Instructions - Perception Grades
Please select your perception of the risk to each asset given the information described on
the previous pages. You may only select one option.
Critical Infrastructure (GWU Hospital) (Choose one)
o none
o very low
o low
o medium
o high
o very high
Key Resource (Motor Gasoline in VA) (Choose one)
o none
o very low
o low
o medium
o high
o very high
Key Asset (Lincoln Memorial) (Choose one)
o none
o very low
o low
o medium
o high
o very high
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APPENDIX F
INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT (IN VIVO)
Informed Consent Document
Dr. Gheorghe and Kara Norman Hill are studying models to integrate assessments of risk,
vulnerability, consequence, and perception for improved ranking of critical infrastructure,
key resources, and key assets. This study will present examples of critical infrastructure, key
resources, and key assets, as well as a hypothetical risk scenario, then ask participants to
provide grades, based on their perceptions of the risk to the critical infrastructure, key
resource, and key asset. The goal is to test the viability of the risk quadruplet methodology
for integrating this subjective, qualitative perception data with objective quantitative and
qualitative data from threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessments.
You are invited to participate in this study by providing your risk perception opinions after
reviewing an information packet describing examples of critical infrastructure, key resources,
and key assets, as well as the hypothetical risk scenario. The research project is anticipated to
continue for no more than one year from the date of data collection.
There are no potential risks to respondents completing this survey. All scenarios are
hypothetical and only personal opinions are being solicited and the respondents will remain
effectively anonymous insomuch as the data will not be associated with any personally
identifiable information. Similarly, there are no immediate benefits to participation, however,
participants are encouraged to contact the researchers for additional information on the risk
quadruplet model should they be interested.
The researchers will keep a record of your informed consent document in order to ensure
compliance with the policies of the Institutional Review Board. Your perception data will not
be connected to any personally identifiable information and will be stored in a separate
database. Only the researchers will know the identity of study participants and that
information will not be published as part of the research, although the research will indicate
that the participants are subject matter experts and will cite the agencies and/or universities
represented in the sample of survey participants.
Your signature on this form means that you understand the information presented, and that
you wish to participate in the study. You understand that participation is voluntary, and you
may withdraw from the study at any time.

Signature of Participant
Dr. Adrian Gheorghe
agheorgh@odu,edu
757-683-6801

Date
Kara Norman Hill
kteeln@gmail.com
703-615-6998
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APPENDIX G
DATA SIMULATION (IN VITRO)
Phase 1. Perception Data Simulation
If we had been able to deploy the in vivo risk quadruplet methodology using a survey to
collect risk perception data, respondents would have selected a single grade for the CI, KR,
and KA, based on their perceptions of the risk to that asset (as shown in the survey
provided in APPENDIX E). Then the respondents' selections would be used to calculate the
belief degrees. For the in vitro approach to the risk quadruplet, we simulated this data.
Generating perception data from a uniform distribution would be similar to respondents
providing an equal number of responses for each of the grades, insinuating that their
perceptions are completely random (with a response of none as equally likely as very high),
without any pattern. Any model results using that kind of data would be meaningless as the
impact of the perception attribute would be washed out in the risk quadruplet. However, it
is assumed that a group of respondents, when analyzing risk to CIKRKA, would provide
similar perception grades. We see evidence for comparable subject matter expert behavior
when exploring the risk perception comparison of experts in the 2012 WEF Global Risks
Report (Figure C.19). Subject matter experts tended to provide comparable estimates
(collected with a risk perception survey) on the likelihood and impact of risks across almost
all of the different risk categories ("Global Risks," 2012). Therefore, we must explore
another means of generating perception data.
First we created a set of 100 respondents who were programmed to randomly choose a
value between one and six, based on the Triangular Distribution. In probability theory and
statistics, the triangular distribution is a continuous probability distribution with a lower

k.
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limit represented by a, an upper limit of b, and a mode given by c ("Triangular
Distribution," 2012). Given a random variable U drawn from the uniform distribution along
the interval (0, 1), the following random variable, X, can be used to generate random
numbers from a triangular distribution ("Triangular Distribution," 2012).
(

X = a + V y (ib^-aj(c-^a) f o r 0 < U < F ( c )

[x = b - V ( l - U X b - a X b - c ) f o r F ( c ) < U < 1
Equation G.l. Generating Triangular-Distributed Random Variables

For our simulation, a corresponds to 1 (which, in turn, corresponds to a grade of none),
and b corresponds to 6 (which relates to a grade of very high). In order to simulate the
effects of respondents working from similar background information, such as a common
risk scenario and contextual information regarding the CIKRKA we adjusted the mode of
the triangular distribution depending on the asset for which the simulated respondent was
providing their perception (Table 4.3). By varying the mode across the CIKRKA, we will
be able to better see how the perception attribute affects the overall risk score.
Our ER model, which must ultimately integrate this perception data with threat,
vulnerability, and consequence data consists of alternatives (CIKRKA assets) and attributes
(risk, threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception). For the threat, vulnerability, and
consequence attributes, this produces a limited number of combinations of CIKRKA and
attributes. There would only be one observation for each combination of asset with the
threat, vulnerability, and consequence (which would be the resulting scores from those
assessments). However, there could be multiple observations for each combination of asset
with the perception attribute as the perceptions would be collected from

multiple

respondents for the in vivo risk quadruplet methodology; for the in vitro viability testing,
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the perceptions would be collected from

our 100 pseudo respondents. We used the

proportion of respondents who chose each grade (from our linguistic set of none, very low,
low, medium, high, and very high). The simulated respondent choices (the random values
between one and six generated from the Triangular Distribution) corresponded to those six
grades. The belief degrees for each grade were then calculated as the proportion of
respondents who selected that grade within a given alternative.

Phase 2. Threat, Vulnerability, and Consequence Data Simulation
Similarly, in the in vivo risk quadruplet methodology the threat, vulnerability, and
consequence data would have been leveraged or collected. However, those data are not
readily available due to the sensitive nature of such information. Therefore, attempting to
access historical assessments to test the viability of the risk quadruplet is not a practical
option for this research. It is assumed that the data for threat, vulnerability, and
consequence assessments could be leveraged or collected to fit our in vivo model in the
future. However, it was decided, for the purposes of this research, that this data could be
simulated for an in vitro test of the viability of the risk quadruplet methodology.
It seemed appropriate to simulate the data as qualitative, using the same linguistic set as
the one used for the simulated risk perception data (which would have also been the same
set used in the in vivo Inquisite survey). In IDS, a user would select a grade and a belief
degree for each attribute. The user can select more than one grade, so long as the sum of the
belief degrees is less than or equal to 1. IDS would initially value the belief degrees equally
across the selections, but the user can override these values (Figure D.5).
If we had leveraged or conducted actual threat, vulnerability, and consequence
assessments, then we would have assigned a grade and belief degree based on those

assessments to the different alternatives (CI, KR, and KA) in our IDS model. For the
simulated data, though, we opted for generating belief degrees from a uniform distribution.
For each belief degree within each attribute (threat, vulnerability, and consequence), as
well as across each of the nine alternatives (CIKRKA), we chose a random number
between 0 and 1, then constrained those values such that the sum of the belief degrees
added to 1 for each attribute. The resulting pseudo-random values were used as belief
degrees for each grade within each alternative (Table 4.4).
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